Renauldo Smith v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
_________________________
No. 06-11-00267-CR
______________________________
RENAULDO SMITH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 188th Judicial District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 40304-A
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to an open plea of guilty, Renauldo Smith was convicted of aggravated robbery
and was sentenced to twelve years‘ imprisonment. Smith‘s point of error on appeal complains
that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered because the judge stated he would
consider ―probation‖1 as a sentencing option for this offense, even though deferred adjudication
community supervision was the only probation option available for consideration by the trial
judge.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court because we find that Smith‘s plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered.
I. Background
Smith was charged with one count of aggravated robbery and another count of robbery.
He sought a jury trial and filed an ―application for probation‖ in order to allow the jury to
consider probation as a sentencing option. However, on the day of jury selection, the parties
―reached a plea agreement that the State would drop the robbery charge . . . , leaving only the
aggravated-robbery-with-a-deadly-weapon charge . . . , and Smith would drop his jury demand
and enter an ‗open‘ plea of guilty before the court.‖ An agreement regarding punishment was
not reached. Smith requested probation on the plea agreement form.
The trial judge began the plea proceedings by stating, ―[b]efore I can receive your guilty
plea, I need to ask you a series of questions.‖ The trial judge informed Smith that there was a
1
The Legislature has used ―community supervision‖ since 1993, but the parties and the trial court in this matter have
used ―probation.‖ For consistency, ―probation‖ will be used in this opinion. ‗―Probation‘ and ‗community
supervision‘ are interchangeable terms.‖ Garrett v. State, __ S.W.3d __, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 820 (Tex.
Crim. App. June 20, 2012); Ivey v. State, 277 S.W.3d 43, 51 n.48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
2
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g (West Supp. 2012).
2
―jury panel out in the hall,‖ and affirmed Smith‘s desire to waive his right to trial by jury. In the
following portion of the transcript, the judge inquired into the knowing and voluntary nature of
the plea:
THE COURT: Now, I have before me several papers you have signed; is that
correct?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: These papers are very important. They tell me that you wish to
plead guilty to aggravated robbery. They also tell me that you understand by pleading guilty that
you‘re giving up very—many important rights that you have in this case. Did you understand
that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And before you signed these papers did you sit down with your
lawyer, Mr. Gerald Smith, and did he go over all these papers with you?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did he explain them to you?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And did you understand everything you signed?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir . . . .
THE COURT: Is anybody making you plead guilty to aggravated robbery?
[Defendant]: I made the decision.
THE COURT: Are you guilty of aggravated robbery under Paragraph A?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Do you understand what you‘re doing in court here today?
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[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Just use your own words and tell me what you‘re doing in court
here today.
[Defendant]: I‘m actually trying to get probation on—
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, what are you charged with?
[Defendant]: Aggravated robbery.
THE COURT: How are you pleading to that charge?
[Defendant]: Guilty.
....
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Renauldo Smith, this case comes to me under what
we call an open plea. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That means there‘s no plea bargain; there‘s no plea agreement.
Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: By agreement of the parties, after we take the guilty plea today,
we‘re going to recess at a later date for final sentencing. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And at the final sentencing I will hear evidence, and I will make
the decision what your punishment is going to be. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
....
4
THE COURT: So as the Judge I will make the decision. The range of
punishment for aggravated robbery, it is a first degree felony. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: On the low end of the punishment spectrum is 5 years in prison.
Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And on the high end of the punishment spectrum is 99 years or
life in prison. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Of course, 5 years on the low end and anywhere in between 5
years and 99 years or life is the range of punishment. Did you understand?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
....
THE COURT: You have made a request for probation; is that correct?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I certainly would consider your request for probation, but I
don‘t have to grant you probation. Do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I would listen to all the evidence. We‘re going to have a pre-
sentence done; I would read that. I would listen to any witnesses you brought. You could
testify, you wouldn‘t have to, but if you wish to I would certainly listen to what you had to say.
