in the Interest of N. H., a Child

NO. 07-04-0059-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
MARCH 23, 2004
______________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF N. H., A MINOR CHILD
________________________________
FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY;
NO. 32,008; HONORABLE PHIL N. VANDERPOOL, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ. and BOYD, S.J.1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Tammie Bennett-Hayes filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her daughter, N. H. The order was signed on October 31,
2003, and the notice of appeal was filed on February 13, 2004. We dismiss this purported
appeal for want of jurisdiction.
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John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment.
An appeal from an order terminating the parent-child relationship is accelerated and
governed by the rules for accelerated appeals in civil cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§
109.002(a) and 263.405(a) (Vernon 2002). Rule 26.1(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides that in an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within
20 days after the order is signed. Moreover, neither a motion for new trial, a request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor any other post-trial motion will extend the
deadline for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 26.1(b). See § 263.405(c); see also In re
T.W., 89 S.W.3d 641 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
After the termination order was signed on October 31, 2003, Bennett-Hayes filed
a motion for new trial. She did not, however, file her notice of appeal until February 13,
2004. Pursuant to Rule 42.3(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, by letter dated
February 26, 2004, this Court requested that Bennett-Hayes show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. No response was received.
Although the Supreme Court has directed us to construe the Rules of Appellate
Procedure reasonably and liberally so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing
requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of a rule, Verburgt v. Dorner,
959 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Tex. 1997), regarding our jurisdiction, we are prohibited from
enlarging the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case. Tex. R. App. P. 2; see generally
Denton County v. Huther, 43 S.W.3d 665 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (dismissing
an accelerated appeal for want of jurisdiction where appellants failed to file their notice of
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appeal within 20 days after the date the order was signed); see also In re D.K.P., No. 07-
03-0356-CV, 2003 WL 22175937, *1 (Tex.App.–Amarillo Sept. 17, 2003, no pet. h.)
(recognizing that applying the exceptions of Rule 26.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure to extend the time in which to file a notice of appeal would thwart the policy
underlying an accelerated appeal).
Accordingly, this purported appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Don H. Reavis
Justice
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