Gregory Bernard Statin v. State

Opinion issued June 6, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NOS. 01-11-00651-CR & 01-11-00652-CR
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GREGORY BERNARD STATIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 123986301010 & 123986401010
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING *
A jury convicted appellant Gregory Bernard Statin of possession with intent
to deliver cocaine weighing between 4 and 200 grams (trial court case no.
1239863, appellate court case no. 01-11-00651-CR), see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(3)(D), 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010), and of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon (trial court case no. 1239864, appellate court
case no. 01-11-00652-CR). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a), (e) (West
2011). The trial court assessed punishment of 25 years in prison for possession of
cocaine and 10 years in prison for possession of a firearm, with the terms to run
concurrently. On appeal, Statin argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress evidence and by not giving the jury a requested instruction
relating to the lawfulness of a search. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
In 2009, a task force of the Houston Police Department conducted
surveillance on a condominium unit in southwest Houston, which the police
believed was a place used for trafficking in narcotics. Officers involved with the
surveillance briefed the officers who patrolled the area about their ongoing
*
We originally issued our memorandum opinion in this appeal on March 12, 2013.
Appellant, Gregory Bernard Statin, filed a motion for rehearing. We deny the
motion for rehearing, withdraw our previous memorandum opinion, vacate our
prior judgments, and issue this memorandum opinion and the related judgments in
their stead.
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investigation. Statin and his girlfriend, Monique Harris, owned apartment 207,
which was the unit that was under surveillance. Statin also owned apartment 201.
One afternoon Statin offered to drive Harris’s sister-in-law, Yolanda Brown,
to an appointment. On the way they picked up another passenger, who rode in the
back seat. Statin left the condominium complex, made a u-turn without signaling,
and was stopped by Houston Police Department Officers Tran and Gandingco for a
traffic violation. The officers were patrolling the area when they stopped Statin’s
truck; they were not conducting surveillance. Tran testified that as he approached
the driver’s side, “immediately I detected an odor of marijuana in the vehicle.”
The officers asked Statin, Brown, and the other passenger to get out of the truck,
and they separated them. Although Statin was cooperative, Tran noticed that the
other passenger was not, so he handcuffed Statin and put him in the back seat of a
patrol car. When Statin provided his identification, Tran recognized the name and
remembered that he was the target of the investigation and surveillance of
apartment 207 in the nearby condominium complex. Tran immediately contacted
the tactical unit supervisors, Houston Police Department Sergeants Sims and
Garza, who arrived at the scene of the traffic stop within 20 minutes.
Houston Police Department Officer J. Oliver was assigned to the tactical
unit in southwest Houston that worked with issues involving gangs, narcotics, and
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homicide. When he heard about the traffic stop of Statin over the radio, he went to
the scene of the traffic stop to help with the investigation.
When Tran returned to the truck, he saw a crack pipe in plain view “on the
driver’s seat by the middle console.” After a field test of the residue in the crack
pipe was positive, Statin was arrested for possession of a controlled substance.
Yolanda Brown, who was the front-seat passenger in Statin’s car, testified
that after the officers took the keys from the truck’s ignition, they then asked Statin
if they “could go to his house.” According to Brown, Statin declined and inquired
why the officers were going to his house. When asked about Statin’s attitude at the
time, she reiterated: “He told them no. He was upset and he said no. He said don’t
go to my house. What you going to my house for?” She further testified, “They
said nothing else. They just took the keys and burned off and went to the
apartments.”
At a hearing on his motions to suppress, Statin testified similarly. He said,
“The police officer came over there. They already had my keys. And he came
over there. He said, ‘Oh, we’re going to your house.’ And he asked me could he
go, and I told him, ‘No. What you going to my house for?’” Both Statin and
Brown conceded that they had prior felony convictions, and they both testified that
the police officers conspired to and did plant the crack pipe in Statin’s truck, a fact
that the trial court stated informed his determination of these witnesses’ credibility.
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The officers who were present at the traffic stop testified that Statin refused to talk
to them or that they did not ask or did not recall asking his permission to search his
apartment.
