Kenson Jack Jones v. State

NUMBER 13-12-00667-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
KENSON JACK JONES Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
of Tarrant County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
By two issues, appellant, Kenson Jack Jones, challenges his conviction and
sentence for sexual assault of a child under the age of seventeen, a second-degree
felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2) (West Supp. 2011). We affirm.1
1
This case is before this Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth
pursuant to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West
2005).
I. BACKGROUND2
The State charged appellant with the sexual assault of A.S., his stepdaughter.
A.S. testified that she woke up to find appellant on top of her, that he moved her
underwear out of the way, and touched her vagina with his sexual organ. A.S. informed
a classmate at her school that morning about what happened, and the classmate
subsequently informed school officials. School officials later called the police. A.S.
underwent a sexual assault examination at Cook Children’s Medical Center and police
seized several items from A.S.’s home, including the clothes she was wearing during
the crime and her bed sheets. Appellant’s DNA was tested after his arrest, and found to
be a genetic match to both the sperm in the vaginal swab taken from A.S. and the
sperm recovered from the underwear A.S. wore at the time of the crime. Appellant
pleaded not guilty and the case was tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty
and assessed twelve years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient and
that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime charged.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Standard of Review
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, our inquiry
is “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 684, 686–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
2
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them here except as necessary to our decision. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
2
(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). It is the role of the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from
that evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19 (1979)). The trier of fact, in this case the trial court judge,
is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight, if any, to be given to their
testimony. Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 686–87; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). “[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard
that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient.”
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912.
2. Discussion
Appellant briefs authorities pertaining to the standard of review and makes a
conclusory statement that: “[t]he State of Texas did not meet its burden of proof, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, in that it failed to prove that Appellant committed the
offense as is set out in the [sic] indictments.” Appellant has not provided this court with
an argument regarding how the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Appellant has not discussed the essential elements of the offense or identified any
element for which the evidence is arguably inconsistent. Therefore, we conclude that
this point of error is inadequately briefed, and presents nothing for our review. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(observing that “this Court is under no obligation to make appellant’s arguments” for
him). We overrule appellant’s first issue.
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B. Disproportionate Sentence
In his second issue, appellant argues that his sentence of twelve years’
imprisonment was so disproportionate to the crime, and to other sentences imposed for
similar crimes, that it violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. In
order to preserve a complaint of this nature for appeal, a defendant must make a timely
objection to the trial court. Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2009, pet. ref’d); Arriaga v. State, 335 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010 pet. ref’d). Appellant did not object to the sentence at the time it was
imposed, and so did not preserve this argument for our review. We accordingly
overrule appellant’s second issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
_______________________
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
25th day of April, 2013.
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