Kivean Deshai Coffey v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-13-00218-CR
KIVEAN DESHAI COFFEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 276th District Court
Morris County, Texas
Trial Court No. 10,751CR
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Carter
OPINION
Kivean Deshai Coffey was found guilty by a jury of aggravated sexual assault and was
sentenced to seventy-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, 1 Coffey argues that the trial court
erred (1) in allowing the State to file a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment after voir
dire, and (2) in overruling his motion to suppress his recorded statement. We find that the
State’s notice of intent to seek enhancement was timely filed and that the error in denying
Coffey’s motion to suppress his recorded statement was harmless. Consequently, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
I. Notice of Intent to Seek Enhancement
The right to notice of the State’s intention to use prior convictions as enhancements is
rooted in due process. Villescas v. State, 189 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Thus,
prior convictions used as enhancements must be pled in some form so the defendant has an
opportunity to prepare a defense to them. Pelache v. State, 324 S.W.3d 568, 577 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010); Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The State filed notice of its intent to seek an enhancement of Coffey’s range of
punishment based on an April 14, 2008, juvenile conviction for burglary of a habitation. 2 The
notice was filed after the jury had been selected, but prior to Coffey pleading to the indictment.
1
In our case number 06-13-00219-CR, Coffey also appeals another conviction of aggravated sexual assault on the
same grounds.
2
The notice of enhancement incorporated the judgment from Coffey’s 2008 conviction, which was rendered by the
76th Judicial District Court of Morris County, Texas.
2
Coffey argued that the State’s notice of intent to seek enhancement was untimely and constituted
a violation of his due process rights. 3
Coffey claimed neither that he was surprised by the enhancement allegations, nor that he
required a continuance to better prepare his defense. 4 Coffey’s counsel stated,
I did know about the prior juvenile [offense], of course, because I represented
[Coffey during these proceedings]. And [the State] did give me notice that they
may use it at the trial, but they’ve never given me any notice that they were going
to try to enhance punishment until this morning when they handed me the motion.
The State responded that Coffey could not claim to be surprised by the notice because the State
produced a witness list containing the name of his juvenile community supervision officer. The
trial court overruled Coffey’s objection, specifically relying on the fact that Coffey’s trial
counsel had also represented Coffey in the 2008 prosecution.
“[T]he determination of whether proper notice of enhancements was given does not
require that notice be given within a particular period of time before trial or before the guilt
phase is completed.” Pelache, 324 S.W.3d at 577. “[W]hen a defendant has no defense to the
enhancement allegation and has not suggested the need for a continuance in order to prepare one,
[even] notice given at the beginning of the punishment phase satisfies” due process requirements.
Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 294–95; Pelache, 324 S.W.3d at 576–77 (finding post-guilt, pre-
3
Coffey argues that he had the right to be advised that a greater penalty was available for the charged offense.
Aggravated sexual assault is a first degree offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(e) (West Supp. 2013). The
2008 juvenile conviction increased the minimum confinement period from five to fifteen years. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.42(c)(1) (West Supp. 2013). However, the trial court’s punishment charge informed the jury that the
minimum period of confinement was five—not fifteen—years and also allowed the jury to assess a term of
community supervision if it found that Coffey was not previously convicted of a felony offense. The State appears
to suggest that it withdrew its notice of enhancement because it failed to object to the jury charge. There is no
express withdrawal of the notice of enhancement in the record, and we will not imply a withdrawal in light of the
trial court’s written findings on this matter. The State’s arguments are better suited for a harm analysis.
4
Coffee also argues that the right to enhance his punishment was waived.
3
punishment-phase notice of State’s intent to enhance punishment satisfied due process
requirements).
In this case, Coffey presented no defense to the enhancement allegation and did not seek
a continuance to prepare a defense. Therefore, due process was satisfied when the State
provided notice of intent to enhance Coffey’s punishment prior to his arraignment. Accordingly,
we overrule Coffey’s first point of error.
