DocketNumber： 12-02-00119-CR
Filed Date： 3/26/2003
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/10/2015
ALVARO BAZAN,
APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE
Appellant Alvaro Bazan ("Appellant"), in two issues, appeals the denial of a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was stopped on Loop 224 in Nacogdoches by an officer with the Deep East Texas Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task Force. After the officer's drug dog indicated the presence of narcotics, the officer searched Appellant's pickup truck, found 113 bundles containing 329.4 pounds of cocaine, and arrested Appellant for possession of a controlled substance.
Appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of Texas for violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 (a) (1). The indictment alleged that Appellant "did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute and did distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. . . ." After a hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress, the judge granted the motion. The United States Attorney's Office unsuccessfully appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The federal case was subsequently dismissed.
Days before Appellant was to be released on the federal charges, the Assistant United States Attorney who had tried the suppression hearing contacted the Nacogdoches County District Attorney and suggested the District Attorney prosecute Appellant on state charges for possessing the cocaine which was the subject of the federal suppression hearing. Appellant was indicted by a Nacogdoches County grand jury days later.
Appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that double jeopardy and collateral estoppel prevented the State of Texas (the "State") from prosecuting him on the state charges. Appellant further contended that the telephone call by the Assistant United States Attorney to the Nacogdoches County District Attorney constituted joint action by the two offices, eliminating the State's claim of dual sovereignty. After a hearing on Appellant's motion, the trial court denied the writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant appealed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, raising two issues, which were argued together. First, Appellant argues that the Nacogdoches County District Attorney is collaterally estopped from relitigating the search and seizure of Appellant and therefore the state prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In his second issue, Appellant contends that the Nacogdoches District Attorney is collaterally estopped from relitigating the search and seizure of Appellant and therefore the state prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of Article I, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution.
Standard of Review
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is generally reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 33 S.W.3d 828, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The abuse of discretion standard means that a reviewing court will uphold a trial court's decision if that decision is within "the zone of reasonable disagreement." Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Where, as here, we have a question of law based on undisputed facts, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person "shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. Article I, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution states: "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same offense, after verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction." Tex. Const. art. I, § 14. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation by the same parties or those in privity with those parties of an issue of ultimate fact that has been determined by a valid judgment. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1193, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970).
It is well established that a person can be prosecuted by both the federal government and a state for the commission of the same act. The United States Supreme Court, in Moore v. Illinois, wrote:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other.
55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20, 14 L. Ed. 306 (1852); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131-32, 79 S. Ct. 676, 682, 3 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1959).
In Bartkus, the defendant had been acquitted of bank robbery charges in federal court, but was then indicted and tried in the state court for the same act. The Bartkus court, recognizing the long line of precedent permitting prosecution in a federal court and then a state court, wrote:
With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state and federal courts have for years refused to bar a second trial even though there had been a prior trial by another government for a similar offense, it would be disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication for the Court now to rule that due process compels such a bar. . . . It would be in derogation of our federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of prosecution of minor federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the States.
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 136-37, 79 S. Ct. at 685.
Texas courts agree. In Breedlove v. State, 470 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), three defendants were convicted in federal court of bank robbery, and then convicted of the bank robbery in state court. The Breedlove court, citing Bartkus and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945), held that
[t]he allowance of the subsequent prosecution would avoid a possible derogation of the federal system by displacing the reserved power of the states by reason of prosecution by federal authorities of what may be a minor federal offense and thus effectively deny the states the right to prosecute what could be a major violation of the state laws. The Court fully recognized the sovereignty of the states and their right to maintain peace and order within their confines.
Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882; see also Hill v. Beto, 390 F.2d 640, 641 (5th Cir. 1968).
