Delapaz, Antonio v. State

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed this 6th day of May, 2013.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-11-01465-CR
ANTONIO DELAPAZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F11-00659-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, O'Neill, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice Moseley
A jury convicted Antonio Delapaz, a juvenile, of the murder of Agustin Valdez. In a
single issue, Delapaz argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and admitting
his written statement into evidence because the written statement was a product of a prior oral
statement to police that was taken in violation of section 51.095 of the Texas Family Code. The
background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we
do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this
memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. Officer Fidel Perez of the
Dallas Police Department testified to the following facts. On July 18, 2010, Perez interviewed
Delapaz in an interview room at the youth division of the Dallas Police Department. Before the
interview began, Perez, unarmed and alone, introduced himself to Delapaz and gave Miranda
warnings to Delapaz. After Delapaz told Perez his story, Perez “realized that we needed to have
a judge come in and give him his magistrate warning.” Perez called Magistrate Judge Mike
Snipes to give the warnings required by the family code. After Snipes warned Delapaz, Perez
wrote down Delapaz’s statement.
Snipes also testified at the hearing. On July 18, 2010, he was called to admonish
Delapaz. At that time, Snipes was not aware that, prior to his arrival, Perez had Mirandized
Delapaz and taken Delapaz’s oral statement. Snipes testified: “if there had been any doubt
whatsoever in my mind about the voluntariness of this young man’s statement, I wouldn’t have
taken it.” He believed Delapaz’s written statement was “completely, freely, knowingly and
voluntarily made.” Snipes’s magistrate certification and acknowledgement of voluntary
statement of a juvenile, as well as Delapaz’s signed, written statement were admitted into
evidence.
The trial court overruled Delapaz’s motion to suppress, concluding:
The oral and written statement [sic] was freely and voluntarily
made and does stem from a custodial interrogation by Officer Fidel
Perez of Antonio Delapaz. The Defendant made the statements
free of any threats, compulsions, or coercion or promises made in
order to persuade the Defendant to make the oral statement or sign
the written statement. The Defendant’s statements were
voluntarily made and are admissible into evidence.
At trial, Delapaz’s written statement was admitted over his renewed objection. On
appeal, Delapaz argues his written statement was taken in violation of section 51.095 of the
family code because it was a product of his initial, oral statement, which was taken before he
received warnings from a magistrate. See TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 51.095 (West 2008).
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
the historical facts that the record supports, and a de novo standard for the legal components of
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the trial court’s decision. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When the trial court makes no
explicit findings of historical facts, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327–28. If the trial court’s ruling is correct under any
theory of law applicable to the case, the ruling will be sustained. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853,
855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Section 51.095 governs the admissibility of a juvenile’s custodial statement. 1 See TEX.
FAMILY CODE ANN. § 51.095. A child’s written statement is admissible if, among other
requirements, “the statement shows that the child has at some time before the making of the
statement received” the requisite warning from a magistrate. See id. § 51.095(a)(1)(A).
In Jeffrey v. State, Jeffrey, a juvenile, was interviewed at a police station about a murder.
38 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Jeffrey gave one
written statement and four oral statements before receiving warnings pursuant to section 51.095.
Id. In her fourth oral statement, Jeffrey incriminated herself. Id. After she made the
incriminating statement, a magistrate administered the warnings prescribed by section 51.095.
Jeffrey then provided a second written statement. Id. After making the second written
statement, another magistrate issued a second set of warnings. Id. The court of appeals
concluded that Jeffrey’s third and fourth oral custodial statements were inadmissible because
they were obtained without a magistrate’s warning in violation of section 51.095. Id. at 858.
However, the court also concluded that Jeffrey’s second written statement, also the result of a
custodial interrogation, was obtained in accordance with section 51.095 because Jeffrey received
1
The trial court concluded that Delapaz’s oral and written statements were the result of a custodial interrogation. Neither party contests this
conclusion.
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the required warning before providing the statement. Id. The court of appeals concluded the
trial court did not err by denying Jeffrey’s motion to suppress the second written statement. Id.
Here Delapaz made two statements while in custody: an oral statement and a subsequent
written statement. Like Jeffrey, Delapaz gave his initial oral statement without the protections of
section 51.095; however, Delapaz’s subsequent written statement was taken after he received the
magistrate warning prescribed by section 51.095. See id. at 852. Because Delapaz received a
magistrate warning before providing his written statement, his written statement was obtained in
accordance with section 51.095. See id. at 858. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Delapaz’s motion to suppress and we overrule Delapaz’s sole issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Jim Moseley/
JIM MOSELEY
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
111465F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ANTONIO DELAPAZ, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-11-01465-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F11-00659-I.
Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices O'Neill and Lewis participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 6th day of May, 2013.
/Jim Moseley/
JIM MOSELEY
JUSTICE
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