DocketNumber： 10-00-00188-CR
Filed Date： 6/27/2001
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/10/2015
IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-00-188-CR
MELISSA KAY RESENDEZ
A/K/A MELISSA KAY DAVIS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court # 1999-619-C
DISSENTING OPINION
The United States Supreme Court has said, “Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal justice process, we have engaged in ‛unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1776, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1716, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986)). We should be engaged in the same endeavor.
The right to a trial free of racial prejudice is, in my view, a fundamental, systemic requirement of the criminal justice system. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). It is thus a category-one right under Marin, not subject to the preservation requirement of Rule 33 or a harm analysis under Rule 44. See id. at 280.
Although the record does not prove a sinister motive by the State, the fact is that the prosecutor unnecessarily asked questions that had the potential to appeal to racial prejudice. Because I view this as a violation of Resendez' fundamental right to a trial free of racial prejudice, I would reverse the judgment. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
BILL VANCE
Justice
Dissenting Opinion delivered and filed June 27, 2001
Publish
al style='text-indent:.5in'>Justice Reyna, and
Justice Davis
Motion to reconsider granted in part
Order issued and filed January 21, 2009
Do not publish