In the Interest of J.K.B. and Minor Children

Opinion issued June 26, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-13-00629-CV
———————————
IN THE INTEREST OF J.K.B. AND J.D.B., MINOR CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 246th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2011-77322
OPINION
Roy 1 filed suit to terminate the parent-child relationship between him and
J.K.B. and J.D.B., pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.005. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.005 (Vernon 2014). The statute permits a man to terminate the
parent-child relationship with a child if he satisfies certain statutory criteria
1
We refer to the parties involved by either first names only or initials to protect the
identities of the minor children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (Vernon
2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
entitling him to court-ordered genetic testing and the result of the testing excludes
him from being the child’s genetic father. See id. The trial court determined that
Roy did not meet certain statutory criteria entitling him to genetic testing under
section 161.005. The trial court signed an order denying Roy’s request for genetic
testing and his request for termination of the parent-child relationship between him
and J.K.B. and J.D.B.
We reverse and remand.
Background
A. Statutory History: Family Code Section 161.005
In 1973, the Texas Legislature enacted Family Code section 15.01, which
allowed a parent to seek voluntary termination of his or her parental rights to a
child. 2 The provision read, “[A] parent may file a petition requesting termination
of the parent-child relationship with his child. The petition may be granted if the
court finds that termination is in the best interest of the child.” 3 In 1995, the
2
Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, sec. 15.01, 1973 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1411, 1426, repealed by Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 2,
1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 282 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.005(a) (Vernon 2014)).
3
Id.
2
Legislature repealed section 15.01 and re-codified it as Family Code section
161.005. 4
The statute was “rarely used,” but when employed, it was most commonly
used “when [a] birth mother want[ed] to place her baby for adoption.” In re T.S.S.,
61 S.W.3d 481, 483 & 483 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (citing
Robinson C. Ramsey, Termination of Parental Rights, 4 Texas Family Law
Service, § 33.8 (6th ed. 1997)). There were, however, reported cases in which a
father asserted, pursuant to section 161.005, that termination of his parental rights
was in the child’s best interest.
In one such case, T.S.S., a father, responding to a threatened increase in child
support, sought to terminate the parent-child relationship under section 161.005,
asserting that termination was in the child’s best interest. See T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d at
483. The sole basis for the father’s assertion was his claim that he was not the
biological father. See id. at 488. The T.S.S. court determined that paternity had
been adjudicated in an earlier divorce proceeding, as indicated by the language in
the divorce decree. See id. at 486. The court held that the father was barred by
collateral estoppel from re-litigating the paternity issue and affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the termination request. Id. at 486, 488.
4
Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, §§ 1, 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113,
282 (amended 2011, 2013).
3
In 2011, the Legislature amended Family Code section 161.005,
substantially revising and expanding its provisions.5 Under the amended statute, a
mother or father could still seek to terminate the parent-child relationship based on
best interest of the child. 6 However, the 2011 amendments added provisions to the
statute giving a father a means to terminate the parent-child relationship when
paternity is in question. 7 These added provisions include the following:
§ 161.005. Termination When Parent Is Petitioner
....
(c) [A] man may file a suit for termination of the parent-child
relationship between the man and a child if, without obtaining genetic
testing, the man signed an acknowledgment of paternity of the child in
accordance with Subchapter D, Chapter 160, or was adjudicated to be
the father of the child in a previous proceeding under this title in
which genetic testing did not occur. The petition must be verified and
must allege facts showing that the petitioner:
(1) is not the child’s genetic father; and
(2) signed the acknowledgment of paternity or failed to
contest parentage in the previous proceeding because of
the mistaken belief, at the time the acknowledgment was
signed or on the date the court order in the previous
proceeding was rendered, that he was the child’s genetic
5
Act of Apr. 14, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 54, § 2, sec. 161.005, 2011 Tex. Gen.
Laws 86, 87–88.
6
Act of Apr. 14, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 54, § 2, sec. 161.005(a), 2011 Tex. Gen.
Laws 86, 87–88.
7
Act of Apr. 14, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 54, § 2, sec. 161.005(c)–(o), 2011 Tex.
Gen. Laws 86, 87–88.
4
father based on misrepresentations that led him to that
conclusion.
