Michael Leroyce Rodgers v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 3, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-10-00211-CR

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Michael Leroyce Rodgers, Appellant

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On Appeal from the 263rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1149926

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Appellant Michael Leroyce Rodgers was convicted on one count of aggravated robbery. Punishment was assessed at eighteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The complainant, Anthony Pete, rented a two-bedroom apartment in southwest Houston, which he shared with Daphne Pete, his daughter, and appellant, her then-boyfriend. On January 13, 2008, Anthony overheard a heated argument coming from the couple’s bedroom. Anthony called the police, who responded to the disturbance but made no arrests. After the police left, Anthony advised appellant that he was no longer welcome in the apartment. He called appellant’s sister and arranged for her to remove appellant and all of his belongings the following evening.

The next day, Anthony returned home from work and found that appellant was still at his apartment. Anthony overheard a phone call between appellant and his sister in which appellant mentioned that he was plotting “some sort of revenge” against Anthony for having called the police the night before. Anthony took his cell phone into the bathroom, locked the door, and called his cousin for help.

Anthony testified that he then heard appellant exit the apartment and return with another person. Anthony stated that they started kicking and banging on the bathroom door, and when the frame eventually broke, a masked man came inside and began kicking and punching him. According to Anthony, appellant stood in the doorway, encouraging the attacker to “get that [expletive].” Anthony said that appellant also told the attacker to check for any money in his pockets. When none was found, the attacker took a knife and stabbed Anthony twice in the back, causing damage to his spleen. The men left, absconding only with Anthony’s cell phone.

The incident was overheard by Paris Tate, Anthony’s upstairs neighbor. When he heard that the beating had stopped, Paris testified that he saw appellant run outside to a waiting SUV, screaming “He doesn’t have any money.”

Later that night, Daphne received a call from appellant in which he admitted to having “one of his Blood friends to go and beat up my dad.” She testified that appellant “kept telling me he was sorry and didn’t mean for that to happen.” Daphne further claimed that appellant was in possession of her father’s cell phone in the hours after the attack.

Appellant took the stand in his own defense and denied any involvement in the offense.

In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that no physical evidence was ever collected showing that appellant participated in the offense. He also notes that nothing was stolen from the complainant’s person, because the cell phone was purportedly left in an adjacent room. In his second issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient, challenging the accuracy and credibility of the witness testimony.

During the pendency of this appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided that only one standard should be used to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case: legal sufficiency. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality opinion); id. at 926 (Cochran, J., concurring). Accordingly, we review appellant’s two issues under the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307 (1979), asking only whether the evidence against him is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pomier v. State, 326 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 433 U.S. at 319. Although we consider everything presented at trial, we do not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight afforded to their testimony, any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Our review includes both properly and improperly admitted evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We also consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id.

A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02 (West 2010). A person does not have to complete a theft to commit a robbery; rather, his conduct must only occur “in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01. To obtain a conviction for aggravated robbery, the State was required to show that appellant committed a robbery and either (1) caused serious bodily injury to another, or (2) used or exhibited a deadly weapon. Id. § 29.03.

Appellant was charged as both a principal and a party to the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party if, acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of another’s offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Because the jury could convict appellant under alternative theories, we will uphold the verdict if the evidence is sufficient under either one. Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have convicted appellant under the law of parties. The complainant testified that appellant was present at the offense, directing the assailant to attack him and check his pockets for money. A neighbor, who had come to recognize appellant as a resident in the apartment complex, saw him running away just after the offense was committed. Moreover, the complainant’s daughter testified that appellant admitted to having a friend beat up her father. She also testified that appellant was in possession of the complainant’s cell phone after the offense had been committed. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could have found every element of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. As the finder of fact, the jury was free to disbelieve appellant’s testimony that he was not involved in the offense.

We overrule appellant’s two issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        /s/        Tracy Christopher

                                                                                    Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Frost and Christopher.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).