Tran and several other officers went to apartment number 201, which
belonged to Statin. They knocked, and Monique Harris answered the door. She
said that she and Statin lived there, and she had keys and was able to control her
barking pit bulls that were present. The officers informed her that Statin was in
custody and that they were conducting an investigation. They asked for and
obtained her consent to search apartment 201.
Harris secured her dogs and permitted the police to search apartment 201
with a narcotics-sniffing police dog. In addition, Harris pointed out the presence of
a gun, which Officer Oliver said was “[i]n the bedroom in the closet in plain view.”
Harris told the officers that the gun was hers and that she had a receipt for it.
Oliver stayed with Harris during the search of apartment 201, and afterward
he asked for her consent to search apartment 207. Harris told the officers that she
and Statin were remodeling it in anticipation of a move. Harris was reluctant to
consent to a search of apartment 207. Oliver said, “She was concerned about
herself, if anything was found in there . . . what was going to happen.” After
speaking to an attorney, she consented in writing to the search of the other
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apartment. At trial, evidence was introduced that showed Harris and Statin jointly
owned apartment 207.
In apartment 207, police found plastic containers of marijuana and a 9-
millimeter pistol with 12 live rounds. In a closet, they also found a bag containing
190 individually foil-wrapped portions of crack cocaine, which officers estimated
would sell for $20 each. The apartment also contained utensils for cooking crack
cocaine, a beaker with trace amounts of residue, a spoon, a wick, and a scale.
Statin’s name appeared on bills, tax returns, and dry cleaning receipts found in the
apartment.
Statin filed a motion to suppress evidence pertaining to both the firearm and
drug charges. Before trial, the court told the parties that it would hear the motion
as it heard the case. Because the motion to suppress dealt with an issue that would
have been completely decisive of the case, and because the court told Statin that it
wanted to carry the motion to suppress with the case, the motion to suppress was
not untimely and was sufficient to preserve Statin’s complaint for appeal. See
Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Defense counsel
repeatedly raised his objections to the admission of evidence and the court
continually noted that the evidence was conditionally admitted. At one point, the
court stated specifically that it wanted the appellate record to be clear that the
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defendant had objected, “So, I just want to make sure that everybody reading this
record understands that counsel has not waived his objection to this.”
After the State rested its case, the trial court conducted a hearing on Statin’s
motion to suppress. Statin based his motion on constitutional grounds, arguing that
under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1526 (2006),
Harris’s consent was invalid as to evidence to be used against Statin because he
expressly denied consent by saying, “Don’t go to my house.” At the suppression
hearing, Statin’s lawyer said, “I agree that Monique Harris had the right to give
consent to search the house. . . . But that consent is only good against her. It’s not
good against this man because he refused consent.” The trial court found that there
was no question that Harris’s consent was voluntary. The court overruled the
motion to suppress and admitted all the evidence that previously had been admitted
conditionally.
Statin objected to the jury charge and requested that the court instruct the
jury to disregard the evidence against him if they had a reasonable doubt that the
search of his home was without his consent. He argued that as in Randolph, he
“was present and made his objection known . . . directly to the police.” Counsel
specifically argued:
This defendant, although not physically at the house, was
physically present for all other purposes. In that physically he was
located within blocks of his house. That he had the keys to his house.
That when the keys were taken from him, he told the police officer at
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the time I do not want you to search my house. And I don’t believe
that the Court will require him to be standing physically looking at his
house and saying don’t search that house belonging to me. I think this
law was created for situations where somebody can give or refuse
consent. The correlative of that law which would allow the police
officer to get consent from a—a person authorized to give that consent
is when the other owner is not present. They can’t get the other
owner. They don’t know where the other owner is. The owner is not
there. They have to wait for the other owner to come. Those facts are
not present here. The other owner is actually being held by the police
at another location. They could have easily brought him to the house,
but they chose not to, to circumvent the law by not letting him be at
that house and look at it and say I’m present, hey, you can’t search the
house. So, he . . . told them he didn’t want the house searched. For
that reason, I think the charge should read that if you have reasonable
doubt that the search of the defendant’s home was without his consent
. . . . Then you should not consider the evidence against him in this
case.
