Collins, Edward Shamar v. State

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..\FFII{MEI>; Opinion Filed Scptcmhcr 7, 2012
In The
282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). There is no required quantity of corroborating
evidence necessary for sutliciency purposes. Malone v. State, 253 S. W .3d 253,257 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Corroborating evidence, considered independently, need not establish guilt. !d.
When there are conflicting views of the evidence-one that tends to connect the accused to
the offense and one that does not-an appellate court will defer to the fact finder's resolution of the
evidence. Simmons 282 S.W.3d at 508. 2 Consequently, it is not appropriate for appellate courts to
independently construe the non-accomplice evidence. /d. at 509.
Each set of non-accomplice evidence must be judged on its own merits, but some examples
1 The United States Supreme Court has held th~t when there are two permissible views of the evidence. the fact finder's choice between
them cannot be clearl!" erroneous. See Anderson v. Ciry of Bessemer. 470 U.S. 564, 574 ( 1985).
"
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of slll:h ~vidcnc~ hav~ bl:t:n discussed by other courts of appeal and by our court of criminal appeals.
,,;z: Hernandez v_ .\'tate. 939 S.W.2d 173. 17S (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (evidence ofguiltydemeanor);
Reed v. .\'tate. 744 S. \V.2d 112, l27-2S (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(suspicious circumstances, coupled
with defendant's presence during commission of the crime, and discrepancies in stories); Johnson
v. State. 234 S.W.Jd 43, 55 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 2007, no pet.) (consciousness of guilt);
Undenvood v. State, 967 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. ref' d) (contradictory
explanations for traveling); Spra/1 v. Stale, 881 S.W.2d 65, 66-67 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no
pet.) (furtive behavior).
APPLICATION OF LAW To FACTS
Appellant, citing Holladay v. State, 109 S.W.2d 194, 199-200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986),
contends the non-accomplice evidence raises only extraneous matters that do not sufficiently connect
him to the commission of the offense. It is true that facts not material to the case are not sufficient,
alone, to satisfy the corroboration requirement of article 38.14. Holladay, 709 S.W.2d at 200. But
Holladay is not directly applicable to this case because it addresses the proper article 38.14 jury
instruction in capital murder cases where a defendant is alleged to have committed a predicate felony
along with a murder. I d. at 196. The court in Holladay specifically held the question of whether non-
accomplice evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony must be decided on an
ad hoc basis. ld. at 200. So any holding regarding the quantum of corroborating evidence in
Holladay is dicta.
In this case, the only issue to be decided is whether the evidence corroborating the
accomplice testimony is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. To that end, the State offers in
its brief examples of corroboration of Hodges's testimony that appear in this record, and were
outlined earlier in this- opinion. Shouse testified that appellant displayed more than the usual
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nervousness typically s~cn in a trartic stop and that was more in line of consciousness or criminal
:tctivity. Appellant and Hodges provided Shouse with contradictory travel plans and contradictory
places of residence. Appellant and Hodges at tirst provided Shouse with contradictory information
conccming who had rented the subject vehicle. Appellant offered an unsolicited comment to Shouse,
before Shouse indicated he had found the marijuana, "that's not even mine". Appellant was in
proximity to a quantity of marijuana that far exceeded possession tor personal use. Finally, appellant
made a cell phone call shortly after the stop to Raven Gregory, the person named on the car rental
agreement. None of these factors, if considered alone and in a vacuum, would arguably provide
sut1icient corroboration of Hodges's testimony to sustain appellant's conviction. But taken together,
they would supply adequate corroboration for Hodges's testimony when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. See Simmons, 282 S.W.3d at 508. Appellant's sole point of error is
overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CHARLES F. C
JUSTICE, ASSI
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
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