in the Interest of E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., and Y.S., Children

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00028-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF E.S.D.L.S.,
A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S.,
AND Y.S., CHILDREN
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FROM 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is an ultra-accelerated appeal.2 In a single issue, Appellant Mother
argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate court to dispose of
appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably
possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal was filed). We note that under
that rule, our opinion is required to issue on or before July 17, 2013.
court‘s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of her
five children—E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., and Y.S. We will
affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview
Mother testified3 at the termination trial that she had never been married,
that she had been pregnant almost every other year for twenty years, that she
had given birth to eleven children, that she could not recall each of their
birthdates, and that she did not have custody of any of her eleven children at the
time of the termination trial.4 The children at issue in this appeal include
E.S.D.L.S., a female born on November 28, 1999; A.A.D.L.S., a male child born
on April 13, 2006; P.H.D.L.S., a male child born on February 29, 2008; S.D.L.S.,
a female child born on March 5, 2010; and Y.S., a female child born on January
18, 2012. Because Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury‘s best-interest finding, we set forth the evidence presented at trial that
will be used in the Holley analysis below.
3
Mother, who speaks only Spanish, utilized an interpreter to testify at the
termination trial.
4
Two of Mother‘s children, M.D.L.S. and R.S.L.S. who are not involved in
this appeal, were living with their grandmother in Mexico because when their
father went to jail, Mother struggled to provide food ―and everything else‖; the
grandmother offered to help, the children went to stay with her, and then the
grandmother refused to return the children.
2
B. Mother’s Housing and Employment History
At the termination trial, Mother detailed her housing history, stating that
she had moved many times in the four years prior to the termination trial because
she was struggling financially and was kicked out by her landlord. Mother said
that she was able to pay rent and provide for her five children prior to their
removal by the Department of Family and Protective Services (―the Department‖)
because the father of Y.S. provided for them and because Mother received food
stamps. Mother had lived at her current address on 24th Street for two months
prior to the termination trial.
The home in which Mother was living at the time of the termination trial
contained two bedrooms: J., the father of Mother‘s older boys who are not
involved in this appeal, slept in one bedroom with two of the boys; the third boy
slept on the couch; and Mother slept in the other bedroom. Mother was
supposed to pay rent to J., but she had not paid him any rent as of the time of the
termination trial. She understood that J. could kick her out at any time and
testified that she was making an effort to get an apartment.
At the time of the termination trial in November 2012, Mother had $30; she
did not have a bank account and did not have any money saved. The last time
that Mother had a regular paying job was in June 2012 when she cleaned offices.
During the six months that she worked cleaning offices, she was paid every two
weeks and received approximately $200 to $280. She testified that she was
cleaning one or two houses and offices at the time of the termination trial.
3
C. First Removal When S.D.L.S. Was Born with Cocaine in Her System
A Family Based Safety Services (FBSS) case was opened in March 2010,
and the Department removed the children because Mother and S.D.L.S. tested
positive for cocaine when S.D.L.S. was born.
D. Domestic Violence
Mother attended counseling in November 2010 and reported to her
counselor that her partner had been verbally and mentally abusive to her and her
children throughout the relationship. The counselor‘s notes, which were admitted
into evidence at the termination trial, state that the ―husband‖ abuses ―when they
eat the food‖ and that he had recently threatened to hit Mother with a belt and
had taken his belt off as if to hit her. The counselor‘s notes state that Mother‘s
children had asked her to leave him and move them to a new home because
they did not want to continue living in the home with him. Mother told the
counselor that she takes her children out of the home when her partner is mad.
Mr. D.L.S., the father of several of the children involved in this appeal and
presumably the ―partner‖ Mother had mentioned during counseling, was arrested
in November 2010 for sexually abusing Mother. Mother recalled telling the
Victims‘ Assistance office that she did not want Mr. D.L.S. to go to jail because
he would not be able to help her with the children and that was the only
assistance that she had at that time. Despite that Mr. D.L.S. had sexually
assaulted Mother, she wanted him free to support her because she was
―struggling a lot being all by [her]self‖ and because, in Mother‘s opinion, he is a
4
good father to the children. Mother‘s understanding was that ―he could be put to
work‖ to support her. Mother believed that her problems started when Mr. D.L.S.
mistreated her, not when S.D.L.S. tested positive for cocaine.
