Robertson, Damon v. State

Order entered April 16, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-11-01594-CR
DAMON ROBERTSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F11-17405-K
ORDER
On February 25, 2013, appellant, who is represented by counsel, filed a pro se motion to
file a supplemental brief. Because he is not entitled to hybrid representation, we denied
appellant’s motion by order dated February 28, 2013. See Rudd v. State, 616 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). On March 14, 2013, appellant filed an objection to our ruling and
on April 4, 2013, he filed a motion requesting we rule on his objection. In both the objection and
motion, appellant asserts that the language in article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution and
article 1.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure providing that an accused “shall have the
right of being heard by himself, or counsel, or both” in fact entitles him to hybrid representation.
However, as noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272,
278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), this language has consistently been interpreted “to allow an accused
and his counsel to be heard at trial in appropriate situations, but not to expand or alter the right to
counsel or in any way give the accused the right to hybrid representation.” Accordingly, we
DENY appellant’s March 14th objection and April 4th motion.
/Douglas S. Lang/
DOUGLAS S. LANG
PRESIDING JUSTICE