Ron Marcus Chandler Spencer v. State

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00211-CR
RON MARCUS CHANDLER APPELLANT
SPENCER
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Ron Marcus Chandler Spencer appeals from the trial court’s
revocation of his community supervision. In two points, he contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision and that his
five-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We will affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Spencer pleaded guilty to burglary of a
habitation. The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to ten years’
confinement and a $1,000 fine but suspended imposition of the confinement
portion of his sentence and placed him on community supervision for ten years.
Approximately eight months later, the State filed a petition to revoke Spencer’s
community supervision, alleging that he had committed another offense, had
failed to report to his community supervision officer as directed, and had not
participated in a program as required under the terms of his community
supervision. Spencer pleaded true to all of the allegations contained in the
State’s petition and, regarding punishment, presented evidence that he has a
brain tumor requiring continual radiation treatment and that he assisted
authorities on a related federal prosecution. The trial court revoked Spencer’s
community supervision and sentenced him to five years’ confinement.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT COMMUNITY-SUPERVISION REVOCATION
In his first point, Spencer argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking his community supervision. He argues that there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support his pleas of true to the allegations in the State’s
petition. But Spencer’s pleas of true, standing alone, are sufficient to support the
revocation of his community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127,
128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Fisher v. State, No. 02-10-00478-CR,
2011 WL 4916420, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem.
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op., not designated for publication). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by revoking Spencer’s community supervision. See Rickels v.
State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665
S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We overrule Spencer’s first point.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY OF SENTENCE
In his second point, Spencer argues that his five-year sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, “particularly in light of his severe and profound
medical condition and the substantial assistance [he] provided to the government
in a related federal prosecution.”
Spencer did not object to his punishment when it was imposed, nor did he
raise this complaint in a motion for new trial. We have held on numerous
occasions that this type of claim must be preserved at the trial court level. See
Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d);
Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see
also Cisneros v. State, No. 02-06-00103-CR, 2007 WL 80002, at *1 (Tex. App—
Fort Worth May 23, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(collecting cases); cf. Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(“A sentencing issue may be preserved by objecting at the punishment hearing,
or when the sentence is pronounced.”). Because Spencer did not raise his
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complaint in the trial court, the complaint is forfeited.2 We overrule Spencer’s
second point.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Spencer’s two points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: February 6, 2014
2
Even if we were to reach the merits of Spencer’s complaint, his
punishment was within the statutory limits for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. §§ 12.33(a), 30.02(c)(2) (West 2011). Punishment that is imposed within
the statutory limits and based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment
is generally not subject to challenge for excessiveness except in “‘exceedingly
rare’” situations. Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 476 (quoting Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d
320, 323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); see also Davis v. State, 323 S.W.3d 190,
195–96 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. ref’d) (stating that punishment within
statutory range was not excessive, cruel, or unusual when defendant argued that
the penitentiary could not provide treatment for his medical condition, AIDS).
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