E. Children Are Returned to Mother
Mother ultimately completed her FBSS services, and the children were
returned to her.
F. Second Removal When Y.S. Was Born with Cocaine in Her System
Elizabeth Cuevas, the Department caseworker for Mother, testified that
Mother‘s children came into care in January 2012 because Mother and Y.S.
tested positive for cocaine at Y.S.‘s birth and because Mother admitted to using
cocaine while caring for the children. The Department attempted to place the
children with Mother‘s roommate and Mother‘s mother, who were living in the
home that the children had been removed from. Mother was not allowed to come
back to the home, but she came back and locked her mother out so that she
could not care for the children. Mother‘s roommate and Mother‘s mother were
unable to protect the children from Mother.5 The Department was thus forced to
remove the children from the home.
After the Department removed the children, they drug tested all of the
children, and S.D.L.S. tested positive for methamphetamine at twenty-two
5
Mother‘s mother told Cuevas that she was fearful of Mother and did not
feel like she could be protective of the children. The ―Child‘s Service Plan‖ noted
that ―Maternal grandmother fears [M]other and has to sneak out [of] the house
with the children in order to bathe them and provide them with food.‖
5
months old.6 Mother told Cuevas that she did not know how S.D.L.S. had tested
positive for methamphetamine. Mother testified at trial, however, that she had
left S.D.L.S. with her mother and sister and that ―they do have pills over there
prescribed by the doctor.‖
Cuevas testified that when the children came into the Department‘s care,
they were ―obviously neglected. They had infestations of lice that were very
difficult to remove.‖ Cuevas said that one of the children was so delayed that the
Department thought he could not speak either Spanish or English, but after
working with the speech therapist, he was able to communicate. Cuevas testified
that the children had ―come a long way‖ since the removal. At the time of the
termination trial, all five children had been placed together in a dual-licensed,
adoption-motivated placement.
Cuevas testified that Mother‘s oldest child, E.S.D.L.S., had made
statements indicating that she had been abused or neglected. E.S.D.L.S. had
stated that she had been withheld from school to take care of the children while
Mother was not present, that Mother could be mean and violent towards the
children, that all of the children had been locked in the closet as a form of
punishment,7 and that she wanted Mother to get help and to be nice to them.
6
The notes from Cook Children‘s Hospital, where S.D.L.S. was taken for
the drug test, reveal that she presented with bruises on her chest, chin, and right
abdomen.
7
The ―Family Service Plan‖ dated February 28, 2012 states, ―All children
fear retribution as they have been locked in closets and denied food for not doing
6
E.S.D.L.S. knew that Mother used drugs and said that Mother needed help.
E.S.D.L.S. had inquired of Cuevas whether Mother was still using drugs and
whether she was completing her classes to enable her to have the children
returned.
G. Mother’s History of Drug Use
Mother started using cocaine after E.S.D.L.S was born in 1999.8 Mother
used cocaine approximately four times while she was pregnant with S.D.L.S.
Mother attended drug classes after she gave birth to S.D.L.S., but she used
drugs again after taking the classes.
Mother testified at the termination trial that she had previously used
cocaine but that she was no longer a drug user. Mother last used cocaine in
January 2012 on the day before she gave birth to Y.S. Mother testified that she
has never lived in a drug house or in a house where other people used drugs.
Mother testified that it was hard for her to discuss her cocaine use because
she did not like ―[t]o tell what [she] was doing.‖ Mother said, ―I wasn‘t an addict
or anything, but once in a while.‖ Mother testified that she was able to parent her
children while she was using cocaine because, ―like I told you, I was not using as
much and I wasn‘t an addict and I was always keeping an eye on my children.‖
what their mother wants.‖ The Court-Appointed Special Advocate‘s report noted
that S.D.L.S.‘s only word was ―cucui,‖ which E.S.D.L.S. explained to her foster
mother was a monster that Mother had said would ―get‖ S.D.L.S. if she made
noise in the closet.
8
Mother testified that she had never used marijuana or methamphetamine.
