Manuel Valadez v. MEMC Pasadena, Inc., DBA MEMC Electronic Materials Pasadena Inc.

Opinion issued March 3, 2011

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-09-00778-CV

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Manuel valadez, Appellant

V.

memc pasadena, inc. d/b/a memc electronic

materials pasadena, inc., Appellee

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2008-59250

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Manuel Valadez appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment against him on his negligence suit against appellee MEMC Pasadena, Inc. d/b/a MEMC Electronic Materials Pasadena, Inc. (“MEMC”).  In a single issue, Valadez argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment in favor of MEMC because Valadez’s claim was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  MEMC contends that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the basis of the Workers’ Compensation Act and, in two cross-points, argues that the trial court’s summary judgment can also be affirmed on two alternative grounds presented but not reached by the trial court.  MEMC’s alternative grounds are (1) Valadez’s action was barred under Chapter 95 of the Civil Procedure and Remedies Code, and (2) Valadez could not establish a negligence claim as a matter of law.[1]  We hold that Valadez’s claim against MEMC is not barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act but is barred under Chapter 95.  Because we can uphold the trial court’s judgment on the basis of MEMC’s first cross-point, we do not reach MEMC’s second cross-point.  We affirm.

Background

MEMC owns and operates a chemical process facility in Pasadena, Texas. MEMC subcontracted maintenance of the Pasadena facility to Turner Industries Group, LLC (“Turner”).  MEMC’s contract with Turner required Turner to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees, which Turner did.  Valadez, an employee of Turner, is an industrial pipefitter and boilermaker.  On January 27, 2007, Valadez was injured while performing work at the MEMC facility. Attempting to measure the space for a pipe jack, Valadez stepped on a bucket in order to reach the tape measure to the top of the space below the pipe.  As he went up, Valadez grabbed onto the pipe to help balance himself. When he did so, the pipe came loose and Valadez fell backward, with the pipe landing on his ankle.

As a result of this accident, Valadez claimed and received workers’ compensation benefits for approximately a year and a half under the coverage procured by Turner.  In October 2008, Valadez brought this negligence action against MEMC.  MEMC moved for summary judgment on Valadez’s claim, arguing that the claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, that the claim failed to meet the requirements under Chapter 95, and that Valadez could not prevail on a common law negligence claim.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of MEMC on the basis of the Workers’ Compensation Act and did not reach MEMC’s Chapter 95 and common law grounds for summary judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.  Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).  We review the evidence presented in the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.  Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848; City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).  We must review all of the summary judgment grounds on which the trial court ruled that are dispositive of the appeal, and we may consider any other grounds on which the trial court did not rule. See Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 1999) (citing Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. 1996)).  However, “[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

MEMC’s motion for summary asserted both traditional and no-evidence grounds.  On a motion for traditional summary judgment, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).  A defendant-movant may meet this burden by conclusively negating at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or by conclusively establishing each element of an affirmative defense.  Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). 

A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a directed verdict granted before trial, to which we apply a legal sufficiency standard of review.  King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003).  A party moving for no-evidence summary judgment must specifically state the element or elements of a claim for which there is no evidence. Id. at 751; Green v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).  The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue on each of the challenged elements.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).  A no-evidence summary judgment will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.   King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).  Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of a fact.  Id. (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem., Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).  More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.”  Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., 953 S.W.2d at 711).

Statutory Construction Standard of Review

Statutory construction is a legal question, which is reviewed de novo to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.  HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. 2009) (citing F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 683 (Tex. 2007)).  To discern that intent, we must begin with the “plain and common meaning of the statute’s words.”  Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004)). We also consider the objective the Legislature sought to achieve through the statute, as well as the consequences of a particular construction.  Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 146 S.W.3d at 642; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023(1), (5)).  Generally, we accept the ordinary meaning of words used unless the Legislature provides a specific statutory definition.  Cities of Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth & Hereford v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. 2002).  

The Workers’ Compensation Act

In his sole issue, Valadez contends that the trial court erred by determining that the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act precludes his negligence claim against MEMC.

