Francisco Arzate v. State

Opinion issued December 17, 2013.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-01074-CR
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FRANCISCO ARZATE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1317247
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Francisco Arzate appeals a judgment convicting him of capital murder for
the shooting of his father-in-law, Guillermo Valdez. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013). A jury found Arzate guilty, and the trial judge
sentenced him to life in prison. In his sole issue on appeal, Arzate contends that
the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
Arzate was married to Maria and Guillermo Valdez’s daughter, Patricia, for
almost ten years, but he and Patricia had separated two years before the incident.
Patricia and Arzate had five children. Patricia testified that she and Arzate had an
unstable relationship and often fought and that she moved to her parents’ home
upon her separation from Arzate. In August 2011, Arzate was upset because he
had recently learned that Patricia was in a relationship with another man. Arzate
had called Patricia upset about her boyfriend and threatened that he would take
action if Patricia did not end that relationship.
Patricia testified that on the day of the incident, August, 19, 2011, she talked
to Arzate about paying school tuition, but they did not fight, and it was a “normal
day.” Arzate left a voicemail on Patricia’s phone around 11:30 p.m. that night
saying that “he was suffering so [Patricia was] going to suffer the same way that he
was suffering.” Patricia was at the hospital with her oldest son that night, but she
called her sister because the voicemail worried her. A few minutes later, Maria
called Patricia and told her that Arzate had shot Maria and Guillermo.
Although Patricia was not at her parents’ home at the time of the shooting,
several others were. Maria testified that she and Guillermo were in their bedroom
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watching television with the door closed late at night when Maria heard a noise.
Guillermo opened the bedroom door, Maria heard Arzate say “he was going to kill
us,” and Arzate began shooting at Maria and Guillermo. Maria testified that she
had heard Arzate’s voice on many occasions and immediately recognized it. Maria
also testified that she saw the side of the shooter’s body and it looked like Arzate.
On the night of the shooting, Maria told police that she saw only the shooter’s
shadow, and not the shooter’s face.
Guillermo and Maria’s other daughter, Elizabeth, was also at the scene.
She had fallen asleep in one of the bedrooms a little after midnight, but she woke
up when she heard Arzate screaming in Spanish from the living room several
times, “where’s the bastard?” Elizabeth then heard gunshots and Maria screaming,
so she ran to the living room and saw that the front door, which had been closed
and locked, was open and appeared to have been forced open. She saw that
Guillermo was lying on his back—shot more than once—and Maria was bleeding.
When Elizabeth saw Maria, Maria was screaming, “why Francisco, why?” and
Elizabeth believed that Maria was referring to Arzate. Elizabeth did not see the
shooter, but she testified that there was no doubt in her mind that the voice she
heard yelling “where is the bastard?” was the voice of Arzate.
Elizabeth’s thirteen year old son, Heron, was also home and sleeping on the
living room couch when the shooting took place. Heron testified that he also heard
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Arzate yelling, “where was the bastard at?” Heron did not see Arzate on the night
of the shooting, but recognized his voice because he had often visited Arzate’s
house. Heron also testified that he heard Maria say, “why Francisco, why?”
By the time police and EMS arrived, Guillermo was dead from four gunshot
wounds. Arzate called Patricia after the incident, but she did not answer.
The day after the shooting, Arzate called his employer, Richard Gonzalez,
and told him “that he wasn’t going to be coming in because he had an issue,
something happened with his family and he doesn’t know if he’s ever going to
come back.” Gonzalez testified that during the same phone call, Arzate also said,
“what happened happened.”
The police suspected Arzate was the shooter and that he had fled to Mexico
shortly after the shooting. Arzate’s brother and sister testified that Arzate went to
Mexico but added that the trip was a planned vacation to visit family. Patricia
testified that this was Arzate’s first trip to Mexico and that he would not have
vacationed there because he did not have documentation that would allow him to
re-enter the United States.
A few months after the shooting, Arzate sent Patricia a text message that
said, “I’m sorry. Are you guys okay. Are my kids okay.” Patricia testified that
Arzate also called her from Mexico. In one such call, Arzate, who had said he was
angry that Patricia was not taking his calls, threatened Patricia by saying that “The
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same thing that he did to [her] dad he was going to do it to [her] grandma, that he
knew where she lived and he was going to go over there and get her also.”
Patricia also testified that Arzate attempted to have her create an alibi for
him. In a letter, Arzate wrote: “do it for our children and for the love we had
between us. You know it wasn’t my fault about your father. Why do you want to
take your children’s father away.” The letter continued: “If you feel something in
your heart you tell the lawyer that I was in Mexico.”
Arzate also called Gonzalez and threatened that Gonzalez would suffer the
same fate as Guillermo. When Arzate left for Mexico, Arzate had left his car and
tools with Gonzalez. Gonzalez testified that Arzate told him that if Gonzalez did
not pay Arzate’s brother for the vehicle and his tools, that he “was going to kill me
and come after my family.” Gonzalez testified that Arzate added, “If you don’t
believe me you saw what happened to my in-laws.”
