State v. Reynaldo Martinez Jr.

NUMBER 13-18-00210-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
REYNALDO MARTINEZ JR., Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By five issues, which we address as two, appellant, the State argues the trial court
erred by granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice in favor of appellee Reynaldo
Martinez, Jr. The State alleges the trial court incorrectly found a speedy trial violation.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Martinez was charged by complaint for theft of property, a class A misdemeanor,
on June 28, 2016. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(3). On January 18, 2017, the
State dismissed the complaint stating there “appeared to be a mistake of fact.” On March
8, 2017, the State refiled the complaint for theft. See id.
At a pre-trial hearing on March 20, 2018, both sides announced ready for trial. On
March 26, 2018, the day the trial was set to commence, the State announced not ready
for trial and indicated it would be dismissing the complaint due to a defect in the charging
language. The State notified the trial court that it would re-file charges against Martinez
for theft. See id. Following the State’s announcement, Martinez made an oral objection
and asked that the dismissal be with prejudice. Martinez alleged that the State had failed
to turn over exculpatory evidence1 and had violated his right to a speedy trial. The trial
court heard arguments from both Martinez and the State, asked for supplemental briefing,
and took the case under advisement. On April 11, 2018, the trial court sustained
Martinez’s objection and dismissed the case with prejudice. The order of dismissal
included the following findings:
That the Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, the delay before the
setting of another trial would be uncommonly long after a refiling of this
cause, the State is more to blame for the delay, and the Defendant would
suffer prejudice as the delay’s result;
That the Defendant’s Constitutional rights would be violated including, but
not limited to, his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the
1 On appeal, the State raised two issues regarding an alleged Brady violation as argued in the
trial court. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Martinez’s appellate counsel agrees in his
brief that there was no Brady violation as the case had not yet gone to trial. Therefore, we need not
address the State’s issues two, three, and four as they are not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; see
generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14.
2
Constitution of the United States, due process rights and due course of law
rights;
That the Defendant would further suffer harm as a result of multiple arrests
and further proceedings.
The State appealed.2
II. SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION
By its first and fifth issue, the State argues the trial court committed error by finding
Martinez’s right to a speedy trial had been violated and by dismissing his case with
prejudice.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a speedy trial to an accused.”
Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In “determining
whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial, a court must use a
balancing test ‘in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.’” Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). The factors to be weighed include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his speedy trial right, and the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay. Id. No single factor is necessary or sufficient to establish a violation of the right
to a speedy trial. Id. However, if the defendant can make a threshold holding that the
interval between accusation and trial is “presumptively prejudicial,” then a court must
2 The State’s right to appeal certain situations, including the dismissal of an indictment, is found
in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01.
3
consider each of the remaining Barker factors and weigh them. Balderas v. State, 517
S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
When reviewing the trial court’s application of the Barker test, we give almost total
deference to the trial court’s historical findings of fact that the record supports, and we
draw reasonable inferences from those facts necessary to support the trial court’s
findings. Id. at 767–68. Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact
determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal
question that we review de novo. Id. at 768. However, “although a reviewing court may
be required to accord great deference to the ruling of a trial court granting a mistrial, that
trial court’s ruling is not insulated from appellate review.” Pierson v. State, 426 S.W.3d
763, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If a violation of the speedy trial right is established, the
only possible remedy is dismissal of the prosecution. Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313.
B. Discussion
1. Length of the Delay
The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, is measured from the time the
defendant is arrested or formally charged. Id. The length of the delay is, to some
extent, a triggering mechanism, so that a speedy trial claim will not even be heard until
passage of a period of time that is, on its face, unreasonable in the circumstances. Id.
(citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)). “If the ‘accused makes
this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to
which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial
examination of the claim.’” Id. at 314 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652). In general,
4
courts deem a delay approaching one year to be “unreasonable enough to trigger the
Barker [i]nquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. Any speedy trial analysis depends first
upon whether the delay is more than “ordinary,”; if so, the longer the delay beyond what
is ordinary, the more prejudicial that delay is to the defendant. Zamorano v. State, 84
S.W.3d 643, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
Although the underlying offense occurred on December 12, 2015, Martinez was
arrested on that day for public intoxication, not theft of property. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 31.03, 49.02. The State’s first criminal complaint was signed on June 28, 2016,
and Martinez was arrested for theft for the first time on June 29, 2016. The date of the
State’s second motion to dismiss was March 26, 2018. A period of twenty-one months
is beyond the one-year standard that is considered “unreasonable enough to trigger the
Barker” analysis. See Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314. This factor weighs heavily in favor of
finding a violation of speedy trial. See id.
2. Reason for the Delay
When looking at the second Barker factor, the trial court must consider whether
the justification given by the State means that “different weights should be assigned to
different reasons.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; see Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314. Some
reasons are valid and “serve to justify appropriate delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. We
consider “whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e]
delay.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651). Deliberate
delay intended to “hamper the defense” weighs heavily against the State, while more
neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, weigh less heavily. Id.
5
(quoting Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009)). Delay caused by either the
defendant or his counsel weighs against the defendant. Id. “In the absence of an
assigned reason for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the
part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.” Dragoo, 96
S.W.3d at 314.