II. Admission of Coffey’s Recorded Statement Was Harmless Error
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Coffey’s second point of error stems from the trial court’s mid-trial ruling on his motion
to suppress his recorded statement. Prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress, the victim had
already testified, describing her violent rape and positively identifying Coffey as the perpetrator
of the sexual assault. The victim met Coffey during a gathering at the home of her friends, Josh
and Adrianna White. The victim and Coffey were both invited to spend the night at the Whites’
home. The victim testified,
[T]hat night after I went to sleep, [Coffey] came in the room, and I woke up, and
he was looking out the window. And I told him to leave, and that happened
another time. And then the third time when he came in, I was asleep, and I heard
him come in. And he jumped on top of me and started hitting me in the face
repeatedly. And then he kind of threw me onto the floor, and I tried to call for
help. And he came from behind me and choked me. And then he finally told me
he’d let me go if I wouldn’t scream. And if I did, he would kill me. And then I
stood up, and he told me to turn the lamp on that was beside the bed. And then he
told me to take my clothes off. And then he made me lay [sic] down on the bed,
and that’s when he raped me. And then he made me perform oral sex on him.
And then after he was done with all that, he left the room. . . . And then
periodically he would come back into the bedroom. . . . And at one point he found
a pair of scissors and a knife and handed it to me and basically said that if I
thought I could do anything to him, to go ahead and do it, but it wouldn’t be
4
worth it because he had a gun. And he was wearing -- at that time when he came
in, he was wearing a tank top and sweats. And at that time I could see the outline
of what looked to me like a handgun in his waistband of his pants. And at a
different time he came in the room and told me that he was in a gang, and if
anybody -- if I told anybody, that they would all kill me. And that proceeded to
go on until about 9:00 o’clock in the morning when he finally left.
Although Josh and Adrianna were asleep in the same house, they did not hear any commotion
and were unable to come to their friend’s aid.
In fact, when Josh found Coffey asleep on the living room couch, he offered to drive him
to the Relax Inn, a motel in Daingerfield. As soon as Josh returned from dropping Coffey off at
the motel, Adriana reported the victim’s rape to him. Josh described the victim’s gut-wrenching
state and the scene in his guest bedroom. He testified, “Her eye was swollen shut, her lip was
caught in her braces . . . . Her hair was stuck to her ear, glued by the blood. There was . . .
[b]lood all over the sheets, all over the pillows,” and she had bruises on her neck indicating that
she had been choked. Josh immediately called 9-1-1.
Robbie Gray, a Sergeant with the Morris County Sheriff’s Department, testified that the
victim suffered extensive physical injury during the assault; she required immediate medical
care, including facial reconstructive surgery. The victim told the police that Coffey’s DNA
would be found on a black shirt that he left in her room and that Coffey stole her Samsung
Galaxy tablet and its charger after the sexual assault. Officer Stephen Blythe with the Lone Star
Police Department in Morris County, Texas, testified that police soon located Coffey at the
Relax Inn, found the victim’s tablet in Coffey’s motel room, and brought Coffey in for
questioning. Blythe took Coffey’s recorded statement at the Lone Star Police Department.
Blythe testified that he submitted a black shirt found at the crime scene and a buccal swab
5
obtained from Coffey during the recorded interview for DNA analysis. Coffey stipulated to the
chain of custody of the DNA samples. During the interview, Blythe also took photographs of
Coffey’s hands and the scratches on his forehead, which were admitted into evidence at trial
without objection.
After the testimony and physical evidence referenced above was introduced, Coffey filed
a motion to suppress both the recorded statement and the buccal swabs that were taken during the
interview, claiming that the statement was involuntary because he never received proper
Miranda 5 warnings. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Blythe testified that he orally read
a piece of paper containing Miranda warnings to Coffey prior to conducting his interrogation.
However, Blythe admitted that he did not read the warnings word-for-word and did not ask
Coffey specifically whether he wished to waive his rights. Blythe believed that Coffey affirmed
his understanding of Blythe’s oral admonishments by nodding his head up and down.