Discussion
In his sole point of error, Arzate contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Arzate argues that a rational
jury could not have found him guilty based solely upon voice identification, which
he argues is less reliable than eyewitness identification.
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A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact
finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2789 (1979)); see also Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (holding Jackson standard is only standard to use when determining
sufficiency of evidence). Our review of “all of the evidence” includes evidence
that was properly and improperly admitted. McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 110
(quoting Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Id. (citing Bartlett v. State,
270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A jury may accept one version of
the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness’s testimony. Id.
(citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). We may not
re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the fact finder. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007)). We afford almost complete deference to the jury’s
determinations of credibility and we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in
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favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
B. Applicable Law
A person commits capital murder when he commits murder under section
19.02(b)(1) of the Penal Code and “commits the murder in the course of
committing or attempting to commit . . . burglary.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(2). A person commits the offense of burglary if, “without the effective
consent of the owner,” the person “enters a building or habitation and commits or
attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 30.02(a)(3) (West 2011). Under section 19.02(b)(1), a person commits murder if
he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person or intends to
cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2011);
Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
A murder conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. Temple,
390 S.W.3d at 359 (citing Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). “Circumstantial evidence
is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. (quoting
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In circumstantial
evidence cases, it is not necessary that every fact and circumstance point directly
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and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is
warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993)).
C. Analysis
To prove that Arzate is guilty of capital murder, the State had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Arzate, in the course of a burglary or attempted
burglary, knowingly or intentionally caused Guillermo’s death or intended to cause
Guillermo serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human
life that caused Guillermo’s death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1);
19.03(a)(2).
We conclude the evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict. First, three
witnesses who had known Arzate for years identified Arzate as the shooter based
on his voice. Maria testified that she heard Arzate say “he was going to kill us”
and then the shooter began shooting at her and Guillermo. Elizabeth testified that
it was Arzate who screamed “where’s the bastard” right before she heard gunshots.
Heron also testified that it was Arzate who yelled those words. Voice identification
is an acceptable means of identification and has been held sufficient to support a
conviction. See Locke v. State, 453 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)
(“Voice is a competent means of identification if the witness had any previous
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acquaintance with the person identified”); Davis v. State, 180 S.W.3d 277, 285–86
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding voice identification sufficient to
support conviction).
Second, Arzate’s conduct after the murder indicates consciousness of guilt.
There is evidence that Arzate was in Mexico after the shooting, despite the fact that
he had not previously traveled to Mexico because his immigration status made it
impossible for him to return. Gonzalez testified that Arzate told him the day after
the murder “something happened with his family and he doesn’t know if he’s ever
going to come back.”
Finally, there is evidence that Arzate implicitly admitted shooting
Guillermo, explicitly asked Patricia to create an alibi for him, and threatened both
Patricia and Gonzalez that their relatives would meet the same fate as Guillermo if
his demands were not met. Patricia testified that Arzate sent her a letter asking
Patricia to lie about his whereabouts on the night of the shooting. Patricia also
testified that a few months after Guillermo’s murder, Arzate sent her a text
message stating that he was “sorry” and that Arzate also called her from Mexico
and threatened to do the “same thing” to her grandma that he did to Guillermo.
Gonzalez testified that Arzate called him several times after the murder and during
one call threatened to kill Gonzalez and go after his family if Gonzalez did not pay
Arzate’s brother. Gonzalez testified that Arzate substantiated the threat by saying,
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“if you don’t believe me you saw what happened to my in-laws. What do you think
is going to happen to you[?]” And, in a voicemail Arzate left Patricia on the night
of the shooting, he warned that he was going to make her suffer like she was
making him suffer.
Arzate contends that the State’s failure to present an eyewitness identifying
Arzate or physical evidence—such as fingerprints, DNA, or ballistic evidence—
linking Arzate with the shooting renders the evidence insufficient. But, the lack of
physical evidence, such as fingerprints, footprints, or DNA, does not render the
evidence supporting a conviction insufficient. Harmon v. State, 167 S.W.3d 610,
614 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). Similarly, eyewitness
identification is not required for a conviction. Green v. State, 124 S.W.3d 789, 792
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (eyewitness identification is not
necessary to identify perpetrator). The lack of eyewitness testimony and physical
evidence were factors for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence, and we
defer to the jury’s resolution of these issues. See McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 110.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
that a rational juror could have found that during the course of committing a
burglary, Arzate intentionally or knowingly caused Guillermo’s death or intended
to cause his death and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
caused his death. Accordingly, we hold the evidence was legally sufficient to
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support the judgment. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (“Evidence of flight or escape is admissible as a circumstance from which an
inference of guilt may be drawn.”); McInturf v. State, 544 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.
Crim App. 1976) (holding voice identification is direct evidence, which may
constitute sufficient basis for conviction, and testimony about voice identification
is question of fact for jury); Kesaria v. State, 148 S.W.3d 634, 640–41 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (holding evidence was sufficient to establish
defendant’s identity to support burglary of habitation conviction where victims
unequivocally identified defendant as man who burglarized home in part because
they recognized his voice), aff’d, 189 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
We overrule Arzate’s sole point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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