A.      Introduction to Applicable Workers’ Compensation Law

The purpose of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act is to provide employees with certainty that their medical bills and lost wages will be covered if they are injured, without the time and expense of litigation.  HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. 2009); Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. Konecny, 290 S.W.3d 238, 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).  The Act encourages employers to participate in workers’ compensation insurance with both the carrot and the stick: employers who do not subscribe are precluded from relying on common law defenses to negligence suits brought by employees injured on the job, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033 (West 2006); employers who do subscribe are entitled to assert the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy as a bar to negligence actions brought by injured employees, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (West 2006).  See also HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 350; Hunt, 290 S.W.3d at 247 (citing Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. 2000)).

The exclusivity defense is found in Section 408.001(a) of the Act.  It states: “Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage or a legal beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the employee.”  Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a).[2]  A general contractor may qualify as “the employer” within the meaning of this statute if the general contract “provides” workers’ compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and its employees pursuant to a written agreement.  Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.123(a), (e) (West 2006);[3] HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 350. In this scenario, the general contractor and its “employees” under the Act may assert the exclusivity defense against any subcontractors or employees of subcontractors for which the general contractor has “provided” coverage.  E.g., HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 350; Hunt, 290 S.W.3d at 246; Funes v. Eldridge Elec. Co., 270 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.).

B.      Analysis

The question in this case asks what the circumstances must show for a general contractor to “provide” workers’ compensation insurance within the meaning of the Act, such that the general contractor is entitled to assert the Act’s exclusivity defense.  The parties agree that this case is governed by the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in HCBeck, but disagree about the case’s import. Valadez asserts that this case is distinguishable from HCBeck because the general contractor in HCBeck was contractually obligated to provide workers’ compensation insurance in the event the Owner Controlled Insurance Policy (“OCIP”) was terminated; but MEMC has no contractual obligation to provide workers’ compensation coverage for Turner or its employees.  Valadez argues that a general contractor like MEMC does not “provide” coverage if the general contractor is not contractually obligated to purchase the insurance itself or compensate the purchaser for the insurance premiums.    

MEMC responds that it “provided” workers’ compensation coverage to Turner by contractually requiring Turner to maintain such coverage as a condition for Turner’s participation in the subcontract with MEMC.  MEMC points out that the general contractor in HCBeck had not paid for or reimbursed the workers’ compensation premiums at issue in that case and was still determined to have “provided” coverage within the meaning of the statute.

We conclude that merely requiring the subcontractor to obtain its own workers’ compensation insurance does not constitute “providing” coverage within the meaning of the statute.

          1.       Cases Interpreting the Term “Provides” Coverage

                   a.       HCBeck v. Rice

In HCBeck, FMR Texas Ltd. contracted with HCBeck, Ltd. to construct an office on FMR’s property.  HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 350.  The contract between FMR and HCBeck required HCBeck and all of its subcontractors to enroll in FMR’s OCIP, which included workers’ compensation insurance.  Id.  The agreement permitted FMR to terminate the OCIP but required, in such instance, that HCBeck obtain replacement insurance, including equivalent workers’ compensation coverage, for itself and its subcontractors at FMR’s expense.  Id. at 350–51.

HCBeck subcontracted with Haley Greer.  Id. at 351.  Pursuant to the FMR-HCBeck contract, HCBeck’s subcontract with Greer required Greer to enroll in FMR’s OCIP, which Greer did.  Id.  When Charley Rice, one of Greer’s employees, was injured on the job, he claimed and received workers’ compensation benefits under the policy issued to Greer by FMR.  Id.  Rice subsequently brought a negligence suit against HCBeck.  Id.  HCBeck moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to assert the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy defense pursuant to Sections 406.123(a) and 408.001(a).  Id.  Rice argued HCBeck did not “provide” worker’s compensation coverage — and therefore could not rely on the statutory defense — because HCBeck did not, and was not contractually obligated to, pay for Greer’s workers’ compensation insurance.  Id.  The trial court granted HCBeck’s motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that HCBeck did not “provide” workers’ compensation coverage because the subcontract called for Greer to obtain its own alternate insurance if FMR terminated the OCIP.  Id. at 354. 