In response to Blythe’s initial questioning, Coffey denied engaging in sexual conduct
with anyone on the morning of the victim’s rape and explained that he had simply found the
victim’s tablet on the ground. Blythe received no information of consequence until he stated
(1) that Coffey was being charged with aggravated sexual assault, (2) that Blythe was going to
conduct a buccal swab, (3) that Coffey’s DNA was going to be compared to a shirt found at the
scene of the rape, and (4) that Coffey needed to be honest. Thereafter, Coffey admitted that he
was at the Whites’ home with several other acquaintances and claimed that his acquaintances
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6
were having consensual sex with two women. Coffey told Blythe that he had consensual oral
sex with one of the women “[f]or like two seconds,” and denied that he hit either woman.
During the interview, Coffey stated that he would not mind giving his DNA, provided
that Blythe also obtained DNA samples from the other people at the gathering. Prior to
obtaining the buccal swab, Blythe gave Coffey a written copy of his Miranda rights and obtained
Coffey’s signature that the rights were read to him and that he understood them. 6 Blythe also
informed Coffey that his entire interview was being recorded. He then passed Coffey a buccaal
swab and had Coffey collect a sample of his DNA from his cheek. Blythe testified that Coffey
never protested or interfered with his questioning. 7
6
Miranda “indisputably requires a law enforcement agent to give the appropriate legal warnings before any
questioning or ‘discussion interview,’ not merely prior to signing a written statement after all the custodial
interrogation is complete.” Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 774 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Miranda, 384
U.S. at 445, 457, 465, 468, 474, 478).
7
No search warrant was obtained prior to conducting the buccal swab. The trial court stated,
I find and it was stipulated that there was a warrantless search conducted in order to get the DNA
sample, the buccal swab, from Mr. Coffey. I do find that Mr. Coffey did not voluntarily consent
to the taking of the buccal swab, the DNA sample. Because he didn’t voluntarily consent to it, a
search warrant was required and it wasn’t given, and therefore the Court is going to exclude the
DNA sample and evidence related to and which would be derived from the buccal swab.
However, shortly after receiving this favorable ruling, Coffey’s counsel informed the trial court that Coffey wanted
to “withdraw his objections to the DNA swabs not being voluntary or consensually taken from Officer Blythe during
the time the video was taken” and that Coffey did not plan “to object to the DNA experts testifying . . . in regard to
the DNA results of the buccal swabs taken . . . by Officer Blythe.” After admonishing Coffey about the matter, the
trial court accepted Coffey’s waiver of any objection to the DNA testimony. However, Coffey still objected to the
recorded statement being played for the jury on the ground that the statement was not voluntarily given.
7
After hearing Blythe’s testimony and watching the recorded statement, the trial court
denied Coffey’s motion to suppress, ruling that “[t]he warnings were substantially correct and
the effective equivalent of the statutory warnings for video statements.” 8
B. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion
and will not disturb that ruling so long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43,
48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2014, no pet.). In reviewing such a ruling, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Wilson v.
State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 457–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323,
327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “We approach our review with two standards, ‘giving almost total
deference to a trial court’s determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact
that rely on the credibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of review to pure
questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.”’
Hutchinson, 424 S.W.3d at 175 (quoting Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 922–23); see State v. Johnston,
336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458; Carmouche, 10
S.W.3d at 327; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and exclusive judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. St. George v. State, 237
8
After finding that an accused was properly admonished of his Miranda and statutory rights, the trial court must also
find that the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights prior to the admission of
statements made during a custodial interrogation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(b) (West Supp.
2013). Here, the trial court found that Coffey’s statement was voluntarily given, but also submitted the issue of
voluntariness to the jury. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 7 (West Supp. 2013).
8
S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. A trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress will be affirmed if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct
under any theory of law applicable to the case. Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 873 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (per curiam).