Similarly, in Stewart v. State, 652 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet.), Stewart was acquitted in federal court of assault on a postal employee, but the Texas state court held that neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel barred state prosecution for the same act. The Stewart court, in denying a plea at bar of double jeopardy, noted that the two prosecutions were brought by two different sovereigns, the United States and the State of Texas. However, "[f]or a plea of double jeopardy to be upheld, it must be established that both tribunals before which appellant was tried derive their authority and jurisdiction from the same sovereign." Stewart, 652 S.W.2d at 502; (citing Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814, 83 S. Ct. 25, 9 L. Ed. 2d 56). In denying the bar to state prosecution under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Stewart court stated:
Application of collateral estoppel ordinarily depends upon whether some issue necessary for the prosecution's case in the second trial has necessarily been found for the defendant in the first trial; however, the prior trial in Federal court did not involve the same parties as the trial in the present cause. The parties in the Federal case were the United States and the appellant; here the parties are the State of Texas and the appellant. The prosecuting parties are distinct sovereigns, with independent jurisdictions and authority. Traditionally, collateral estoppel is applied against parties to the first adjudication only and their privies. (citation omitted). It cannot be said that the State of Texas was a privy in the Federal prosecution, since the State of Texas and the United States enforce different sets of laws.
Stewart, 652 S.W.2d at 502.
In the present case, the two sovereigns, the federal government and the State of Texas, are separate and distinct. Appellant contends that the telephone call from the Assistant United States Attorney to the Nacogdoches County District Attorney constituted joint action. Therefore, Appellant argues, the principle of dual sovereignty is inapplicable.
The petitioner in Bartkus made a similar argument contending that the subsequent state prosecution was actually a second federal prosecution because federal investigators turned over to the State of Illinois evidence they had gathered against the petitioner, some of which had been gathered after the petitioner was acquitted in federal court. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123, 79 S. Ct. at 678. Furthermore, the petitioner "suggested" that federal sentencing of the accomplices who testified against him in both trials was purposely continued by the federal court until after they testified in the state trial. Id. The Court recognized that the evidence established that the federal officials acted in cooperation with state authorities, but held that such cooperation did not justify a conclusion that the state prosecution was, in essence, a second federal prosecution. Id., 359 U.S. at 124, 79 S. Ct. at 678. Because the level of federal involvement in the case at hand is less than that described in Bartkus, we conclude that the telephone call from the Assistant United States Attorney to the Nacogdoches County District Attorney did not constitute such involvement as to either put the two sovereigns in privity or to overcome the principle of dual sovereignty. Id., 359 U.S. at 121, 79 S. Ct. at 676. Therefore, neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel bars the trial of Appellant on state charges. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the writ of habeas corpus.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Opinion delivered March 25, 2003.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C. J., and Griffith, J.
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the oral arguments, appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being inspected, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below Be In All Things Affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
Sam Griffith, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J. and Griffith, J.
TO THE 145TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, GREETINGS:
Before our Court of Appeals for the 12th Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the ___th day of March, 2003, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between
was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the oral arguments, appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being inspected, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below Be In All Things Affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
WHEREAS, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to observe the foregoing order of said Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Court of Appeals District of Texas in this behalf, and in all things have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.
WITNESS, THE HONORABLE JAMES T. WORTHEN, Chief Justice of said Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Court of Appeals District, with the Seal thereof affixed, at the City of Tyler, this the ______ day of __________________, 200_.
CATHY S. LUSK, CLERK
By:_______________________________
Deputy Clerk
Moore v. Illinois , 14 L. Ed. 306 ( 1852 )
Screws v. United States , 65 S. Ct. 1031 ( 1945 )
Breedlove v. State , 1971 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1763 ( 1971 )
Ashe v. Swenson , 90 S. Ct. 1189 ( 1970 )
Oles v. State , 1999 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 53 ( 1999 )
James W. Harlow, Charles E. Wilson and Thomas F. Addy v. ... , 301 F.2d 361 ( 1962 )
Johnny Leo Hill v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas ... , 390 F.2d 640 ( 1968 )
Stewart v. State , 1983 Tex. App. LEXIS 5024 ( 1983 )
Bartkus v. Illinois , 79 S. Ct. 676 ( 1959 )
Salazar v. State , 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 ( 2001 )