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, rejecting its conclusion that the subcontract put the obligation of obtaining alternate insurance on Greer.  The court read the contract as imposing the obligation of obtaining alternate insurance on HCBeck in the first instance and on Greer only if HCBeck defaulted on that obligation.  Id. at 353–54.  The court determined that this was sufficient to satisfy the Act’s requirements even though HCBeck did not actually obtain or pay for Greer’s workers’ compensation insurance.  Id. at 353 (“[Section 406.123(a)] does not require a general contractor to actually obtain the insurance, or even pay for it directly.”). 

The court further observed that “the Texas workers’ compensation insurance scheme, as enacted by the Legislature, was intended to make the exclusive remedy defense available to a general contractor who, by use of a written agreement with the owner and subcontractors, provides workers’ compensation insurance coverage to its subcontractors and the subcontractors’ employees.”  Id. at 360.  The court concluded that the OCIP, which was established and paid for by FMR pursuant to its contract with HCBeck, qualified as “providing” coverage under the Act pursuant to Section 406.123(a).  Therefore, the court held that HCBeck was entitled to assert the exclusivity defense because it had provided coverage to Greer’s employees by virtue of the OCIP.  Id. 

b.      Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. Konecny and Funes v. Eldridge Electric Co.

          While HCBeck was pending in the Supreme Court of Texas, an appeal involving similar facts came before this court.  See Hunt Constr. Group, Inc., 290 S.W.3d at 245–47.  Hunt also involved an OCIP, provided by the Harris County Houston Sports Authority to the general contractor and subcontractors on a construction project that is now the Toyota Center.  Id. at 240–41.  The contract between the Sports Authority and its general contractor, Hunt, required Hunt and all of its subcontractors at every tier to participate in the OCIP and include the OCIP requirements in every subcontract.  Id.  Hunt subcontracted the ventilation and air conditioning work to Way, which in turn subcontracted the sheet metal and duct work to Superior.  Id. at 240.  Hunt subcontracted the application of fireproofing material to Desert Plains, Inc. Id. at 241.  The OCIP provisions were included in Hunt’s subcontracts with Way and Desert Plains and in Way’s subcontract with Superior.  Id. at 241.  The OCIP provisions provided that: (1) Sports Authority would provide workers’ compensation for contractors and subcontractors of every tier and pay all premiums; (2) participation in the OCIP was “mandatory but not automatic,” making coverage dependent on eligibility; (3) contractors and subcontractors not enrolled in the OCIP were required to maintain their own insurance and provide certificates of insurance to the Sports Authority; and (4) contractors could not permit any subcontractor to enter the project site prior to OCIP enrollment unless the subcontractor was ineligible for the OCIP and covered by its own insurance.  Id. at 241–42. 

          Konecny, a foreman for Superior, was injured on the job while sharing the construction site with employees of Desert Plains.  Id. at 242. He claimed and received workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to the OCIP coverage.  Id.  He subsequently brought negligence claims against Hunt, Way and Desert Plains.  Id. at 240.  The trial court entered judgment on a jury award in favor of Konecny.  Id. at 242.  On appeal, Hunt argued that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Konecny’s claims against it were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Id.  We concluded that Hunt was a general contractor who “provided” workers’ compensation insurance within the meaning of Section 406.123(a) and, therefore, Hunt and its “employees” under the Act — Superior and Way — were entitled to judgment on the basis of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Id. at 245–47.

          In determining that Hunt was entitled to the exclusivity defense, we rejected Konecny’s argument that Hunt did not “provide” coverage because the Sports Authority, rather than Hunt, obtained the policy and paid the premiums.  Id. at 245– 46 (citing Funes v. Eldridge Elec. Co., 270 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.); Williams v. Razor Enters., Inc., 70 S.W.3d 274, 277 n.6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 673, 678 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no pet.)).  We held that Section 406.123(a) was unambiguous and the term “provide” should be given its plain meaning: “to supply or make available.”  Id. at 245 (citing Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 948 (1990); see Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 671). 

In so holding, we relied in part on the San Antonio Court of Appeals’s interpretation of the same provision in Funes:

[W]e apply the plain and common meaning of the word “provide” within its reasonable context, which we determine to be “to supply or make available.”  With this definition in mind, we construe subsection 406.123(a) to mean the following: where a general contractor and a subcontractor enter into a written agreement under which the general contractor   supplies or makes available workers’ compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and its employees, the general contractor is the employer of the subcontractor and its employees for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as provided under subsection 406.123(e).

Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 671 (internal citations omitted) (holding that employee of subcontractor was barred from bringing suit against general contractor’s other subcontractor where subcontracts obligated subcontractors to participate in OCIP and both subcontractors did participate in OCIP).  

Consistent with this definition of “provide,” we concluded in Hunt that Hunt did “provide” workers’ compensation insurance to its subcontractors and was thus an employer under the Act.  Hunt, 290 S.W.3d 246.  Because the subcontractors in Hunt received the OCIP coverage provided by Hunt, we concluded that they and their employees were employees of Hunt under the Act.  Id. at 247.  We therefore held that Konecny’s sole remedy was workers’ compensation and his negligence claim against Hunt, Way and Desert Plains were barred.  Id.

                    2.       Application of Cases Interpreting “Provides” Coverage

          In HCBeck, HCBeck was ultimately financially responsible for the workers’ compensation coverage because, as the Texas Supreme Court determined, HCBeck would be required to procure coverage for Greer in the event that FMR terminated the OCIP.  Id. at 353–54. In Hunt and Funes, however, the courts made no distinction with respect to responsibility for coverage in the absence of the OCIP.  See Hunt, 290 S.W.3d 245–47; Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 671–73.  HCBeck cited both Hunt and Funes favorably in this respect.  HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 358–59.  It is the provision of coverage, not the responsibility in the event of its absence, that supports the exclusivity defense.  See id. at 359 (noting that this interpretation of the statute favors blanket coverage of all workers in multi-tiered contractor relationships in manner that serves the Legislature’s “decided bias” for coverage).

          However, as both parties agree, the subcontract at issue in this case only requires Turner to obtain workers’ compensation for itself as a requisite for participation in the project.  It does not “supply or make available” workers’ compensation to Turner or Turner’s employees; it merely requires the subcontractor to independently acquire its own coverage.  Cf. Hunt, 290 S.W.3d 245; Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 671–72.  MEMC cites no authority where such a contractual requirement for self-supplied coverage by the subcontractor has been held to entitle a general contractor to invoke the exclusive remedy defense of the Workers’ Compensation Act. MEMC has not contractually “provided” coverage for Turner and its employees, and thus does not qualify as an “employer” under the Act.  See Hunt, 290 S.W.3d 245; Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 671; Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.123(a), (e). MEMC therefore may not uphold its summary judgment on the basis of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Chapter 95

A second ground for summary judgment MEMC asserted in its motion was that Valadez failed to satisfy Section 95.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code because neither of the statute’s requisites for liability — control and actual knowledge — were met.  In a cross-point, MEMC argues that the trial court’s judgment can be affirmed on this alternative ground.  Valadez did not address this issue in his appellant’s brief, nor did he respond to MEMC’s cross-point in his reply brief.  This Court entered an order noting that MEMC had raised cross-points and allowing Valadez additional time to file briefing addressing the cross-points, but Valadez declined to file briefing on the cross-points.  In addressing MEMC’s Chapter 95 cross-point, we look to the summary judgment briefing to determine the arguments raised by the parties before the trial court.  See, e.g., Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Tex. 1992) (observing that appellate court’s review of summary judgment is limited to arguments presented to trial court); Klentzman v. Brady, 312 S.W.3d 886, 909 n.14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (same).

Section 95.003 reads:

A property owner is not liable for personal injury, death, or property damage to a contractor, subcontractor, or an employee of a contractor or subcontractor who constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies an improvement to real property, including personal injury, death, or property damage arising from the failure to provide a safe workplace unless:

(1) the property owner exercises or retains some control over the manner in which the work is performed, other than the right to order the work to start or stop or to inspect progress or receive reports; and

(2)   the property owner had actual knowledge of the danger or condition resulting in the personal injury, death, or property damage and failed to adequately warn.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 95.003 (West 2005).