C. Required Warnings and Waiver of Rights
“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute,
evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves
the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”
Hutchinson, 424 S.W.3d at 175 (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.22 (West Supp. 2013); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008)). 9 “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney . . . .” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure precludes the use of oral
statements that result from custodial interrogation absent compliance with additional procedural
safeguards. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a). Specifically, the interrogator
must inform the accused that:
9
The prosecution may not use statements stemming from the custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444; Alvarado v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In order for the Miranda safeguards
to apply, there must be two showings: (1) the suspect must have been “in custody,” and (2) the police must have
“interrogated” the suspect either by express questioning or its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300–02 (1980); Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Here, the State concedes
that the statements were made as the result of custodial interrogation.
9
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all
and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in
court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and
during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a
lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time . . . .
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3.
Unless the accused is given these admonishments or their “fully effective equivalent,” an
oral statement resulting from custodial interrogation is inadmissible. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(e)(2). “As long as the substance of the warnings are adequately
communicated, the failure to give the warnings precisely as set forth in Miranda does not
invalidate a subsequent confession.” Hutchinson, 424 S.W.3d at 175 n.7 (citing California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360–62 (1981); Clark v. State, 627 S.W.2d 693, 704 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982) (op. on reh’g)).
The State first argues that Blythe substantially complied with the requirements in Article
38.22. The transcript of the recorded statement included the following pre-interrogation
warnings given by Blythe: “You have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will
be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you can’t afford one,
one will be represented [sic] for you. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not
answer any of my questions.” These warnings substantially complied with all but the third
10
essential requirement enumerated in Article 38.22, Section 2(a). While Blythe informed Coffey
that he had the right to an attorney and that one would be “represented” to him, Blythe failed to
inform Coffey that he had the “right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during
any questioning.” 10 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a)(3) (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court wrote in Miranda,
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly
to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is
indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the
system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to
choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process. . . . [T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment
privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to
questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the
defendant so desires.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470–71. Blythe failed to inform Coffey of a right the United States
Supreme Court has characterized as “an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.” Id. at 471. We
find that Blythe failed to substantially comply with Miranda and the requirements of Article
38.22. See Prysock, 453 U.S. 356–60.
Coffey also argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
Miranda and statutory rights. Both Miranda and Article 38.22 require the State to prove two
distinct elements—that the prescribed warnings were given to the suspect and that the suspect
waived those rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Blythe was asked to confirm that, after giving Coffey the Miranda warnings,
10
“[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a
warning being given.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
11
Q. he voluntarily assented by shaking his head affirmatively, yes –
A. Yes.
Q. -- that he understood and waived those rights?
A. Yes, sir.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has acknowledged that a defendant is not required
to “explicitly” waive the Miranda rights, but must do so knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To make such a
determination we must review whether such relinquishment was the product of a free and
deliberate choice, with full awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may
a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Id. We have determined
that the warnings did not adequately advise Coffey of his right to counsel prior to and during
interrogation; therefore, he could not have intentionally waived that right. 11
Yet, the State argues that Blythe was not required to give the Miranda and statutory
warnings, relying on an exception in Article 38.22, which provides that the proscribed warnings
“shall not apply to any statement which contains assertions of facts or circumstances that are
found to be true and which conduce to establish the guilt of the accused, such as the finding of
11
In a concurring opinion in Joseph, Judge Cochran noted a “rising trend in which Texas law-enforcement officers
fail to explicitly ask a suspect if he is willing to give up his Miranda rights and speak to them.” Joseph, 309 S.W.3d
at 28–29 (Cochran, J., concurring). Judge Cochran explains that the prosecution’s burden is great when the waiver
is not express. “Thus, law-enforcement officers are well advised to expressly ask a suspect to waive his Miranda
rights so as to avoid later, protracted litigation and the very real possibility that a suspect’s statement must be
excluded because the totality of the circumstances are insufficient to meet the State’s ‘heavy burden’ to show an
implied waiver.” Id. at 30 (Cochran, J., concurring).
12
secreted or stolen property . . . .” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(c). The State
argues that this exception should apply because Coffey’s statements obtained during the
interview led them to the victim’s stolen tablet computer charger.
First, because Section 3(c) only applies to the statutory warnings of Article 38.22,
Miranda warnings were still required even if Section 3(c) were invoked by the facts of this case.
Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see Perillo v. State, 758
S.W.2d 567, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Second, the State’s argument that Section 3(c) applies
is simply unsupported by the record.
In an attempt to demonstrate Section 3(c)’s applicability, the State claims, “[Coffey]
informed the police during his interview that the charger to the stolen tablet was still in
Daingerfield at the motel.” The State continues, “The presence of whereabouts of the charger
was unknown until defendant revealed during his video statement that the charger was still at the
Daingerfield motel.” Contrary to the State’s assertions, Coffey claimed that the charger that was
in his motel room was his charger, not the charger for the tablet computer that he allegedly found
on the ground. Further, another officer plainly told Blythe during the interview, “[T]here’s a
charger for [the tablet] in his room.” Coffey’s statements did not assert facts that were later
found to be true and did not lead officers to the allegedly secreted or stolen property; the charger
had already been found. Therefore, the Section 3(c) exemption does not apply.
Because Coffey was not provided with the required Miranda and statutory warning that
he had the right to have an attorney present during questioning and could not have waived that
13
right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the recorded statement was inadmissible. We
now address whether the error in admitting the statement was harmful.
D. Harm
In a criminal case, the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress a statement taken in
violation of Miranda is constitutional error subject to review under the standard set forth in Rule
42.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Jones v. State,
119 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Reversal is required unless we can determine,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the failure to suppress Coffey’s statement did not contribute to
the jury’s verdict. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011); Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777.
The emphasis of a harm analysis pursuant to Rule 44.2(a) should not be on the propriety
of the outcome of the trial. Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[T]he
question for the reviewing court is not whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence.
Instead, the question is the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a contributing
factor in the jury’s deliberations in arriving at that verdict.” Id. In reaching that decision, we
may consider (1) whether the recorded statement was cumulative of other evidence, (2) the
importance of the recorded statement to the State’s case, (3) the probable weight a juror would
place upon the recorded statement, (4) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the recorded statement on material points, and (5) the overall strength of the
prosecution’s case. See id.; Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 778.
14
“In situations where a recording is improperly admitted, yet the recording is cumulative
of . . . properly admitted live testimony on the same issue, courts often disregard the error . . . .”
Land v. State, 291 S.W.3d 23, 29 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d). “Redundancy from
properly admitted or nonchallenged evidence does not cure or moot the original error. It is,
however, a consideration in our harm analysis.” Id. (citing Matz v. State, 14 S.W.3d 746, 747
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
Here, the State continued Blythe’s direct examination after it played the recorded
statement. During the examination, Blythe testified that Coffey (1) initially denied knowing the
victim, (2) initially denied having sexual relations with anyone during the morning of the
victim’s attack, (3) later admitted that his acquaintances were involved, (4) admitted that he had
consensual oral sex with the victim, (5) denied beating the victim, (6) admitted that he had
injuries to his hands, arms, elbow, and scratches on his forehead, and (7) claimed that the injuries
on his body were caused by a fall he sustained after getting drunk and losing his balance.
Coffey complained of the admission of the substantive statements he made during the
interview. Blythe’s testimony, admitted without objection, highlighted the important substantive
statements made by Coffey during his interview and, thus, was cumulative of the recorded
statement. Moreover, (1) the recorded statement was not essential to the State’s case because it
did not contain a confession of the alleged crime, (2) because the statement contained no
confession, the probable weight a juror would have placed it would have been slight, (3) the jury
had already heard the testimony of the victim and Josh White identifying Coffey as the
perpetrator, (4) photographs suggesting that Coffey had been involved in a recent struggle were
15
also admitted without objection, (5) the jury later learned that the DNA analysis of samples
collected from the black shirt and from underneath the victim’s fingernails failed to exclude
Coffey as a contributor of the DNA, and (6) overall, the State’s case against Coffey was strong.
Here, we are confident, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of Coffey’s
recorded statement did not contribute to the conviction. Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690. Therefore, we
find that the error in admitting Coffey’s recorded statement was harmless and overrule Coffey’s
last point of error.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: May 8, 2014
Date Decided: June 13, 2014
Publish
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