John Allen Queen v. State

NUMBER 13-12-00300-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JOHN ALLEN QUEEN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 411th District Court
of Polk County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
By one issue, appellant, John Allen Queen, challenges his conviction for felony
retaliation, arguing that the trial court erroneously allowed jury argument and testimony
referring to his previous murder conviction. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(1)
(West 2011). We affirm.1
I. BACKGROUND2
Appellant was indicted for retaliation, a third-degree felony. See id. The case
was tried to a jury. The State presented evidence that appellant threatened to harm the
victim, Laura Ramirez, after she reported appellant’s unwelcome requests for a date to
the police. Prior to his trial, appellant filed a motion in limine requesting a hearing
before the State made reference to or elicited testimony regarding appellant’s previous
convictions or prison sentences. The State responded that references to appellant
being on parole for murder were appropriate because they provided context for why the
victim did not want to have a relationship with appellant, support for the seriousness of
appellant’s threats, and evidence of appellant’s motive to threaten the victim. The trial
court ruled that the State could mention that appellant “is on parole right now. And then
let that come out if the witness—if they can recall it. That way we’ll let them testify
about it.”
During opening statements, the State referenced appellant’s parole status by
stating that appellant informed the victim of his parole status and showed her a
newspaper clipping about the offense for which he was on parole. Later, at trial, the
victim, Ramirez, testified to this encounter with appellant, recalling that he had told her
that he was on parole for murder. Rodriguez’s coworker also testified that appellant had
1
This case is before this Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant
to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2005).
2
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons
for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
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informed the victim that he was on parole for murder. At closing arguments, the State
again recounted that the victim was aware that the appellant was on parole for murder.
The jury found appellant guilty and sentenced him to twenty years in prison. This
appeal ensued.
I. APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION
The State, in its brief, argues that appellant did not preserve error for appeal
because his trial counsel did not object to evidence of: (1) appellant’s parole status or
(2) the fact that appellant was on parole for murder. Appellant did not address
preservation of error in his brief.
To preserve error for appeal, a defendant must (1) object, (2) state the grounds
with sufficient specificity, and (3) obtain an adverse ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see
Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“To preserve error in
prosecutorial argument, a defendant must pursue to an adverse ruling his objections to
jury argument.”); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A motion
in limine seeks a preliminary ruling by a trial court that serves as a procedural device to
prevent prejudicial questions and statements from being made in the presence of the
jury. Norman v. State, 523 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Obtaining a ruling
on a motion in limine is not sufficient to preserve error for review, but rather there must
be a proper contemporaneous objection to the proffered evidence. Willis v. State, 785
S.W.2d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 275 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988);
Here, while appellant obtained a ruling on his motion in limine, he failed to object
to any references at trial to his previous murder conviction or his parole status, which he
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now alleges were allowed erroneously. By not objecting at the time these references
were made, appellant waived any argument that the trial court erred by allowing
references either to appellant’s parole status or his prior murder conviction. See Willis,
785 S.W.2d at 384, Webb, 760 S.W.2d at 275. Therefore, appellant’s sole issue is not
preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Wilson, 71 S.W.3d at 349; Archie,
221 S.W.3d at 699. We overrule appellant’s issue.
II. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
__________________
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
9th day of May, 2013.
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