Christie Maureen Hoagland v. State

Opinion issued September 25, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-13-00753-CR
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CHRISTI MAUREEN HOAGLAND, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 3
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1798263
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Christi Maureen Hoagland of driving while intoxicated.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West Supp. 2014). The trial court placed
Hoagland on community supervision for one year. She appealed, contending that it
was error for her medical records and the testimony of an emergency room nurse to
be admitted at trial. We hold that the testimony and medical records were properly
admitted, and we therefore affirm.
Background
On October 23, 2011, off-duty Houston Police Department Officer M. Urban
was involved in a car accident with the appellant, Christi Hoagland. Hoagland was
taken to St. Joseph’s Hospital, where emergency room nurse Stacy Gutierrez drew
a blood sample. Before drawing the blood, Gutierrez verified Hoagland’s identity
verbally and with her hospital armband. Gutierrez stayed in the room at all times
surrounding the blood draw. She placed the blood into a specimen container,
labeled the specimen to indicate Hoagland’s full name, date of birth, and account
number, and initialed the labels. Next, Gutierrez placed the sample into pneumatic
tubes that transported it directly to a laboratory. She testified that all the steps taken
were in compliance with hospital procedures.
A lab technician, Dana Overhold, confirmed that the hospital’s procedure
entailed labeling the specimens before they arrive at the lab. She also testified that
the lab instruments were working properly on the day Hoagland’s blood was
tested. There was no evidence that the blood sample had been altered or subject to
tampering.
Houston Police Officer D. Nguyen testified that he accompanied Hoagland
to the hospital emergency room. When Hoagland was taken to another room,
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Nguyen remained outside that room at all times surrounding the blood draw.
Nguyen testified that no one aside from Hoagland, the nurse, a doctor, and hospital
staff entered the hospital room. Gutierrez testified that there was only one patient
in the room at the time of the blood draw, however she was unable to identify
Hoagland at trial.
Analysis
Hoagland contends that after Gutierrez admitted she was unable to identify
her at trial, the trial court erred by admitting further testimony by the nurse and by
allowing her to sponsor the offer of medical records. Because Gutierrez could not
identify her, Hoagland contends that the necessary chain of custody of the drawn
blood was not established. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);
Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As with other
types of evidentiary rulings, we uphold the trial court’s decision unless it lies
outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Layton, 280 S.W.3d at 240 (citing
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380.
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Generally, all relevant testimony is admissible. See TEX. R. EVID. 402.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. When determining if proffered
evidence is relevant, the court must consider whether there is a logical connection
between the evidence and the proposition sought to be proved. Layton, 280 S.W.3d
at 240. Here, Gutierrez’s testimony was relevant to establishing the chain of
custody of the blood sample. The blood sample is evidence that Hoagland was
driving while intoxicated. Therefore, the Gutierrez’s testimony was properly
admitted because there is a “logical connection between the evidence and the
proposition sought to be proved.” See Layton, 280 S.W.3d at 240.
The Rules of Evidence provide that the “requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). A trial court properly admits evidence when a
reasonable juror could find that the evidence was authenticated. Pondexter v. State,
942 S.W.2d 577, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
The results of a blood test are authenticated if a proper chain of custody is
established. Durrett v. State, 36 S.W.3d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Absent any showing of tampering or alteration, proof of the
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beginning and the end of the chain of custody will support admission of the
evidence. Id. Any gaps in the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not
to its admissibility. McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 125 (Tex.App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). This court has previously held that when the hospital
followed its standard procedures, the testimony of a person who attended to the
patient and the laboratory technician who tested the sample adequately establishes
the beginning and the end of the chain of custody, even if the identity of specific
person who drew the blood is unknown. See Beck v. State, 651 S.W.2d 827, 829
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet.).
The State adequately established the chain of custody of the blood sample in
this case. Despite being unable to identify Hoagland in the courtroom, the evidence
established that Gutierrez took her blood sample at the hospital. Further, Gutierrez
explained in detail the hospital’s procedures to ensure accurate identification of the
source of a blood sample. She testified that as soon as a patient is put into a room
at the hospital, the registration staff verifies the patient’s name and date of birth
and gives the patient an armband. Gutierrez verified Hoagland’s identity verbally
and with her armband. She then drew Hoagland’s blood, labeled it, and sent it
directly to the laboratory by pneumatic tubes. Overhold testified that she tested the
labeled blood sample once it arrived in the laboratory. Both Gutierrez and
Overhold testified that they followed standard hospital procedures.
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Hoagland argues that the chain of custody was not established because the
nurse could not identify her in the courtroom. But Gutierrez’s failure to identify
Hoagland at trial goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Durrett,
36 S.W.3d at 210–11. Because Gutierrez testified that standard hospital procedures
were followed, her failure to identify Hoagland does not render the evidence
inadmissible. See id. at 210–11; Beck, 651 S.W.2d 827 at 829. The testimony of
the nurse, the lab technician, and the officer adequately linked the blood sample to
Hoagland and established the chain of custody. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the challenged evidence.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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