Patrick Crawford v. CitiMortgage Inc.

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed February 20, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01473-CV
PATRICK FAYE CRAWFORD, Appellant
V.
CITIMORTGAGE INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-02213
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Appellant Patrick Faye Crawford appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment
rendered in favor of appellee CitiMortgage, Inc. Crawford argues that the trial court erred when
it denied her motion to continue the summary judgment hearing and when it granted summary
judgment in favor of CitiMortgage. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
After a non-judicial foreclosure sale of property located in Lancaster, Texas, Crawford
filed a pro se “Petition for a Verification of Debt” against CitiMortgage in which she requested
that CitiMortgage produce the original copy of her promissory note in order to prove that it “is in
fact the Note Holder in Due Course.” After obtaining counsel, Crawford filed an amended
petition alleging that the promissory note and deed of trust Crawford signed “were not lawfully
and timely indorsed, transferred, and assigned” to CitiMortgage and seeking a declaratory
judgment that the non-judicial foreclosure sale was invalid. CitiMortgage counterclaimed
seeking a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale was valid. CitiMortgage filed a motion
for summary judgment supported by a business records affidavit, which included among its
exhibits “[a] true and correct copy of the Note.” At the hearing on its motion CitiMortgage
produced to the trial court the original copy of Crawford’s promissory note. The note includes
an endorsement on the back of the signature page stating, “PAY TO THE ORDER OF
CitiMortgage, Inc.” After reviewing the original promissory note the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of CitiMortgage.
ANALYSIS
After Crawford filed a pro se appellant’s brief, this Court notified her by letter that her
brief was deficient in several respects, most notably because it did not contain citations to the
record. Crawford was given time to cure the deficiencies.
Crawford filed an amended brief and reply brief. But those briefs do not contain any
citation to the record as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(d), (g), and (i).
Instead, Crawford cites to various documents appended to her amended brief. Citations to an
appendix, however, are not substitutes for citations to the record. Jackson v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., 345 S.W.3d 214, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). Moreover, with respect
to her complaint about the trial court’s summary judgment, Crawford cites generally to some
legal authority concerning the standards for summary judgment, but she does not apply that
authority to the facts of the case. Instead, her entire argument is limited to the following three
sentences:
There was a genuine issue of material fact raised in County Court on April 21,
2011. Same issue was raised again in the Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition
(Appendix H). This issue of material fact [was] raised again in Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Appendix G).
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Crawford has not provided this Court with proper briefing. And without proper briefing
an appellate court cannot discharge its responsibility to review and dispose of an appeal. See id.
(“Because appellant has not provided any citations to the record, despite notice from this Court
and an opportunity to correct this deficiency, nothing is preserved for review.”); Bolling v.
Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)
(“Only when we are provided with proper briefing may we discharge our responsibility to review
the appeal and make a decision that disposes of the appeal one way or another.”).
Based on our review of the reporter’s record, we also note that Crawford’s complaint
about the denial of her motion for continuance is without merit. Crawford moved to continue the
summary judgment for essentially two reasons: (1) she was forced to hire new counsel on short
notice after her prior counsel resigned from the practice of law, and (2) CitiMortgage had not
produced Crawford’s original promissory note. At the summary judgment hearing, however,
CitiMortgage produced the original promissory note, which established as a matter of law that
CitiMortgage was entitled to foreclose on the property. As a result, the trial court explained that
it would not have benefitted Crawford to continue the summary judgment hearing. In response,
Crawford’s counsel acknowledged that the arguments raised in connection with her motion for
continuance were “irrelevant at this point.”
We resolve Crawford’s issues against her and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE
121473F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
PATRICK FAYE CRAWFORD, Appellant On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-12-01473-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-02213.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers.
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Appellee Justices Francis and Lewis participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee CitiMortgage, Inc. recover its costs of this appeal from
appellant Patrick Faye Crawford.
Judgment entered this 20th day of February, 2014.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE
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