....
(e) A petition under Subsection (c) must be filed not later than the
second anniversary of the date on which the petitioner becomes aware
of the facts alleged in the petition indicating that the petitioner is not
the child’s genetic father.
(e-1) Subsection (e) applies beginning September 1, 2012. Before that
date, a petition may be filed under Subsection (c) regardless of the
date on which the petitioner became aware of the facts alleged in the
petition indicating that the petitioner is not the child’s genetic father.
This subsection expires September 1, 2013.
(f) In a proceeding initiated under Subsection (c), the court shall hold
a pretrial hearing to determine whether the petitioner has established a
meritorious prima facie case for termination of the parent-child
relationship. If a meritorious prima facie claim is established, the
court shall order the petitioner and the child to submit to genetic
testing under Sub-chapter F, Chapter 160.
(g) If the results of genetic testing ordered under Subsection (f)
identify the petitioner as the child’s genetic father under the standards
prescribed by Section 160.505 and the results of any further testing
requested by the petitioner and ordered by the court under Subchapter
F, Chapter 160, do not exclude the petitioner as the child’s genetic
father, the court shall deny the petitioner’s request for termination of
the parent-child relationship.
(h) If the results of genetic testing ordered under Subsection (f)
exclude the petitioner as the child’s genetic father, the court shall
render an order terminating the parent-child relationship.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.005(c)-(h) (Vernon 2014).
5
The text of the statute plainly provides a method for an acknowledged or
adjudicated father to challenge paternity through genetic testing. The legislative
history confirms this plain reading.
In the bill analysis for the 2011 amendment, the Senate Research Committee
recognized that, although section 161.005 provided that a parent may file a suit to
terminate the parent-child relationship, and a court may order termination if it is in
the child’s best interest, the statute contained no provisions “dealing with situations
in which a father has mistakenly signed an acknowledgment of paternity or has
been adjudicated as the father of a child.” SENATE RESEARCH CTR., BILL
ANALYSIS, TEX. S.B. 785, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011). The committee observed, “The
father would be required to continue paying child support even if genetic testing
proved that he could not be the father of the child.” Id. The analysis indicates that
the purpose of the 2011 amendment was to provide “a way for a man who has
either signed an acknowledgement of paternity or is adjudicated to be the father of
a child without obtaining genetic testing to have the parent-child relationship
terminated.” Id.
B. Facts and Procedural History
Roy married Mona in 1987. During the marriage, Mona gave birth to twins,
J.K.B. and J.D.B on July 12, 1999. At that time, the couple already had three other
children.
6
Roy and Mona divorced in 2002. On September 25, 2002, the trial court
signed an “Agreed Final Divorce Decree and Order Affecting the Parent-Child
Relationship.” In that judgment, the trial court found that Roy and Mona “are the
parents of” J.K.B. and J.D.B. and of their three siblings. Roy and Mona were
appointed joint managing conservators of the five children, with Mona having the
right of primary possession. Roy was ordered to pay child support for the children,
which he has paid through the years.
On December 28, 2011, Roy filed a verified petition to terminate the parent-
child relationship between him and the twins pursuant to Family Code section
161.005(c).8 Pleading the statutory elements of his section 161.005 claim, Roy
alleged as follows: (1) he had been adjudicated to be the twins’ father in the 2002
judgment from the divorce proceeding; (2) genetic testing had not occurred in that
proceeding; (3) he had not contested parentage in the divorce proceeding because
of his mistaken belief at that time he was the twins’ father; and (4) his mistaken
belief was based on misrepresentations that had been made to him. Roy asserted
that, after the divorce, he had undergone genetic testing, which excluded him as the
twins’ father. Roy attached the genetic testing report to his petition, which showed
8
Relevant to this appeal, a petition may be filed under subsection (c) regardless of
the date on which the petitioner became aware of the facts alleged in the petition,
provided the petition was filed after May 12, 2011 but before September 1, 2012.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.005 (e–1). Here, Roy filed his petition, within this
time period, on December 28, 2011.
7
that the testing had been done in September 2003 and had excluded Roy as the
twins’ biological father.
The trial court conducted pre-trial hearings on Roy’s termination request.