I would listen to what the State‘s evidence was. And at the end of the sentencing phase
of the trial I would make the decision and set your punishment within the range of punishment
provided by law. Did you understand?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: Now, I don‘t know what I‘m going to do, but in the event you
receive a prison sentence you do understand that there are implications because of this offense as
to how much time you would spend in prison. Did you understand?
[Defendant]: Can you explain that?
THE COURT: All right. This is aggravated robbery. It‘s what we call a 3g
offense. There is an allegation that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited. Did you understand
that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I don‘t know what I would do, but if I impose a prison sentence,
just by example a 10-year prison sentence, just as an example, then under our law you would
have to serve half that time before you‘re eligible for parole. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That‘s the significance of this kind of offense if you were to
receive prison time. Did you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
Following the exchange, the judge received the guilty plea, finding that it was ―freely and
voluntarily‖ made. In his address dismissing the jury, the trial judge stated,
This is a first degree felony. On the low end it can be 5 years in prison; on the
high end it could be up to life in prison. The defendant had also requested
probation. He is eligible for probation, doesn‘t mean that he‘ll get it, but he‘s
making that request. And at the final sentencing the parties have agreed that I
will make that decision.
Although he received Smith‘s plea, the trial judge did not make a finding of guilt.
On the day of the sentencing hearing, Smith signed a written plea admonishment, further
explaining the range of punishment and the availability only of ―deferred adjudication.‖ At the
sentencing hearing, defense counsel repeatedly requested probation. Smith, his mother, and his
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wife testified and asked the judge to sentence Smith to probation. At the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing, the trial court found Smith guilty of aggravated robbery ―[b]ased upon your
plea and based upon the evidence,‖ and sentenced Smith to twelve years‘ imprisonment.
On appeal, Smith argues that the trial judge did not properly admonish him regarding the
range of punishment for the offense of aggravated robbery because the judge voluntarily
indicated he would consider probation, whereas Section 3g of Article 42.12 specifically prohibits
a judge from giving probation to someone convicted of aggravated robbery. Smith further
argues that since he was misled to believe that probation was a possibility, his guilty plea was
involuntarily induced.3
The State contends that the trial judge substantially complied with the provisions of
Article 26.13 because deferred adjudication probation was available to Smith. Further, the State
asserts that Smith failed to affirmatively show that he was not aware of the consequences of his
plea or that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment.
II. Rules for Review of Smith’s Plea
In determining the voluntariness of a plea, we consider the totality of the circumstances,
viewed in light of the entire record. Griffin v. State, 703 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986); Ybarra v. State, 93 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Lopez v.
State, 25 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); see Martinez v. State,
981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). ―Before accepting a plea of guilty . . . , the trial
court shall admonish the defendant of: (1) the range of punishment attached to the offense.‖
3
Smith does not argue that he would have pleaded ―not guilty‖ if he had known probation was a possibility only
under the deferred adjudication statute.
7
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012). ―In admonishing the defendant
. . . , substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows
that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the
admonishment of the court.‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(c) (West Supp. 2012); see
VanNortrick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Seagraves v. State, 342
S.W.3d 176, 183 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.). The court may make the admonitions
either orally or in writing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(d) (West Supp. 2012). If
the court gives the written admonitions, the court ―must receive a statement signed by the
defendant and the defendant‘s attorney that he understands the admonitions and is aware of the
consequences of his plea.‖ Id.
There is a presumption of regularity of the judgment and the proceedings. Lopez, 25
S.W.3d at 928. Thus, if the record reflects that Smith was properly admonished, it presents a
prima facie showing that the guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez, 981
S.W.2d at 197. Faced with this prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant. Id.
―Once a defendant has pled guilty and attested to the voluntary nature of his plea, he bears a
heavy burden at a subsequent hearing to demonstrate a lack of voluntariness.‖ Ybarra, 93
S.W.3d at 925.
