DocketNumber： 09-02-00025-CR
Filed Date： 2/12/2003
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/9/2015
Without a plea bargain, Joshua Wayne Reynolds pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery, which were enhanced by his prior felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Reynolds to thirty years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We will affirm.
After a series of aggravated robberies in The Woodlands area, a bank employee reported to authorities that a suspicious car and driver was in the bank's parking lot. The description of the driver and car matched the general description given after one of the robberies. Law enforcement officials arrived and detained Reynolds in the parking lot for several minutes to wait for detectives familiar with the robbery investigations. While questioning Reynolds, Detective Chris Smith noticed panty hose under Reynolds's cap. The panty hose had "face mask" holes cut in it. Reynolds refused to consent to a car search. The detectives prepared an affidavit, met with an assistant district attorney in Conroe, and then appeared before a judge to obtain a search warrant before returning to the parking lot for the search, a process taking approximately three hours and during which Reynolds was handcuffed and detained in a patrol car in the parking lot. During the search, the officers found a black handgun and arrested Reynolds for unlawfully carrying a weapon. Under questioning at the detective's office, Reynolds admitted committing the robberies.
In a sole appellate issue, Reynolds contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress. Complaining of events that occurred prior to his confession, Reynolds argues: (1) his continued detention was improper after the "Terry Stop" and his subsequent refusal of consent to search, and (2) the taint of his continued detention was not attenuated prior to his statement to officers.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). "At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the trier of fact and assesses the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. As long as they are supported by the record, we afford almost total deference to a trial court's findings of historical fact." Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)( citations omitted). The trial court's traditional role is "to resolve issues of historical fact, whether or not credibility and demeanor determinations are involved." Manzi v. State, 88 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). (1) "Furthermore, we defer to a trial court's application of law to fact rulings if they turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 627. Here, the trial court made findings of fact.
Reynolds concedes his initial detention was proper, but contends that the length of time he was detained requires suppression of the evidence recovered from his car.
The reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in terms of the totality of the circumstances and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.
Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 768 (citing Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). While the length of the detention may render a stop unreasonable, there is no "bright line" time limit. Id. at 770. The reasonableness of the detention instead depends on whether the officers "diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly." Id.
As found by the trial court and supported by the evidence, the officers initially detained Reynolds based on his similarity, and that of his car, to those involved in other robberies. While questioning him, they discovered the panty hose that could be used as a face mask. Further, Reynolds's first name indicated involvement in the robberies as Detective Smith had testified an individual named Joshua had attempted to cash money orders that had been stolen during one of the previous robberies. A bank employee, who could not remember the individual's last name, informed officials that the individual had presented a driver's license showing his first name as Joshua. These facts, taken together with rational inferences from them, could lead the officers to conclude Reynolds had been or soon would be engaged in criminal activity. Further, nothing in the record shows that the officers were not diligent in pursuing the search warrant that was necessary to either dispel or confirm their suspicions. If Reynolds were the robber, there almost certainly would be a handgun in his car. Thus, absent his consent to the search, his detention lasted no longer than was necessary to determine if he was involved in the robberies.
Having determined that Reynolds was not improperly detained, we need not consider whether the detention tainted his confession. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reynold's motions to suppress. Reynold's issue is overruled. The trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on January 30, 2003
Opinion Delivered February 12, 2003
Do not publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Burgess, and Gaultney, JJ.
1. The Manzi Court explained that its ruling in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), "did not purport to hold that historical fact issues could be reviewed de novo if credibility and demeanor considerations were absent." Manzi, 88 S.W.3d at 243.