Roy claimed, as he had in his petition, that he had been adjudicated to be the twins’
father in the 2002 divorce proceeding. Asserting that he had made a prima facie
showing under section 161.005, Roy requested the trial court to order genetic
testing and ultimately to order termination of the parent-child relationship.
The trial court disagreed that Roy had been adjudicated to be the twins’
father in the divorce proceeding. Rather than an adjudicated father, the court stated
that Roy was the twins’ presumed father, as defined in the Family Code. The court
further stated that subsection 161.005(c) did not entitle a presumed father to
petition for termination under section 161.005. The trial court pointed out that,
under the Family Code, a presumed father must seek to challenge paternity within
four years of the birth of the child, which Roy had not done.9
9
Family Code section 160.607 provides that when a child has a presumed father, a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage “shall be commenced not later than the fourth
anniversary of the date of the birth of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.607(a) (Vernon 2014). However, there are exceptions to this requirement.
As amended in 2011, section 160.607 provides,
(b) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between
a child and the child’s presumed father may be maintained at any time if the
court determines that:
8
Having concluded that he was not an adjudicated father as alleged in his
petition, the trial court denied Roy’s request for genetic testing and his request for
termination of the parent-child relationship. On July 5, 2013, the trial court signed
an order, which provided as follows:
The Court finds that Petitioner [Roy] is the presumed father, married
to the mother of the children born during the marriage of the parents
and, therefore, is not an acknowledged father nor an adjudicated father
under Texas Family Code §161.005(c). Therefore, request for DNA
testing is denied and termination is denied.
At Roy’s request, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which provided as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about December 28, 2011, Roy . . . sought to have his
parentage terminated.
2. Roy . . . was married to the mother of the children at the time of the
conception and birth of the children.
(1) the presumed father and the mother of the child did not
live together or engage in sexual intercourse with each other
during the probable time of conception; or
(2) the presumed father was precluded from commencing a
proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of the child before the
expiration of the time prescribed by Subsection (a) because of
the mistaken belief that he was the child’s biological father
based on misrepresentations that led him to that conclusion.
Id. § 160.607(b).
9
3. Roy . . . was not an acknowledged father under Texas Family Code
161.005(c).
4. Roy . . . was not an adjudicated father under Texas Family Code
161.005(c).
5. Roy . . . failed to make a prima-facie showing under 161.005(f).
6. Roy . . . failed to show that the termination would be in the best
interest of the children.
7. Any Conclusion of Law that should be a Finding of Fact is adopted
here as a Finding of Fact.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction of all the parties and the subject matter
of the suit.
2. Roy . . . was not entitled to the relief requested.
2A. A presumed father is not an adjudicated father nor is he an
acknowledged father under the statute.
3. Any Conclusion of Law that should be a Finding of fact is adopted
here as a Finding of Fact.
Roy now appeals the trial court’s judgment, identifying three issues.10
Adjudicated to Be the Twins’ Father
In his first issue, Roy asserts that the trial court incorrectly determined that
he was not an adjudicated father for purposes of subsection 161.005(c), as Roy had
alleged in his petition. The material facts underlying whether Roy is an
adjudicated father for purposes of subsection 161.005(c) are undisputed. The
10
Mona has not filed an appellee’s brief.
10
resolution of this issue turns on the application of statutory language to those
undisputed facts. We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Molinet
v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). Our fundamental objective in
interpreting a statute is “to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.”
Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Samudio, 370 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. 2012). “The plain
language of a statute is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent.” Prairie View A
& M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. 2012).
When statutory text is clear, it is determinative of legislative intent, unless
enforcing the plain meaning of the statute’s words would produce an absurd result.
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). The
words of the statute cannot be examined in isolation, but must be construed based
on the context in which they are used. TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs,
340 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tex. 2011).
Roy asserts that, for purposes of Family Code subsection 161.005(c), he was
adjudicated to be the twins’ father in the 2002 divorce proceeding. Roy points to
the language in the December 2002 judgment from that proceeding in which the
court expressly found Mona and Roy “are the parents of” J.K.B. and J.D.B.
