Fadhil M. Salih and Selwa Abdul Hussein v. JPMorgan Chase Bank

Opinion issued May 19, 2011.

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01-10-00813-CV

———————————

Fadhil M. Salih and Selwa Abdul Hussein, Appellants

V.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Appellee

On Appeal from the 113th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2010-12634

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Fadil M. Salih and Selwa A. Abdul Hussein appeal the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan) holding them individually liable for the unpaid business debts of Macrostar LLC f/k/a Nino Import Export, LLC d/b/a The Palm Group (Nino).  A review of the record reveals that the summary judgment does not dispose of JPMorgan Chase’s claims against Nino, which is named as a defendant in the trial court.  As a result, the summary judgment is not a final and appealable judgment. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  See  Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

In the spring of 2010, JPMorgan brought suit against Nino and its guarantors, Salih and Hussein, for unpaid business loans.  After being served with citation, Salih and Hussein, each acting pro se, individually answered.  Salih, purporting to act pro se for Nino as Nino’s registered agent, also filed an answer for Nino.

JPMorgan Chase filed a motion asking the trial court to strike Nino’s answer and grant summary judgment on its claims against Salih and Hussein.  In June 2010, the trial court signed two orders, one granting JPMorgan’s motion for summary judgment as to Salih and Hussein, and the other granting the motion to strike Nino’s answer.  Salih and Hussein moved for new trial and filed a notice of appeal. 

With the exception of certain statutory interlocutory jurisdiction not at issue here, this Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals only from final judgments.  Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (West 2008) (granting jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders).  We do not presume that a summary judgment entered before a conventional trial is a final judgment.  See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 199–200; see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 829 (Tex. 2005).  An order or judgment entered before a conventional trial on the merits is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or if it states “with unmistakable clarity” that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.  M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673–75 (Tex. 2004); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. 

In this case, the trial court’s summary judgment order addresses only JPMorgan’s claims against Salih and Hussein.  Under the case’s current posture, Nino has been served but has not effectively answered.  JPMorgan has not asked the trial court to adjudicate or dismiss its claims against Nino, and the trial court’s order does not contain clear language indicating either that it is final or that it disposes of those claims. 

A summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and causes of action is not final and appealable absent a severance.  Parker v. Waller Cnty., No. 01-95-01010-CV, 1996 WL 609434, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 24, 1996, no writ) (citing Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. 1993)).  Because the summary judgment order does not dispose of JPMorgan’s claims against Nino, it is not a final judgment.  As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.  Cf. Yahweh v. Abbott, No. 01-09-00584-CV, 2010 WL 3928511, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 7, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction where summary judgment order did not dispose of all parties and claims).

                                                PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.