7
Mother was not initially aware that she had put her children in danger when she
had used cocaine; according to notes from her counseling, Mother displayed a
lack of insight into the role that substance abuse has played in her life and
believed that she could stop using at any time. But at the time of the termination
trial, Mother could see the damage of how she had hurt her children, was ―very
remorseful,‖ and regretted using cocaine. Mother explained that she had hurt her
children by using drugs, which had resulted in their being removed from Mother
and in their missing the love and affection that she provides. Mother testified that
she had changed a lot; at the time of the termination trial, she was thinking more
about her children and behaving better with them so that the Department would
return them to her.
H. Mother’s Service Plan and Her Compliance
Mother‘s service plan in the present case required her to obtain an
appropriate living environment for the children and to provide Cuevas with a copy
of the leasing agreement; Mother, however, had not obtained an appropriate
living environment for the children or provided Cuevas with a leasing agreement.
Cuevas testified that throughout the case, Mother had never provided an address
to enable Cuevas to make a home visit.9
9
Nor had Mother provided Cuevas with information related to the location
of her children‘s fathers.
8
Mother‘s service plan required her to obtain legal employment and to
provide Cuevas with monthly pay stubs; Mother had not provided documentation
to show that she was employed at the time of the termination trial.
Mother‘s service plan required her to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and
Narcotics Anonymous meetings and to provide Cuevas with copies of the
monthly sign-in sheets; Mother had not attended any meetings. Mother‘s service
plan required her to locate a sponsor and to provide Cuevas with the sponsor‘s
name and phone number; Mother had not done this.
Mother‘s service plan required her to participate in individual counseling
with Opportunities Counseling Center; Cuevas testified that Mother had
completed this task at the time of the termination trial.10 Contrary to Mother‘s
testimony that the counselor at Opportunities Counseling Center had made a
recommendation that the children be returned to Mother, the counselor,
according to Cuevas, had recommended the opposite.
Mother‘s service plan required her to attend and to participate in Safe
Haven‘s eight-week program for domestic violence; Mother had not completed
this task.
Mother‘s service plan required her to refrain from criminal activity and
illegal acts; Cuevas was not aware of any criminal activity that Mother had
engaged in.
10
Mother, however, testified that she had not participated in individual
counseling during this case.
9
Mother‘s service plan required her to attend all scheduled visitations with
her children;11 Mother had missed three or four visits and had arrived late to
some visits. Mother had not given reasonable explanations for arriving late to the
visits, and the Department had canceled some visits because Mother had arrived
more than twenty minutes late. The children had already been transported forty-
five to fifty minutes to attend the visits and then had to return without seeing
Mother. The children did not like when Mother missed a visit; ―[i]t would upset
them, especially [E.D.L.S.], the oldest child.‖
Mother‘s service plan required her to attend Resource Recovery for a drug
assessment and drug treatment; Mother completed the drug assessment, which
recommended that she attend outpatient services for six months. Mother
completed half of her outpatient classes. Mother provided three oral swab drug
tests during the case, which were negative, but she failed to appear for two
requested hair follicle tests.
Cuevas requested that Mother participate in the Safe Haven CPS classes.
Mother testified that she had attended one class at Safe Haven on the Friday
before the termination trial.
I. Mother’s Plan for the Children
Mother testified that she is ready to keep her five children safe. Mother
said that her sister-in-law would help her with the children. Mother testified that if
11
Mother‘s visits occurred every other Friday.
10
the children were returned, she would live on 24th Street in the house with J. and
his three children. Mother asked the trial court to allow her children to come live
with her even though she did not have enough places for all of them to sleep at
the two-bedroom house on 24th Street.
J. Recommendations
Cuevas stated that she could not tell from interactions with Mother or her
service providers whether Mother had made any lifestyle changes. Cuevas
testified that terminating Mother‘s parental rights was in the children‘s best
interest. Cuevas asked that the Department be named the permanent managing
conservator with the right to place the children up for adoption.
The Court-Appointed Special Advocate‘s report stated that Mother had not
demonstrated enough progress to reduce the risks associated with Mother‘s drug
history, the extensive concerns regarding her instability, and her inadequate care
of the children. CASA recommended that the trial court terminate Mother‘s
parental rights to all five children.
The children‘s ad litem, James Masek, testified that the trial court should
follow the Department‘s recommendation because he had not seen a change in
Mother‘s lifestyle and because the children were now thriving in foster care.