In its motion for summary judgment, MEMC asserts Valadez has no evidence of control or actual knowledge and provides evidence purporting to show a lack of control or actual knowledge.  Valadez’s response includes evidence that he asserts raises an issue of fact on each of those issues.  Valadez did not contest that Chapter 95 applies to his claim.  We conclude that Valadez presented no evidence sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether MEMC had actual knowledge of the danger or condition that allegedly caused his injury.  Because Valadez did not contest the applicability of Chapter 95 and did not raise an issue of fact on the prerequisite of actual knowledge, summary judgment was proper.

A.      Actual Knowledge

As evidence of actual knowledge, Valadez relies largely on the deposition testimony of Genarro Arredando.  The cited portions of Arredando’s deposition relevant to an actual knowledge inquiry tend to show the following:

· after Valadez’s accident, Arredando called out to three MEMC employees who were located on the ground, approximately 20 feet below where Valadez and Arredando were located;

· these operators saw the buckets in the area where Valadez and Arredando were located, but Arredando did not specify whether this was before or after the accident;

· at a post-accident meeting where he was asked about how the accident happened, he told MEMC personnel that they were trying to put in a pipe jack to support the line and Valadez was measuring for the jack;

· the shutdown process that Turner was performing at the time of Valadez’s accident was a process that they performed every six months; and

· one crewmember left to speak to MEMC about the job that Turner was performing at the time of Valadez’s accident, but there is no indication in the cited portions of the record of what, if anything, this crewmember may have said to MEMC.

This testimony tends to show that, prior to Valadez’s accident, MEMC had actual knowledge that Valadez and other Turner employees were present in the area and were performing work.  Arredando’s testimony does not show that MEMC had actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition created by Valadez’s use of a bucket as a stepping stool and grabbing onto a pipe to balance himself.

Valadez also cites to his own deposition testimony and incorporates by reference the affidavit of his expert, Stephen Astrin.  Valadez relies on his own testimony for the proposition that MEMC employees were present when another Turner employee instructed Valadez to take a pipe out of the bottom of the reactor.  While Valadez may be citing this testimony as evidence of control, it does not tend to show that MEMC had any actual knowledge of a danger or condition that allegedly caused Valadez’s injury.[4]  Having reviewed the Astrin affidavit, we observe that its addresses whether MEMC complied with certain standards of care, whether such noncompliance caused Valadez’s injury, and whether MEMC exercised control over Turner’s work, but does not address whether MEMC had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.   

We conclude that the evidence presented by Valadez does not constitute more than a scintilla of evidence that MEMC had “actual knowledge of the danger or condition” that allegedly resulted in Valadez’s injuries. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 95.003(2). 

          B.      Control

Having determined that Valadez has not presented evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether MEMC had actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition, we need not reach the issue of whether MEMC exercised or retained control over Valadez’s work as required to satisfy the other prong of Section 95.003.  Section 95.003 precludes liability unless both prongs of the statute — control and actual knowledge — are satisfied.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 95.003; Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., 152 S.W.3d 688, 699 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (noting that control and knowledge are two independent and necessary conditions to imposition of liability in Chapter 95 action). Therefore, we hold that Section 95.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code precludes Valadez from establishing liability against MEMC in this action and affirm the trial court’s judgment on this ground. 

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                   Elsa Alcala

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.

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[1]           MEMC did not file a separate appeal and raises these cross-points in its appellee’s brief.  Because MEMC’s cross-points merely present an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s and do not seek more relief that was granted in the judgment, no separate notice of appeal is required.  See Helton v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 126 S.W.3d 111, 119-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

[2]           The statute contains an exception relating to gross negligence claims that is not implicated here.

[3]           Section 406.123 provides in part:

(a)       A general contractor and a subcontractor may enter into a written agreement under which the general contractor provides workers’ compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and the employees of the subcontractor. 

. . .

(e)       An agreement under this section makes the general contractor the employer of the subcontractor and the subcontractor’s employees only for the purposes of the workers’ compensation laws of this State. 

. . .

[4]           Valadez also references portions of Arredando’s deposition testimony for certain facts that may be relevant to the control inquiry but are not relevant to the actual knowledge inquiry, such as Arredando’s testimony that Turner employees got raingear from MEMC at the MEMC warehouse, that MEMC requires Turner employees to wear an oxygen suit when breaking an oxygen line, and that MEMC told Turner when to start work on the process that Turner was performing at the time of Valadez’s accident.