Priscilla Sanders v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-14-00038-CR
PRISCILLA SANDERS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 242nd District Court
Swisher County, Texas
Trial Court No. B-4475-12-12, Honorable Edward Lee Self, Presiding
March 18, 2015
OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Priscilla Sanders, appeals her conviction for tampering with a
governmental record,1 with intent to defraud or harm another,2 and resulting sentence of
nine months’ incarceration in a State Jail Facility, suspended for a period of nine
months, and $500 fine. We will reverse.
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.10(a)(5) (West Supp. 2014).
2
See id. § 37.10(c)(1).
 Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant’s nephew, Billy Cruz, has a child, N.G.C., with the child’s mother, Alma
Gutierrez. In September 2012, Cruz and Gutierrez were not married and were not
cohabitating. In accordance with a 2008 order, Gutierrez was managing conservator of
N.G.C. with the exclusive right to establish the child’s residence without geographical
restriction.
In September 2012, appellant’s sister and the child’s paternal grandmother,
Christina Garza, became concerned about the manner in which Gutierrez was caring for
N.G.C. As a result of this concern, Garza contacted appellant who had, mere months
before, been elected Justice of the Peace of Swisher County, Texas. On September
24, appellant signed an incomplete Emergency Magistrate Order for Protection of
N.G.C., and gave the document to Garza. Garza evidently provided a copy of the
document to Cruz.
On September 25, Corporal George Brenes of the Amarillo Police Department
was dispatched to investigate an alleged harassment. When Brenes arrived at the
scene, he encountered Gutierrez, Cruz, and Garza. Either Cruz or Garza provided
Brenes the Emergency Magistrate Order for Protection that had been acquired from
appellant. In reliance upon this document, Brenes allowed Cruz to take custody of
N.G.C.
On September 26, Gutierrez presented a copy of the 2008 custody order to the
Tulia Police Department. On the basis of this order, N.G.C. was returned to Gutierrez.
2
After seeing this order and speaking with Gutierrez, an officer contacted the Swisher
County Attorney about the event of the preceding days.
The Swisher County Attorney contacted the Texas Rangers about the events that
had been reported to him. In the course of its investigation, Ranger Jaime Downs
contacted appellant for an interview. During this interview, appellant stated that, while
she knew what she had done was ill-advised, the order was never completed, executed,
filed, or formally issued by her office.
Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of making a governmental
record with knowledge of its falsity and with the intent to defraud or harm another. After
trial, appellant was found guilty of the indicted offense. Subsequently, appellant timely
filed a motion for new trial, which was expressly overruled. Appellant then timely filed
notice of appeal.
By her appeal, appellant presents four issues. By her first issue, appellant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s conviction of appellant for
the offense of tampering with a governmental record. By her second issue, appellant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant acted with the intent
to defraud or harm another. By her third issue, appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding evidence relevant to appellant’s state of mind when
she signed the order. By her fourth issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in
failing to conduct a Batson hearing despite appellant’s prima facie showing of a Batson
violation.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant’s first issue contends that the State’s evidence is insufficient to
establish that she committed the offense of tampering with a governmental record as
alleged in the indictment.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in
character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a
conviction.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). We remain mindful
that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no
higher standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.” Id.
When reviewing all of the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate
question is whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07
n.26 (discussing Judge Cochran’s dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d
404, 448–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single
evidentiary standard of review). “[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury’s
credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899. If a reviewing court
determines that the evidence is insufficient to establish any element of the offense, it
must reverse and render a judgment of acquittal. Dean v. State, 449 S.W.3d 267, 268
4
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, no pet.) (citing Cuddy v. State, 107 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2003, no pet.)); see Saldana v. State, 418 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2013, no pet.).
Appellant was charged with the offense of tampering with a governmental record
under Texas Penal Code section 37.10(a)(5), which provides that, “[a] person commits
an offense if he makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of its
falsity.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.10(a)(5). The indictment also alleged that appellant
committed the offense with the “intent . . . to defraud or harm another,” which statutorily
elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a state jail felony. Id. §
37.10(c)(1). Thus, in the present case, the State was required to prove that (1)
appellant, (2) made, presented, or used, (3) a governmental record, (4) with knowledge
of its falsity, and (5) with the intent to defraud or harm another. Appellant presents
challenges to the evidence to support that the challenged document was a
governmental record, she knew the document to be false, and she acted with specific
intent to defraud or harm another. We will limit our analysis to the challenge that is
dispositive of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that she made a
governmental record “with knowledge of its falsity.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
37.10(a)(5). A person “acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature
of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.” Id. § 6.03(b) (West 2011). Under
section 37.10(a)(5), the knowledge that is required is that the governmental record is
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false. Thus, to meet this element, the evidence had to establish that appellant
knowingly made a governmental record that she knew to contain false information. 3
In this case, there is no evidence that appellant signed the Magistrate’s Order of
Protection on another date than the date indicated. The only other information
contained within the document is consistent with information apparently provided by
Cruz in what appears to be an application for the order. Included within this information
is an identification that N.G.C.’s residence was in Tulia, which would bring the matter
within the jurisdiction of appellant’s court. No evidence was presented that appellant
had any knowledge of the falsity of any of this information. Finally, the order does not
identify any “defendant” who had been arrested for family violence and was appearing
before the magistrate for the first time following such an arrest. As this is the sum and
total of the information contained within the order, there is no evidence in this record
reflecting that appellant knowingly made a governmental record that she knew to
contain false information. As such, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
support appellant’s conviction. We sustain appellant’s first issue.
Conclusion
Having determined that there is no evidence to support an essential element of
appellant’s conviction for tampering with a governmental record, we reverse the trial
3
The State argued, at trial, that the challenged document was false because appellant knew that
it was not a valid order yet appellant intended it to be taken as a genuine governmental record. Such a
contention might establish a violation of section 37.10(a)(2), but it will not support a conviction under
section 37.10(a)(5). See Thompson v. State, 215 S.W.3d 557, 559 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007,
no pet.); Mendoza v. State, No. 05-05-00476-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5060, at *3 & n.1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 14, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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court’s judgment and render judgment of acquittal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(c); Dean,
449 S.W.3d at 268.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Publish.
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