Jowel Singleton v. State

Opinion issued May 9, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00652-CR
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JOWEL SINGLETON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 23rd District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 66948
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Jowel Singleton, guilty of the offense of aggravated
robbery1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for eleven years and a $200
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon 2011).
fine. In one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction.
We affirm.
Background
Farooq Ahmed testified that he worked as a cashier at the Fastop
convenience store in Clute, Texas for four years and was working the night of
November 30, 2011 when he was robbed. He explained that two men wearing ski
masks came into the store with handguns around 10:00 to 10:30 p.m. and said
“give me money.” Ahmed used a trash can as cover, hoping that he would not be
shot. He noted that one gun had a “white” or “silver” color and the other had a
“reddish” color. One of the men hit the perfume case and knocked it over when he
opened the cash register and took all the money and some lottery scratch-off tickets
that were found outside. Ahmed told responding police officers that the men were
about 5’5” to 5’8” tall and of “skinny weight.” Although he could not tell the
men’s race, he knew that they were men from the sound of their voices.
Clute Police Department (“CPD”) Officer S. O’Sullivan testified that on
November 30, 2011, he was dispatched to the Fastop convenience store. A Fastop
employee named Byron Dunlap told O’Sullivan at the scene that he was going to
get a cellular telephone in the back when he heard a screaming noise. He returned
to the front of the store and saw two men wearing ski masks and gloves, one
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wearing a white t-shirt and the other wearing a black t-shirt and with a handgun
and the other with a “red gun.” O’Sullivan saw items thrown on the counter, an
open cash register that was empty, and, between the doorway and the cash register,
a knife, which he later determined belonged to the store. O’Sullivan transported
Dunlap and Ahmed to a police station and took their statements. O’Sullivan
explained that police detectives eventually determined that appellant and another
man, Timothy Robinson, were suspects and arrested them on December 8, 2011.
CPD Detective Scotty Harris testified that he was dispatched to the Fastop
convenience store on November 30, 2011, and, once there, he took photographs of
the crime scene. Also, he was eventually able to obtain a video tape from the
store’s security cameras. Harris explained that he arrested a man named Louis
Norris on December 3, 2011, after seeing him break into a car at the Sherwood
Forest Apartment complex. Harris later took from Norris a statement in which he
provided information about the Fastop convenience store robbery. Harris
explained that he believed Norris because he had information that had not been
released to the public, and Norris was not promised anything in return for the
information. Norris identified appellant in a photographic lineup as a party to the
robbery. Harris explained that he did not obtain a search warrant for appellant’s
residence to look for the guns used in the robbery because appellant did not have a
permanent residence. Harris noted that it was possible that Norris was involved in
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the robbery since he had information that the public did not have, and he and the
man that Norris identified as working with him burglarizing vehicles fit the general
description given by the witnesses. He also acknowledged that Norris had asked to
speak to him, and it was possible that his motive for doing so was to try to “get a
deal.” And he noted that because the punishment for aggravated robbery is
confinement for five to ninety-nine years, Norris would not want to be caught and
this could constitute a motive to lie and say that someone else committed the
robbery. However, Norris was never a suspect in the Fastop convenience store
robbery.
Norris testified that he was not offered anything in exchange for his
testimony against appellant and he still had an open case against him for burglary
of a motor vehicle. Norris explained that at about 7:30 p.m. on March 30, 2011, a
few days before he was arrested, he was at his mother’s apartment at Brighton
Manor when appellant and Robinson came by. The men smoked synthetic
marijuana together, and appellant and Robinson asked Norris to rob the Fastop
convenience store with them later that night. They showed Norris an “orange flare
gun” and a “silver .25” handgun that they planned to use. Norris initially agreed to
participate, and appellant and Robinson said that they would come back for him.
Later that night, after 10:00 p.m., he heard a knock on his window and saw
appellant and Robinson through the window blind. Norris ignored the knock and
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stayed in his bed because he had changed his mind and did not want to participate
in the robbery. Norris explained that he did not leave the apartment that night and
would not be able to get in and out because only his mother had a key and she
knew he was in the apartment that night.
Norris was asked on direct examination whether he had seen Robinson the
next day, the day after the robbery. Norris testified that he saw Robinson who told
Norris that he and appellant had robbed the store, but had only gotten a “hundred
and something dollars” from one cash register. On cross-examination and on re-
direct examination, Norris clarified that he had talked to both appellant and
Robinson the day after the robbery. He noted that any inconsistencies between his
testimony and his written statement to Detective Harris did not mean that his
statement to Harris was incorrect simply because “a couple of details were left
out.” And he explained that when he was arrested and gave his statement to
Harris, that he was “drunk” and had “just came from a party,” “but [he knew] what
happened.” Norris also explained that he could only have obtained the details about
the robbery from appellant and Robinson, they were not enemies, and he had no
reason to “lie” about them. Norris also noted that the man who was involved with
him in the motor-vehicle burglaries is Hispanic, short, and weighs over 200
pounds; thus, he did not fit the description of either of the Fastop robbers.
