Derrick Quiller v. State

Opinion issued August 12, 2010

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-09-00335-CR

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Derrick Quiller, Appellant

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 0803899

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Derrick Quiller, was charged with possessing less than one gram of crack cocaine, a group 1 controlled substance.[1]  Four prior offenses enhanced his charge.  Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, and the trial court denied this motion.  Appellant entered a plea of “no contest.”  The trial court found him guilty of the offense, then found the four enhancement paragraphs “true,” and assessed punishment at five years’ imprisonment.  In one issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him. [2] 

          We affirm.

BACKGROUND

          Around 3:30 a.m. on April 9, 2008, appellant was driving his car in Beaumont, Texas.  Officers L. Keen and D. Jackson of the Beaumont Police Department stopped the car because it did not have a functioning light illuminating its rear license plate.  Appellant, the only person in the car, pulled the car into the driveway of a home and exited the car.

Appellant did not follow instructions from the officers to return to his car, and instead locked the car’s doors with a remote control.  Officer Jackson searched appellant while Officer Keen used his flashlight to look into the car, where he saw “a clear plastic baggy [containing] white rock[-]like substances” on the car’s floorboard between the driver’s side and the passenger’s side.  Some of the rock-like substances had fallen out of the bag and onto the floorboard.  Officer Keen suspected that the white rock-like substances were crack cocaine.  Officer Jackson removed the rocks from the car and then contacted police dispatch, which informed him that appellant had warrants out for his arrest.   

          On June 19, 2008, the State obtained an indictment against appellant, charging him with possessing less than one gram of crack cocaine.  The indictment also included four enhancement paragraphs alleging four other felony offenses for possession of a controlled substance.  Appellant filed a motion to suppress the crack cocaine recovered from his car, all evidence obtained from his arrest, and any oral statement he might have made.  He argued in his motion that the evidence was seized without a warrant and therefore violated the United States and Texas Constitutions.

          On February 27, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s motion.  The State called Officer Keen, who testified that he pulled appellant’s car over because it “had defective equipment . . . , a rear license plate lamp that was inoperative.”  The State asked Officer Keen, “Did you have a video taken of [appellant’s arrest],” to which Officer Keen replied, “Yes.”  At that point, defense counsel interrupted the questioning, without objecting, to state that he had not received a copy of this tape.  Officer Keen then stated that he might not have made a tape, or that he might have attempted to make a tape but that the system malfunctioned.  The trial court recessed the hearing so that attempts could be made to determine whether a tape had been made and, if so, to locate it.

          On March 6, 2008, the trial court reconvened and continued its hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress.  Officer Keen was the first witness to testify. He again testified that he had decided to stop appellant because “[t]he rear license plate lamp was inoperable.” He then testified there was video tape of the arrest, but that the camera malfunctioned and the video tape was thus blank.  However, he testified that the crack cocaine was in plain view on the floorboard of the car and that he directed Officer Jackson to arrest appellant.  The State then called Officer Jackson.

          Officer Jackson testified that he and Officer Keen decided to stop appellant because “[t]he rear license plate lamp was out.” He then testified that the area in which they encountered appellant was a high-crime area.  He testified that he removed the crack cocaine from appellant’s car, and he identified his initials on the evidence bag that contained the crack cocaine recovered from the car.  The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.

DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

          In a single issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him because it was seized pursuant to an unreasonable, warrantless search. 

A.   Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).  We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that depend on credibility, while we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327.  In a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.  State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  “This is so because it is the trial court that observes first hand the demeanor and appearance of a witness, as opposed to an appellate court which can only read an impersonal record.”  Id.  We must sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record evidence and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case.  Id. at 855–56.

B.   Analysis

A traffic stop is a detention and, therefore, must be reasonable.  Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Magana v. State, 177 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).  The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  A car must have an operating white light that illuminates its rear license plate.  Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.322(f) (Vernon 1999) (“A taillamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and mounted to emit a white light that: (1) illuminates the rear license plate; and (2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear.”). 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540–41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, but “seizing contraband in plain view does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.”  Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541.  Under this doctrine, if the police show “(1) that law enforcement officials see an item in plain view at a vantage point where they have the right to be, and (2) it is immediately apparent that the item seized constitutes evidence—that is, there is probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity”—then they do not have to first obtain a warrant before seizing the evidence.  Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

Here, Officer Keen testified that he stopped appellant because the car appellant was driving “had defective equipment . . . a rear license plate lamp that was inoperative.”  Officer Keen had the right to stop appellant, and, after seeing a white rock-like substance in a baggie on the floorboard, he had probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.  Therefore his seizure of the crack cocaine without a warrant was legal under the “plain view doctrine.”  See Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 685. 

We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was reasonably supported by the record and correct in its application of the law.  See Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56; see also Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 685.  Therefore, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                   Evelyn V. Keyes

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Hanks, and Higley.

Do not publish.   Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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[1]               See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b) (Vernon 2010) (providing elements for offense of possession of substance listed in Penalty Group 1); see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon 2010) (listing cocaine as substance in Penalty Group 1).

[2]               The Texas Supreme Court transferred this appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas.  See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005) (authorizing transfer of cases).