Pursuant to subsection 161.005(c), “[A] man may file a suit for termination
of the parent-child relationship between the man and a child if, without obtaining
genetic testing, the man . . . was adjudicated to be the father of the child in a
11
previous proceeding under this title in which genetic testing did not occur.” TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005(c). The phrase “under this title” refers to Family Code
Title 5, entitled, “The Parent-Child Relationship and the Suit Affecting the Parent-
Child Relationship.” Title 5 contains Family Code chapters 101 through 266,
which address generally parent-child relationships and suits affecting the parent-
child relationship. See id. §§ 101.001–266.011 (Vernon 2014).
Matters of conservatorship, possession, and support are matters adjudicated
as a suit affecting the parent-child relationship under Title 5. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 101.032 (Vernon 2014) (defining suit affecting the parent-child
relationship); see also id. §§ 153.001–.709 (Vernon 2014) (governing matters of
conservatorship and possession of minor children); id. §§ 154.002–.309 (Vernon
2014) (governing child support issues). This Court has previously recognized that
a suit for divorce in which the parties are parents of minor children necessarily
includes a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Neal v. Kuniansky, No. 01–
05–00368–CV, 2006 WL 1493735, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June
1, 2006, no pet.) (citing Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1994, writ denied)).
As indicated by the December 2002 judgment, issues affecting the parent-
child relationship, governed by Title 5, were resolved in the 2002 divorce
proceeding. Specifically, the judgment—under the heading, “Orders Affecting the
12
Parent-Child Relationship”—appointed Mona and Roy as the children’s joint
managing conservators, gave Mona primary possession, set out a standard
visitation and possession schedule, and ordered Roy to pay child support for the
five children born during Roy and Mona’s marriage, including J.K.B. and J.D.B. It
was within the context of that proceeding and in conjunction with resolving the
issues affecting the parent-child relationship that the trial court expressly found in
the judgment that Roy was the parent of J.K.B. and J.D.B.
As Roy points out, courts have held that a man has been adjudicated to be
the father of a child when a court finds in a divorce judgment that the man is the
parent of the child as part of the court’s resolution of issues affecting the parent-
child relationship in the divorce proceeding. See, e.g., Dreyer v. Greene, 871
S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993); T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d at 485; In re A.L.J., 929 S.W.2d
467, 470-71 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied); Espree v. Guillory, 753 S.W.2d
722, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). Given that, in the 2002
judgment, the trial court expressly found Roy to be the parent of the twins,
appointed him the twins’ joint managing conservator, and ordered him to pay child
support, we conclude that Roy was adjudicated to be the father of J.K.B. and
J.D.B. in a proceeding under Title 5 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.005(c).
13
We also agree with Roy that his status as a presumed father at the time of the
divorce proceeding has no bearing on whether he was adjudicated to be the father
of the twins during that proceeding. 11 It is instructive that the Legislature has
recognized that an adjudication of parentage can occur in the context of a divorce
proceeding. Subsection (c) of Family Code section 160.637, entitled, “Binding
Effect of Determination of Parentage,” provides as follows:
In a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the court is considered to have
made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if . . . the final order:
(1) expressly identifies the child as ‘a child of the marriage’ or ‘issue
of the marriage’ or uses similar words indicating that the husband is
the father of the child; or (2) provides for the payment of child support
for the child by the husband unless paternity is specifically disclaimed
in the order.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.637(c) (Vernon 2014). The Legislature made no
exception for presumed fathers from this provision; nor did the Legislature
preclude presumed fathers from filing a petition to terminate the parent-child
relationship under Family Code subsection 161.005(c). See id.; see also TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005.
11
A presumption of paternity exists if a man is married to the mother of the child
and the child is born during the marriage. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(1)
(Vernon 2014). This presumption legally establishes the father-child relationship
between the man and child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(b)(1). By operation
of law, a “presumed father” is “recognized as the father of the child until that
status is rebutted or confirmed in a judicial proceeding.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.102(13). Roy does not dispute that he was the twins’ presumed father;
rather, he asserts that he was adjudicated to be their father in the 2002 judgment
from the divorce proceeding.