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Norris’s mother, Tina Cooper, testified that he lived with her at the Brighton
Manor apartments on November 30, 2011. She was the only person with a key to
the apartment door and made sure that everyone was in her apartment before she
went to bed at 10:30 p.m. after watching the television news. Cooper explained
that she did not at any time in November, awaken to find the door or any windows
to her apartment unlocked. And she noted that the bedroom doors in the apartment
were not closed until she went to bed at 10:30 p.m. Thus, she “knew” that Norris
was in his room until that time. She explained that Norris has a t-shirt, but not a
black t-shirt, has only jeans, not dark pants, and does not own a “hoodie” or a ski
mask. The only gloves in her apartment were gloves with white dots that she used
for work. And she has never seen Norris with weapons in her apartment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction because the State’s witnesses had “no credibility,” the
strength of the evidence “was tenuous at best,” and, even when considered in the
light most favorable to the verdict, “this jury could not be said to have been
rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant asserts
that the State’s star witness, Louis Norris, was “an admitted snitch and a thief,”
who was “intoxicated, [had] limited memory, [was] drunk at that time [and had]
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smoked synthetic, fake weed,” while the State’s other witness “could not
accurately recall anything.”
We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788–89
(1979)). Evidence is legally insufficient when the “only proper verdict” is
acquittal. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982). Our
role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of
fact’s finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In doing so,
we give deference to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts
in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts.
Id. We defer to the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence unless the
resolution is not rational. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). However, our duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented
actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense
of which he is accused. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.
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Circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct evidence in
establishing the guilt of an actor, and it alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The term “inference”
means,
In the law of evidence, a truth or proposition drawn from another
which is supposed or admitted to be true. A process of reasoning by
which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a
logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already
proved. . . .
Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
700 (5th ed. 1979)). For a jury to infer a fact, “it must be able to deduce that fact
as a logical consequence from other proven facts.” Id.
A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing
theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, he intentionally or
knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2011). A person commits the
offense of aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and uses or exhibits a deadly
weapon. Id. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2011). A firearm is considered a deadly
weapon. Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2012). Theft is the unlawful
appropriation of property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. Id.
§ 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2012).
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Jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses,
and the weight to be given the witness’s testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623
S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Jaggers v. State, 125
S.W.3d 661, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). And, they may
choose to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness’s testimony. See Davis v.
State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
Likewise, “reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive
province of the jury.” Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(quoting Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
Here, Ahmed testified that the two men who robbed him at the Fastop
convenience store used two handguns, one that was “reddish” in color, and the
other one “silver.” Because the robbers wore ski masks and gloves, he was only
able to identify them as males because of their voices, and he told police officers
that they were between 5’5” and 5’8” tall, “skinny,” and weighed around 160 to
165 pounds.
Norris positively identified appellant in a photographic lineup as one of the
men who planned the robbery and had asked Norris to participate in the robbery.
And he corroborated the eye-witness testimony concerning appellant’s height and
weight. Specifically, Norris testified that appellant and Robinson had come to his
mother’s apartment on the night of the robbery, asked him to participate in the
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robbery, and showed him the guns that they planned to use, including an orange
flare gun and a silver .25 handgun. Norris explained that both appellant and
Robinson had come back for him later that night, and although he looked through
the blind and saw them both, he ignored their knock on his window because he had
changed his mind about participating in the robbery. And, although Norris, in his
testimony on direct examination disclosed only the fact that he saw and spoke with
Robinson on the day after the robbery, he clarified on cross-examination and
redirect examination that he actually saw both appellant and Robinson, who both
told him that they had committed the robbery. Norris explained that although his
statement to Detective Harris might be inconsistent, “[he knew] what happened”
even though he might have “left out” some details. Moreover, he stated that both
appellant and Robinson admitted to having robbed the store. As fact finder, the
jury was entitled to resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we defer to that
resolution. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. And Detective Harris testified that
Norris gave him information about the robbery that had not been released to the
public. Moreover, Norris’s description of the guns that appellant and Robinson
had showed to him and planned to use in the robbery was similar to Ahmed’s
description of the weapons that were actually used in the robbery.
Although each piece of evidence may lack strength when considered “in
isolation, the consistency of the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn
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therefrom, provide the girders to strengthen the evidence” and support the jury’s
finding of the elements of the offense. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The bottom line is that from the evidence presented,
including the facts that appellant and Robinson asked Norris to commit the robbery
with them, they came to his apartment to get him as planned, the robbery was
committed as planned, and both appellant and Robinson admitted to Norris the
next day that they had robbed the store, the jury could have reasonably found that
appellant committed the robbery with Robinson.
Viewing the evidence in the light more favorable to the jury’s findings, the
testimony of Norris, Ahmed, and Detective Harris supports an inference that
appellant participated in the robbery of the Fastop convenience store. Accordingly,
we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.
Do not publish. TEX. R. CIV. P. 47.2(b).
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