Scott Wheeler v. State

NO. 07-09-00148-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
MAY 19, 2010
SCOTT A. WHEELER,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
____________________________
FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2007-418,302; HONORABLE BRADLEY S. UNDERWOOD, PRESIDING
Memorandum Opinion
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Scott A. Wheeler appeals his conviction of sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old
girl1 by contending 1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his
confession was not voluntary, 2) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
establish the location of the assault, and 3) he was harmed by the prosecutor’s closing
argument. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
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Appellant was charged with two counts of sexual assault. One count involved the penetration of
the complainant’s vagina by appellant’s penis while the second count involved the contact of appellant’s
penis with the complainant’s mouth. Appellant was acquitted of the second count.
Issue 1 – Voluntariness of Confession
After taking a polygraph examination, appellant gave a written statement to
police in which he admitted having consensual sexual relations with the complainant.
Appellant seems to be arguing that his confession was involuntary, despite having been
Mirandized at the time, because it was given while he was in custody. We overrule the
issue.
Before us is one of those arguments where we can but only shake our collective
heads and say “what?” We know of no authority holding that a confession is involuntary
simply because it was made while the speaker (who had been Mirandized) was in
custody. More importantly, appellant cites us to no such authority. And, to the extent
that the tact undertaken by appellant is one that incorporates an implied request for us
to write new law on the subject, we leave that to other governmental bodies, such as the
legislature or our Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus, appellant’s first issue is overruled.
Issue 2 – Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, appellant argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
establish that the offense occurred in Lubbock County as alleged in the indictment. We
overrule the issue.
Appellant admitted, in his confession, that he had sex with the victim at his
friend’s house. A sheriff’s deputy testified that the “friend” alluded to by appellant was
Ricky Daniels. Other evidence, which appellant does not question, illustrates that Ricky
Daniels lived in Lubbock County. Assuming arguendo that the legal and factual
sufficiency analysis applicable here is that used when assessing whether the State
established the elements of the offense, the foregoing is some evidence upon which a
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rational jury could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the crime occurred in
Lubbock County. That the victim said she was assaulted at a locale other than Daniels’
residence simply created an issue of fact and credibility for the jury to decide. It could
have legitimately doubted the accuracy of her comments about the location given that
she was intoxicated (high on drugs) at the time and opted to believe appellant. And, its
doing so would not be wrong or manifestly unjust.
Issue 3 – Jury Argument
Finally, appellant complains of several instances of allegedly improper jury
argument. They consist of the prosecutor supposedly vouching for the credibility of the
complainant and striking at appellant over the shoulder of defense counsel. The issue
is overruled.
Regarding two of the alleged instances of vouching for the credibility of the
complainant, appellant objected to both and each objection was sustained. The trial
court also instructed the jury to disregard the comments; however, it refused to grant a
mistrial.2 We presume that the jury followed the instruction to disregard. Brock v. State,
275 S.W.3d 586, 591-92 (Tex. App.–Amarillo, 2008, pet. ref’d). Moreover, nothing in
the record indicates that it did not. See Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). Parenthetically, we note that appellant was acquitted of one charge
made against him by the complainant.
As for the third instance of purported vouching, the prosecutor argued: “[a]nd if
[the complainant] was being consistent with her history today, she would have taken the
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Appellant further complains that one of those statements (“she has told you the truth”) was
apparently on a slide presentation. Appellant requested the State to make a copy of that statement for
inclusion in the record although it does not appear in the record. We note that the trial court did not
actually order the State to do so. Furthermore, as noted above, an instruction to disregard was given to
the jury.
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easy way out, but [the complainant] is a different person.” The trial court overruled
appellant’s objection to that comment. We note that a prosecutor may permissibly
summarize the evidence. Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2075, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1139 (2009). Although
appellant argues that the prosecutor was personally assuring the jury that the
complainant had changed, she herself testified at trial that she had lied in the past but
she had changed for the sake of her young son because she did not want him to be a
liar. Thus, the remark was arguably a summation of the testimony given by the
complainant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the
objection. See York v. State, 258 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.–Waco 2008, pet. ref’d)
(stating that abuse of discretion is the standard of review).
Appellant also refers to a remark he deems as an effort to strike at him over the
shoulder of his counsel. The remark was:
But the law does not just protect the good children, sometimes the
troubled ones. The defendant has confessed to this offense. Have we
come to a place in our society that if you’re willing to sling enough mud
that you can get away with the crimes that you admit to?
The objection was overruled. Appellant argues that the statement must refer to his
defense counsel because he did not testify at trial.
Argument that strikes at a defendant over the shoulders of defense counsel is
improper. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). That is not
the ilk of the comment at bar for several reasons. First, it does not refer to defense
counsel personally as opposed to the nature of the defense presented by counsel.
Second, argument made in response to argument of counsel is proper, Cole v. State,
194 S.W.3d 538, 546 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d), and appellant’s
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counsel repeatedly attempted to label the victim as a liar. We believe that the statement
of the prosecutor can be legitimately viewed as a response to appellant’s accusations.
Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the objection. See
id. at 545-46 (holding that the statement that law enforcement officers know better than
the defense attorney when fingerprint testing should be done was not objectionable
when it was a response to closing argument that the police had not done their jobs by
dusting for fingerprints).
Finally, we cannot forget appellant’s confession to committing the crime. That
alone tends to vouch more for the credibility of the complainant than any utterance by
the prosecutor. We further couple this with the fact that appellant was acquitted of one
count and the overall nature of the appellate record and cannot but conclude that no
harm resulted from the comments at issue, assuming arguendo that they were
improper.
Having overruled all of appellant’s issues, the judgment is affirmed.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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