The trial court overruled Statin’s objection to the charge, noted that his complaint
was preserved, and explained:
[T]here’s two things. One, I made my ruling on the motion to
suppress. . . . And, of course, in large part that ruling was a product of
. . . credibility of the witnesses. But having said that, I still think that
this is a question that needs to be answered. I think it’s a significant
question. And I’m just going to say that even in the event that what
your client said and his witnesses said were true, I don’t believe that
they’re entitled to the charge because they weren’t present and there
was a person there at the house that had authority to give the police
officers that consent. . . . So, just essentially the opposite of what you
said.
The court’s charge instructed the jury that a search of Statin’s home—
apartment 207—“without a search warrant or without his consent or the consent of
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another resident would not be lawful.” It defined “consent” as “assent in fact,
whether expressed or apparent.” The charge then stated:
Therefore, in this case, if you have a reasonable doubt that the
search of the defendant’s home located at Apartment 207 . . . , if any,
was without the defendant’s consent or the consent of Monique
Harris, if any, or said consent was not freely and voluntarily given,
then you will wholly disregard such evidence found in the residence,
if any, and not consider it as any evidence whatsoever.
The jury found Statin guilty of both charges, and Statin appealed.
Analysis
I. Motion to suppress
Statin’s first issue complains that the court erred in overruling his motions to
suppress evidence. We review a ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We
give almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts,
especially if those determinations turn on witness credibility or demeanor, and
review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to facts not based on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole and
exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility. Maxwell v. State, 73
S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Accordingly, a trial court may choose to
believe or to disbelieve all or any part the testimony of a witness. State v. Ross, 32
S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When, as in this case, the trial court
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makes no explicit findings of fact, we imply fact findings that support the trial
court’s ruling so long as the evidence supports the implied findings. See Gutierrez
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Although appellate courts
generally limit their review of the trial court’s ruling to an examination of the
evidence produced at the suppression hearing, because the court heard the motion
to suppress after the State’s case-in-chief, we will consider all of the evidence that
was before the court at the time of its ruling. See id. at 687.
“Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a search conducted without
a warrant based on probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Meekins v. State, 340
S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043 (1973)). Consent to search is one such
specifically established and well-delineated exception. Id.; see Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 219, 93 S. Ct. at 2043. Consent must be voluntary. Hubert v. State, 312
S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93
S. Ct. at 2043–44). Voluntariness is a question of fact, and whether a law
enforcement officer acts reasonably in relying on consent is determined from the
totality of the circumstances. Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 458–59. Federal law
requires that the State prove voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence;
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Texas law requires that the State prove voluntary consent by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 459–60.
“A third party can consent to a search to the detriment of another’s privacy
interest if the third party has actual authority over the place or thing to be
searched.” Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 560. “[T]he consent of one who possesses
common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.” U.S. v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974); accord Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 181, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990). But when a co-tenant is physically present
and expressly refuses consent to search, a warrantless search is unreasonable.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1526 (2006). In
Randolph, the Supreme Court distinguished the facts of that case from Matlock and
other earlier authority that upheld a co-tenant’s voluntary consent as
constitutionally reasonable. The Court explained:
If those cases are not to be undercut by today’s holding, we
have to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant
with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-
tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas
the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the
threshold colloquy, loses out.
This is the line we draw, and we think the formalism is
justified. So long as there is no evidence that the police have removed
the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of
avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple
clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s
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permission when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other
according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary
indication when he expresses it.
Id. at 121–22, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
In this case, Statin was arrested away from his apartment, based on a traffic
violation and the subsequent discovery of a controlled substance. Thus, he was
physically absent from the apartment and not involved in the threshold colloquy.
Nothing in the record shows that the police removed him “from the entrance for
the sake of avoiding a possible objection.” Id.
Statin urges this court to follow United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th
Cir. 2008), which held:
If the police cannot prevent a co-tenant from objecting to a search
through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co-tenant and then seek to
ignore an objection he has already made. Nor, more generally, do we
see any reason to limit the Randolph rule to an objecting tenant’s
removal by police. Once a co-tenant has registered his objection, his
refusal to grant consent remains effective barring some objective
manifestation that he has changed his position and no longer objects.
Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1124–25. Statin argues that the court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the search was conducted over his objection. But the
evidence at trial and at the suppression hearing conflicted as to whether Statin
actually objected to the officers’ search of his apartment. Both Brown and Statin
testified that, while holding Statin’s keys, one of the arresting officers told Statin
that they were going to his apartment and Statin replied, “No,” and asked why they
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would do that. But the officers who were present at the traffic stop testified that
Statin refused to talk to them or that they did not ask or did not recall asking his
permission to search his apartment. On a motion to suppress, the trial court is the
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and although the court did not make
written findings of fact, the judge said that he found the officers’ testimony on this
question to be credible. See Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. Based on the court’s
comments and denial of the motion to suppress, we conclude that the court rejected
Brown’s and Statin’s testimony that Statin objected to the search of his apartment.
See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 687. In light of this implied credibility
determination, Murphy, which necessarily requires a finding that the defendant
objected to the search, is not applicable to Statin’s case.
Moreover, not all circuit courts agree with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Murphy. For example, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have recognized that
under Randolph, “the objection of an absent cotenant does not vitiate the consent
of a physically present cotentant.” U.S. v. Cooke, 674 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir.
2012); accord U.S. v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Hudspeth,
518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit explained:
We agree with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that the
objection of an absent cotenant does not vitiate the consent of a
physically present cotenant under Randolph. First, as both courts
noted, Randolph self-consciously emphasized the importance of
Randolph’s presence by repeatedly noting it when declaring and
reiterating the holding. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106, 114, 121, 122,
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123, 126 S. Ct. 1515. Justice Breyer’s concurrence confirms the
importance of physical presence. Id. at 126, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (Breyer,
J., concurring). Second, the Randolph Court seemed to have
structured the holding as an exception to the general rule of Rodriguez
and Matlock that a cotenant may consent to the search of a residence,
id. at 106, 126 S. Ct. 1515, and that this exception was narrowly
drawn along a “fine line.” Id. at 121–22, 126 S. Ct. 1515. Third,
although it is a close question, social convention normally allows for a
visitor to feel invited into a home when invited by a physically-
present resident, even if an absent cotenant objects to it, rather than
the visitor’s assuming he is verboten forever until the objector
consents.
Cooke, 674 F.3d at 499.
Statin’s issue is not controlled by Randolph because Statin was not
physically present at the time of the search. Rather, the principle announced in
Matlock and Rodriguez is controlling of the outcome of this issue. That is, Harris
possessed common authority over apartment 207, Statin was absent, and Harris
consented to the search in Statin’s absence. We hold that the trial court did not err
by denying Statin’s motions to suppress, and we overrule this issue. See Matlock,
415 U.S. at 170, 94 S. Ct. at 993; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S. Ct. at 2797.
II. Article 38.23 jury instruction
In his second issue, Statin contends that the trial court erred in failing to give
the jury the instruction he requested pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure
article 38.23(a), which provides:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation
of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or
of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be
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admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal
case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder,
the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable
doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of
this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such
evidence so obtained.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005). A defendant’s right to the
submission of an instruction under article 38.23(a) “is limited to disputed issues of
fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that
would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509–10
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Before a defendant is entitled to the submission of a jury
instruction under article 38.23(a), he must meet three requirements:
(1) the evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact;
(2) the evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and
(3) that contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the
challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence.
Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 510.
Statin asked the court to instruct the jury that “if you have reasonable doubt
that the search of the defendant’s home was without his consent . . . [t]hen you
should not consider the evidence against him in this case.” While there was a
question of fact as to whether Statin expressly denied consent to search his home,
this question was not material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct because
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the officers acted lawfully by obtaining Harris’s consent. Moreover, the court did
give the jury an appropriate Article 38.23 instruction. It said:
. . . in this case, if you have a reasonable doubt that the search
of the defendant’s home located at Apartment 207 . . . if any, was
without the defendant’s consent or the consent of Monique Harris, if
any, or said consent was not freely and voluntarily given, then you
will wholly disregard such evidence found in the residence, if any,
and not consider it as any evidence whatsoever.
We hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to give Statin’s requested
jury instructions. We overrule this issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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