K. Trial Court’s Disposition
After hearing the above testimony and reviewing the evidence, the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had violated Texas
Family Code section 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), and (P) and that termination of
11
Mother‘s parental rights to E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., and Y.S.
is in the children‘s best interest. This appeal followed.
III. LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
BEST INTEREST FINDING
In her sole issue, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court‘s best interest finding. Specifically, Mother
argues that insufficient evidence was introduced at trial indicating that Mother
would not be able to adequately provide for the emotional, physical, mental, or
spiritual needs of the children now or in the future; Mother contends that the
evidence at trial—that she had accessed State of Texas benefits for the children
and had fed them—is sufficient to conclusively demonstrate that she has the
ability to care for and parent her five children.
A. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to
erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights,
privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except the child‘s
right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West 2008); Holick v. Smith,
685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, ―[w]hen the State seeks to sever
permanently the relationship between a parent and a child, it must first observe
fundamentally fair procedures.‖ In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 n.1 (Tex. 2012)
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–92
(1982)). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe
12
involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Id.; Holick, 685 S.W.2d at
20–21.
Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012), § 161.206(a)
(West 2008). Due process demands this heightened standard because ―[a]
parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‗far more precious
than any property right.‘‖ E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 758–59, 102 S. Ct. at 1397); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see
In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for
termination and conservatorship). Evidence is clear and convincing if it ―will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established.‖ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West
2008).
In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one ground
listed under subsection (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is
in the best interest of the child. Id. § 161.001; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex.
2005). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely
on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d
625, 629 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh‘g).
13
In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination
cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the challenged ground for
termination was proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We
review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment.
Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder
could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could have disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is
contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to
termination if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence
unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.
We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the appearance
and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is the factfinder‘s province. Id. at 573,
574. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer
to the factfinder‘s determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id. at
573.
In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to
the factfinder‘s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire
record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that
termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the
child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002).
14
If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its
finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the
child‘s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Prompt and
permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be
in the child‘s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2008).
Nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact in a termination case may use in
determining the best interest of the child include:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency
seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
15
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted).12
These factors are not exhaustive; some listed factors may be inapplicable
to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of
just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. On the other hand, the
presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a
finding. Id.
B. Analysis of Evidence Under the Holley Factors
Mother focuses her combined legal and factual sufficiency argument on
two of the Holley factors: the children‘s emotional and physical needs now and in
the future and the parental abilities of the person seeking custody. We will weigh
each of the nine factors set forth above.
With regard to the desires of the children, the evidence revealed that
E.S.D.L.S., the oldest child who had acted as the other children‘s caretaker while
Mother had used drugs, had told the CASA volunteer that she did not want to
return home. The CASA volunteer noted ―[t]he children are sometimes
affectionate with their mother, seem at ease during visits, and are glad to eat the
food their mother usually brings,‖ but ―the children have not displayed any
noticeable emotion when leaving the visits.‖ Mother, however, told her counselor
12
Because Mother‘s appellate brief references and utilizes only the Holley
factors in her analysis, we focus on these factors rather than the statutory
factors.
16
in August 2012 that S.D.L.S. and P.H.D.L.S. seemed sad and cried when she left
after a visit and that they told her that they want to live with her. The trial court
was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination of at least
Mother‘s parental rights to E.S.D.L.S.
With regard to the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in
the future, the children require basic needs: food; shelter; clothing; routine
medical and dental care; a safe, stimulating, and nurturing home environment;
and friendships and recreational activities appropriate to their ages. Here, when
the children came into care, they had untreated lice infestations that were difficult
to remove, and S.D.L.S. was dirty and bruised; A.A.D.L.S. had not been enrolled
in school, was developmentally delayed, and had speech difficulties; and
E.S.D.L.S. had missed numerous days of school while she was in Mother‘s care.
Mother also moved the children frequently as her housing situation fluctuated.
Based on the physical neglect of the children by Mother and her housing
instability, the trial court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of
termination.
With regard to the emotional and physical danger to the children now and
in the future, four of the five children were age six or under and could not protect
themselves. The notes from Mother‘s counseling session three months prior to
the termination trial states, ―Client does not appear to understand the importance
of taking care of her and her children or protecting them from harm,‖ and ―[s]he
has a long history of making poor judgments regarding decisions that affect her
17
children.‖ The record demonstrates that Mother had lived with men who were
abusive to both her and the children and that Mother was abusive to the children,
locking them in the closet and scaring them with stories about monsters who
would ―get them‖ if they were not quiet while they were locked in the closet.