14
We hold that Roy was an adjudicated father for purposes of filing a petition
to terminate the parent-child relationship pursuant to Family Code subsection
161.005(c). We further hold that the trial court erred when it denied Roy’s request
for genetic testing and request for termination based on its determination that he
was not an adjudicated father as contemplated by subsection 161.005(c).
We sustain Roy’s first issue.
Prima Facie Case
In his second issue, Roy asserts that the trial court erred when it determined
that he had not presented a prima case pursuant to Family Code subsection
161.005(f). Subsection (f) requires a trial court to hold a pre-trial hearing to
determine whether the father has established a “meritorious prima facie case for
termination of the parent-child relationship.” Id. § 161.005(f). As part of that
prima facie case, Roy was required to show that he failed to contest parentage in
the divorce proceeding because of the mistaken belief—on the date the court order
in the previous proceeding was rendered—that he was the twins’ genetic father
based on misrepresentations that led him to that conclusion. See id. § 161.005(c).
If a trial court finds that the man has established a prima facie case for
termination, the trial court shall order the petitioner and child to submit to genetic
testing. Id. § 161.005(f). Because a determination of whether a party has
presented prima facie proof of a meritorious claim is a question of law, we review
15
the trial court’s decision of this issue de novo. In re C.E., 391 S.W.3d 200, 203
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
Prima facie evidence is “merely that which suffices for the proof of a
particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence.” Id. (citing
Dodson v. Watson, 220 S.W. 771, 772 (Tex. 1920)). The prima facie standard
requires only the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational
inference that the alleged fact is true. Id. (citing In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)). To make a prima facie case for genetic
testing, Roy had to present evidence sufficient to support an inference that a
misrepresentation caused him to believe that he was the twins’ biological father.
See id.; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005(c), (f).
Roy’s petition tracked the statutory language, alleging that he did not contest
paternity in the divorce proceeding because of his mistaken belief at that time that
he was the twins’ genetic father “based on misrepresentations that led him to that
conclusion.” His petition was supported by his sworn statement that the facts
alleged in the petition “are true and correct.” Mona did not answer the petition.
To the contrary, at the pre-trial hearing, she affirmatively stated that she did not
contest the termination request.
In addition, Roy offered the lab reports from the genetic testing completed in
September 2003, nearly one year after rendition of the judgment in the divorce
16
proceeding adjudicating Roy as the twins’ father. The reports reflect that Roy is
excluded from being the twins’ genetic father. Roy stated at the pre-trial hearing
that he paid for the testing, which was after the divorce proceeding. Mona also
stated at the hearing that they had not learned until “later on” that Roy was not the
twins’ biological father.
We conclude that Roy’s uncontested verified petition alleging that a
misrepresentation caused Roy to believe that he was the twins’ biological father
coupled with circumstantial evidence that a misrepresentation as to paternity was
made constitutes a prima facie case for genetic testing under Family Code section
161.005(c) in this case. See C.E., 391 S.W.3d at 204. We sustain Roy’s second
issue.
Best Interest
In his third issue, Roy assails the trial court’s determination that Roy failed
to show that the termination would be in the best interest of the children. Roy
asserts that the trial court erred when it considered the twins’ best interest in
determining whether he was entitled to termination of the parent-child relationship
under subsection 161.005(c). We agree.
As part of the 2011 amendments to section 161.005, the Legislature added
the following italicized language to subsection 161.005(a): “Except as provided by
Subsection (h), the court may order termination if termination is in the best interest
17
of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005(a) (emphasis added). Subsection
(h) provides: “If the results of genetic testing ordered under Subsection (f) exclude
the petitioner as the child’s genetic father, the court shall render an order
terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. § 161.005(h). Although a parent
may still seek termination of the parent-child relationship based on the best interest
of the child under subsection 161.005(a), termination sought under subsection (c)
does not include a best-interest determination. If a petitioner makes a prima facie
showing under subsection (f), entitling him to genetic testing, and the genetic
testing excludes him as the father, then he is entitled to termination under
subsection (h), irrespective of the child’s best interest. See id.
§§ 161.005(a),(c),(f),(h). Thus, the trial court’s determination that Roy did not
show that termination was in the twins’ best interest cannot support denial of his
termination request under subsection 161.005(c).
We sustain Roy’s third issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.
18