Ex Parte Carlton L. Williams III

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-09-00344-CR

No. 10-09-00345-CR

No. 10-09-00346-CR

No. 10-09-00347-CR

Ex parte Carlton L. Williams III

From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. FR-09-19950, FR-09-19951,

FR-09-19952 and FR-09-19953

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

            Carlton L. Williams, III was indicted in separate indictments for four aggravated robberies.  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §29.03 (Vernon 2003).  His bail was originally set at $100,000 per indictment, but was reduced at a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus hearing at which time his bail was set at $ 50,000 per indictment, for a total of $200,000. Williams filed a second application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking another reduction in his bail, which was denied.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the trial court's order denying Williams's application for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

Applicable Law

            Generally, a writ applicant has the burden of proving the facts which would entitle the applicant to relief.  Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  The same holds true for an applicant in a bail reduction proceeding.  See Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).  We review a trial court's decision in a bail reduction proceeding for an abuse of discretion.  Holliman v. State, 485 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we are guided by Article 17.15 as to the rules for fixing bail.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon 2005).  See also Ex parte Pemberton, 577 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).  The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered and this necessarily involves the punishment permitted by law.  Holliman, 485 S.W.2d at 914.  Also, the applicant's indigency is a circumstance to be considered, but it is neither a controlling circumstance nor the sole criterion in determining the amount of bail.  Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).  Other factors to be considered in determining the amount of bail, as interpreted previously by this Court, include family and community ties, work history, length of residence in the county, prior criminal record, conformity with conditions of prior bail, and any aggravating circumstances of the offense.  Ex parte Davis, 147 S.W.3d 546, 548 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

            Williams did not testify at the hearing before the trial court.  His mother testified that Williams was seventeen years old; that she was willing to loan him $10,000 to post bail; and that Williams would live in her home in Copperas Cove, Coryell County, Texas until the cases were resolved.  She would ensure that Williams appeared at any court dates.  A bond agent testified that her company was willing to write bonds for $25,000 per indictment for a $10,000 payment to her company and that based on her conversations with the family, she did not feel that Williams posed a flight risk, although she had never met Williams personally.  A copy of each of the four indictments with the probable cause affidavits were admitted into evidence which showed that each indictment arose out of one criminal episode, but with four victims.

            The trial court took judicial notice of the testimony from the first writ hearing from a detective with the Copperas Cove police department.  The officer testified that six or seven males wearing red bandanas approached a front porch of a residence.  One of the males hit an individual standing on the porch with a firearm and they then forced their way inside the residence.  Another individual in the residence was hit over the head with a firearm as well.  The residents of the home were forced to strip, and items were stolen from them and the residence.  The individual that witnessed the first assault called 911 and while he was retrieving the license plate number from the getaway vehicle, shots were fired at him from a passenger in the vehicle as it left the scene.  The vehicle was driven by Williams and was titled in his mother’s name.  Later, the victims identified Williams by name as one of the perpetrators.  Williams held an aluminum baseball bat, which he abandoned at the residence where the robberies took place.

            None of the other males involved in the aggravated robberies had been arrested at the time of the first writ hearing and no firearm had been recovered.  Williams refused to tell police the identities of the others who committed the offense with him, although he had told his mother their names.  The detective testified that she was concerned for the safety of Williams if released as well as the potential for Williams to commit other violent offenses with the other perpetrators.

            Williams had been charged with an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and other drug offenses as a juvenile. There is no testimony in the record before us of Williams’s ties to the community, the length of time he had been in the community, or any work or school history.  The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law at Williams’s request.  The trial court based its decision to deny the second writ on the seriousness of the offense, the use of weapons to commit the offense, and the welfare of the community.

            Considering all of the factors, the burden of proof, and the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Williams’s second writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, Williams’s sole issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        TOM GRAY

                                                                        Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

            Justice Reyna, and

            Justice Davis

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed March 3, 2010

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adamant he did not promise Anselmo that he would receive shock probation.  Counsel testified that he told him the best case scenario would be shock probation but he also told Anselmo that he could receive 99 years to life in prison.  At the plea hearing, the trial court admonished Anselmo of the range of punishment for each offense and confirmed that Anselmo understood the charges against him, the punishment range, and his rights.  The court also confirmed that Anselmo was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason.

            Based on the record we do not find Anselmo’s pleas to be involuntary due to misinformation by his trial counsel. Anselmo’s assertion of misinformation, standing alone, does not establish that his plea was involuntary.  And there is nothing in the record that substantiates his assertion.  Because we do not find his plea to be involuntary due to misinformation by his trial counsel, Anselmo has not sustained his burden to establish even the first prong of his ineffective assistance claim on the same assertion.

            Anselmo’s second and third issues are overruled.

Translation of Plea Hearing

            In his last issue, Anselmo contends his plea was involuntary because there were errors in the translation of the plea paperwork and the courtroom proceedings.  In assessing the voluntariness of a plea, we review the record as a whole and consider the totality of the circumstances.  Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  An admonishment on punishment is prima facie evidence that a plea was knowing and voluntary.  Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.  The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the plea was entered without understanding the consequences thereof.  Id.

            The plea proceedings were interpreted for Anselmo through a licensed interpreter.  The trial court admonished Anselmo of the range of punishment for each offense, and Anselmo stated that he understood.  Anselmo, as well as the interpreter, signed the written pleas, waivers, stipulations, and judicial confessions.  But on motion for new trial, Anselmo stated that the plea proceedings were translated very quickly, and he knew enough English to know that the proceedings were not being translated word for word.  He claimed that because the translation was inadequate, he did not understand the proceedings fully.  In response, the State introduced an affidavit from the interpreter who stated “I fully translated everything that was said in court in a true and correct manner.  Moreover, I repeatedly asked Mr. Anselmo, during the hearing, if I was going too fast or if there was something he did not understand.  At no time during the hearing did Mr. Anselmo ever state that he could not understand my translation.”  Further, Anselmo’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he had met with Anselmo and talked with him on the phone without the need for an interpreter because “Benizi speaks very good English.” 

            There is nothing in the record from Anselmo’s guilty pleas to indicate that he did not understand the admonitions or the proceedings.  Based on a review of the record, Anselmo did not meet his burden to show that he did not understand the consequences of his pleas.  His fourth issue is overruled.

Conclusion

            Having overruled each issue, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                                                        TOM GRAY

                                                                        Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

            Justice Vance, and

            Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed October 24, 2007

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[1] Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983).

[2] See Oliver v. State, No. 10-06-00152-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6495 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 15, 2007, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Nobles v. State, No. 10-06-00153-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6101 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 1, 2007, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).