Before accepting a plea of guilty, a trial court has an affirmative duty to admonish a
defendant on the ―range of punishment attached to the offense.‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 26.13(a)(1); see Pena v. State, 132 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no
pet.); Tabora v. State, 14 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
8
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ―has ‗long held‘ that the ‗range of punishment‘
that must be included in an admonishment under Article 26.13(a)(1) . . . does not include‖
probation. Ex parte Williams, 704 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see Pena, 132
S.W.3d at 665; Tabora, 14 S.W.3d at 334. Thus, the general rule is that there is no mandatory
duty for the trial court to admonish a defendant as to his or her eligibility for probation.
Williams, 704 S.W.2d at 775; see Harrison v. State, 688 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985); Pena, 132 S.W.3d at 665.
However, if a court provides information about probation by its own volition, the
information provided must be accurate. Williams, 704 S.W.2d at 776; Richard v. State, 788
S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.). This is because a guilty plea is
involuntarily induced if it is shown that: (1) the trial court volunteered an admonishment that
included information on the availability of probation, thereby creating an affirmative duty to
provide accurate information on the availability of probation; (2) the trial court provided
inaccurate information on the availability of probation, thereby leaving the defendant unaware of
the consequences of the guilty plea; and (3) the defendant made an objective showing of being
misled or harmed by the inaccurate admonishment. Williams, 704 S.W.2d at 776–77; Tabora, 14
S.W.3d at 334.
III. Smith Cannot Demonstrate that His Plea Was Involuntary
Here, the trial court properly admonished Smith with respect to the range of punishment
under Article 26.13 by reminding Smith that the ―low end‖ of the punishment was five years‘
incarceration and the ―high end‖ was ―99 years or life in prison.‖ Written admonishments
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further describing the range of punishment were signed by Smith. We find this sufficient to
present a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily in
accordance with Article 26.13. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.
Smith now bears the burden of lack of voluntariness. He seeks to fulfill his burden by
complaining that he relied on probation being an available remedy in advancing his plea. He
points to the testimony presented during the sentencing hearing related to probation, as evidence
of his reliance.
First, Smith must show that the trial court ―volunteered an admonishment that included
information on the availability of‖ probation. Williams, 704 S.W.2d at 776. The trial judge told
Smith that he would consider probation as a possible range of punishment. The initial Williams
requirement was met.
Next, Smith must show that ―the trial court provided him with inaccurate information on
the availability of‖ probation, ―thereby leaving [him] unaware of the consequences of his plea.‖
Id. at 776–77. Smith was only eligible for deferred adjudication probation. The record
establishes that the judge deferred a determination of guilt until after hearing the punishment
evidence and receiving the presentence investigation report. Smith was specifically admonished
in writing as to the availability of deferred adjudication probation. After the trial judge received
the plea of guilty, it had the authority to defer adjudication of guilt and place Smith on probation.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (West Supp. 2012). This is a method for obtaining
what is generally known as one form of probation. The judge may impose all conditions that are
imposed on those on ―regular‖ probation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11(a)
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(West Supp. 2012). Sometime after the guilty plea, the trial court heard evidence with respect to
the possibility of deferred adjudication probation, but it was denied after the court found Smith‘s
testimony incredible.4 The trial court did not adjudicate Smith as ―guilty‖ until he had heard all
of the evidence at the punishment hearing and the final arguments of counsel. Given these facts,
the court‘s admonishment that it would consider probation cannot be said to be inaccurate or
such that Smith was unaware of the consequences of his plea, since the court did, as promised,
consider the imposition of probation. See Williams, 704 S.W.2d at 776–77. While we stress the
importance of proper labeling of the different forms of probation, we find no error in this case.
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that Smith has
failed to show that his plea was involuntary or unknowing.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: August 13, 2012
Date Decided: August 14, 2012
Do Not Publish
4
At the sentencing hearing, Smith and several witnesses on his behalf testified that he would abide by any term of
probation imposed, obtain employment, and act as a law-abiding citizen. Counsel for Smith vigorously implored the
trial court to impose probation. The State opposed probation.
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