Mother had used cocaine and had given birth to two children who were born with
cocaine in their systems, yet Mother minimized her drug use. Moreover, the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that Mother either used
methamphetamine or exposed the children to someone who had used
methamphetamine because S.D.L.S. tested positive for the substance when she
was removed from Mother‘s care following Y.S.‘s birth. Due to the prevalent
physical abuse and drug abuse, the trial court was entitled to find that this factor
weighed in favor of termination.
With regard to her parenting abilities, the evidence detailed above reveals
that Mother did not provide for her children‘s physical and emotional needs and
that she had not eliminated the physical and emotional dangers. The testimony
at trial also demonstrated that Mother had not worked the bulk of her services,
including finding employment and leasing a place to live that would
accommodate her and her five children. Although Mother claimed to have
changed a lot because she was thinking more about her children and behaving
better with them, neither Cuevas, the children‘s ad litem, nor the CASA volunteer
had seen Mother make progress in her parenting during the case. The trial court
was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.
18
With regard to the programs available to assist Mother and to promote the
best interest of the children, the record reveals that Mother‘s counselor provided
her with information regarding community resources and strongly encouraged
her to call and obtain information on them but that Mother ―usually agrees to call
resources but doesn‘t follow up due to language, financial[,] & transportation
barriers.‖ The record revealed that Mother had taken advantage of benefits from
the State in the past in order to provide food for her children, but during the
pendency of the case, she had not worked the services available to her to
promote the best interest of the children. The trial court was entitled to find that
this factor weighed in favor of termination.
Mother‘s plan for the five children was to move them into the two-bedroom
house with her on 24th Street, in which five people were already living. The
Department planned for the children to be adopted, and the children were in an
adoption-motivated placement at the time of the termination trial. The trial court
was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.
The stability of the home that Mother had proposed for the children was in
flux, as she noted that J. could kick her out at any time. The record did not
reveal any instability in the home that the Department had proposed for the
children. The trial court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of
termination.
With regard to the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that
the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, the analysis set forth
19
above—which details Mother‘s drug use; her failure to meet her children‘s
physical and emotional needs; her failure to address the physical and emotional
dangers to the children, including abuse and locking them in the closet; and her
failure to take advantage of the services that were offered to improve her
parenting skills—reveals that the existing parent-child relationship between
Mother and each of the five children is not a proper relationship. The trial court
was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.
With regard to any excuse for Mother‘s acts or omissions, Mother‘s
counselor noted that Mother had struggled financially and had struggled due to
the language barrier, that she lacked skills and a motivation to gain skills, and
that she lacked follow-up on recommendations. Mother repeatedly failed to
acknowledge her drug problem, even after going through FBSS services when
S.D.L.S. was born with cocaine in her system. At the time of the termination trial,
Mother had recognized that her drug use had hurt her children and testified that
she regretted using cocaine. The trial court was entitled to find that this factor
weighed neither in favor of nor against termination.
After weighing the evidence as it relates to the Holley factors, we hold that
the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court‘s
finding that termination of Mother‘s parental rights to her five children is in the
children‘s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2); Jordan v.
Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)
(holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court‘s finding
20
that termination of mother‘s parental rights was in child‘s best interest when most
of the best interest factors weighed in favor of termination); In re M.R., 243
S.W.3d 807, 820–21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding evidence
factually sufficient to support best-interest finding because parents exposed
children to domestic violence and drug abuse, mother had failed to obtain
housing and employment, and children flourished in foster care); In re J.L.C., 194
S.W.3d 667, 675–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (holding evidence
factually sufficient to support best-interest finding because although mother had
attended parenting classes and was attempting to overcome her drug addiction,
mother had difficulty putting her child‘s needs ahead of her own; had exposed
child to drugs when pregnant and continued to use after child was removed; was
involved in a life of crime, unemployment, homelessness, and addiction; and
could not provide a stable home). We therefore overrule Mother‘s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Mother‘s sole issue, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment
terminating her parental rights to E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S.,
and Y.S.
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: May 30, 2013
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