The State filed its first complaint against Martinez on June 30, 2016. There was
a pre-trial hearing in November 2016 that was cancelled because defense counsel was
unavailable. The first court hearing was on January 18, 2017, where the State filed its
first motion to dismiss. The State filed its second complaint on March 3, 2017. At a
hearing on June 10, 2017, the trial court reset the case for December 5, 2017. On
December 5, 2017, the trial court again reset Martinez’s case, at the request of his
counsel, for March 20, 2018. On March 20, 2018, both sides were present and
announced ready for trial. On March 26, 2018, the State presented the trial court with
its motion to dismiss.
Martinez’s counsel requested one continuance. The lengthy period of time
between court settings appears to be due to the trial court’s docket; therefore, we do not
presume a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid
reason for the delay. See id. However, the fact that the State filed two complaints, and
chose to dismiss both complaints and re-file another case against Martinez is relevant to
the delay analysis. The State’s first dismissal stated there was an “apparent mistake of
fact.” The second dismissal was due to the State telling Martinez’s counsel that he could
not prove the allegations. The difference between the two complaints was merely the
6
addition of the complainant’s address. The State’s dismissal and re-filing of complaints
led to the delay in this case. See State v. Lopez, 563 S.W.3d 409, 423 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d) (stating that the trial court could make reasonable inferences
when the State kept the defendant incarcerated while deciding what charge to pursue).
Therefore, we find that the State’s actions could have prejudiced the defense and did not
offer a valid reason for the delay. See id. This factor weighs heavily in favor of finding
a violation of speedy trial. See id.
3. Martinez’s Assertion of the Right
The third Barker factor—the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial—is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant has been
deprived of that right. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771. A defendant’s lack of a timely
demand for a speedy trial indicates strongly that he did not really want one and instead,
sought the benefit of a dismissal. Id. The longer the delay becomes, the more likely a
defendant who wished a speedy trial occurred would “take some action to obtain it.”
Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314. However, whether and how a defendant asserts his speedy
trial right is closely related to the other three factors because the strength of his efforts
will be shaped by them. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651.
In some cases, a defendant would request a dismissal based on a speedy trial
violation; this case is different. Here, the State requested the dismissal; Martinez only
asked that it be with prejudice. Martinez was responsible for one continuance.
Although the trial court’s docket seemed to be partially responsible for the delay between
the filing of the complaint and a trial date, the real delay between the date of Martinez’s
7
first arrest was the State filing and dismissing multiple complaints. The State indicated
in asking for the second motion to dismiss that it intended to dismiss and file a third
complaint against Martinez for the same 2015 theft allegation. Although Martinez did not
assert his right to a speedy trial before asking for a dismissal, this situation is unusual.
Martinez asked the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice, so the State
could not continue to dismiss and re-file the complaint. Therefore, this factor weighs
slightly against the finding of a violation of speedy trial. See id.
4. Prejudice to Martinez Resulting from the Delay
The fourth Barker factor focuses on prejudice to the defendant because of the
length of delay. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772. To analyze prejudice, we consider three
interests of defendants that the Speedy Trial Clause was designed to protect: (1)
preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern for
the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Id. (citing
Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 812). The last interest is the most important because the
fairness of the criminal justice system is distorted when a defendant is unable to
adequately prepare his defense. Id. A defendant has the burden to make some
showing of prejudice, but a showing of actual prejudice is not required. Id. Excessive
delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can
prove or identify. Id.
Although arrested multiple times stemming from this incident, Martinez was out on
bond as he awaited trial on both complaints. Martinez’s trial counsel was sworn in and
described how re-filing would prejudice his client. The theft arose from a party which
8
occurred in December 2015. Defendant, although out on bond, was required to report
to court every setting. Once the first complaint was dismissed, Martinez was arrested a
second time based on the second complaint and was processed by the jail. The State
notified Martinez’s counsel that it intended to do the same thing a third time. Martinez’s
counsel explained Martinez had a job that he kept having to miss to attend court settings;
each time the State dismissed and re-filed, the requirement to attend started over again.
The trial court included this scenario in its findings stating, “Defendant would further suffer
harm as a result of multiple arrests and further proceedings.” Additionally, a trial setting
in late 2018 was almost three years since the alleged theft occurred. A delay of that
magnitude could prejudice Martinez’s defense. Since the State did not challenge
Martinez’s counsel’s testimony, it can be considered “some evidence” that the Supreme
Court considers under the prejudice prong of Barker. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654.
Although there was not substantial testimony regarding this factor, there was enough
evidence to determine it weighs in favor of the speedy trial violation.
5. Balancing Test
Having addressed the four Barker factors, we must now balance them. See id. at
773. “Courts must apply the Barker balancing test with common sense and sensitivity to
ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s
actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed.” Cantu v. State, 253
S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Weighing in favor of finding a violation of
Martinez’s speedy trial are the length, reasons, and prejudice for the delay. See
Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 773. Weighing slightly against the finding of a violation of
9
speedy trial is Martinez’s request for a dismissal with prejudice. Because the State’s
negligence caused a delay of over twenty-one months with the filing, refiling, and
dismissal of multiple complaints and it did not rebut, explain, or minimize the presumption
of prejudice, Martinez is entitled to relief. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 655. Even if
Martinez’s actual prejudice was minimal, “condoning, prolonged and justifiable delays in
prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state’s fault and simply
encourage the government to gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a
low prosecutorial priority.” Id. Based on the facts of this case, we hold that the overall
weight of the four factors, balanced together, demonstrate a speedy trial violation. We
overrule the State’s first and fifth issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed the
22nd day of August, 2019.
10