Thrift v. State

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BILL VANCE, Justice.

A jury convicted Jeffery Arnold Thrift on two counts: sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years in prison on each count which the trial court ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, Thrift complains that (1) the State asked improper commitment questions on voir dire about whether jurors could convict based on the testimony of a single witness, and (2) regarding the indecency conviction, sexually-explicit photographs of minors found in his residence should not have been admitted into evidence.

We will affirm the conviction for sexual assault and reverse the conviction for indecency with a child.

Improper Voir Dire

We find that the complaint about the voir dire question was not properly preserved. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). The State asked numerous jury-panel members about whether they could convict based on the testimony of a single witness, and how they “felt” about convicting based on the testimony of a single witness. Most of the questions were not objected to. Eventually, defense counsel did object and obtain a ruling limiting the State’s questioning to how panel members “felt.” But by then the matter had been explored with the jury panel, without objection. We will not review unpreserved complaints. Id. Therefore, we overrule the first issue.

Photographs

The elements of the offense of indecency with a child are:

(a) A person commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years and not the person’s spouse, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person:

(1) engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact;

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(c) In this section, “sexual contact” means the following acts, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person:

(1) any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child;

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Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 21.11 (Vernon 2003).

The State offered four photographs of nude teenage males, sexually aroused, which were found in a Dallas Cowboys book at Thrift’s residence. Defense counsel objected that the photographs were inadmissible (a) under Rule 404(b) as extraneous bad acts and (b) under Rule 403 because the probative value of the pictures was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that might be caused by them. Tex.R. Evid. 403, 404(b). The trial court admitted the photographs on the ground they were relevant to prove that the act supporting the “indecency with a child” offense, ie., Thrift touching the minor’s genitals, was done with the intent to arouse Thrift, which is also an element of that offense. The trial court gave the following jury-charge instruction:

You are instructed that certain testimony has been admitted before you regarding certain pictures, State’s exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18. You cannot consider said pictures and testimony concerning same unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed said pictures, if he did. And even then you may only consider same, if you consider same at all, in determining the intent of the defendant to arouse or gratify his sexual desire as alleged in Count Two of the indictment, and for no other purpose.

When properly objected to under both Rules 404(b) and 403, as here, the trial court’s analysis for admissibility requires not only that the extraneous-act evidence relates to one of the matters listed in Rule 404(b), here “intent,” but also that the evidence passes the test of Rule 403, ie., that the probative value of the evidence not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or its tendency to mislead the jury. Tex.R. Evid 403; Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 168-69 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 388 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (opinion on reh’g); Graff v. State, 65 S.W.3d 730, 739 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd). The trial court’s decisions about the admissibility of evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 168-69.

Factors considered by a trial court in a Rule 403 analysis are:

(1) how eompellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make a fact of consequence more or less probable — a factor which is related to the strength of the evidence presented by the proponent to show the defendant in fact committed the extraneous offense;

(2) the potential the evidence of the other offense has to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way”;

(3) the time the proponent will need to develop the evidence, during which the jury will be distracted from consideration of the indicted offense;

(4) the force of the proponent’s need for this evidence to prove a fact of consequence, ie., does the proponent have other probative evidence available to him to help establish this fact, and is this fact related to an issue in dispute.

Id. at 169 (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389-90). Relative to “4,” courts have repeatedly held that evidence fails the Rule 403 test if the Rule 404(b) matter is not controverted and can be readily inferred from other evidence, including the offense itself. Cantrell v. State, 731 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (generally); Castillo v. State, 910 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd, untimely filed) (“intent to arouse” in a case of indecency with a child; reversed); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.) (“intent to arouse” in a case of indecency with a child; reversed); Reed v. State, 751 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.) (“identity”).

Our review measures the trial court’s ruling against the “relevant criteria ... (1) that the fact at issue was not seriously contested; (2) that the State had other convincing evidence to establish the issue; (3) that the probative value of the evidence was not particularly compelling; and (4) that the evidence was of such a nature that a limiting instruction would not likely have been effective.” Graff v. State, 65 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet refd) (citing Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), and Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 392-93.). Thrift was eighteen at the time of the alleged offenses. The minor was a male, JB, who was age fourteen at the time. The offenses allegedly occurred one night at Thrift’s residence when JB and a number of other minors were present. JB testified that Thrift placed his hand on JB’s penis and performed oral sex on JB. Another teenager, BM, testified that he saw Thrift’s hand on JB’s penis. Thrift’s defense was that JB was lying and the incident never occurred.

Under this evidence, Thrift’s intent to gratify himself by touching JB was not in controversy — why else would he have touched JB’s penis and performed oral sex on him? Instead, the controversy was whether the incident JB and BM described in fact occurred. Therefore, under Cantrell and other cases, even if the pictures were relevant to show “intent to arouse,” they failed the Rule 403 test. Moreover, these graphic images were of a nature that a limiting instruction would not likely have been effective. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. (“When the record demonstrates one or more of the relevant criteria reasonably creating a risk that the probative value of the tendered evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, then we should conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.”).

Having found error, we must review for harm. We will disregard any error that does not affect a substantial right of the complaining party. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 958 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). We do not reverse if, “after examining the record as [a] whole, [we have] fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). The reviewing court should consider everything in the record, including all the evidence admitted, the closing arguments, and voir dire. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The strength of the evidence of guilt, especially if it is overwhelming, is a factor to be considered. Id. at 357-58.

The evidence was not overwhelming that Thrift was guilty. JB testified about the allegations against Thrift, but admitted he had a lot of alcohol that night. BM confirmed JB’s testimony in part when he testified he saw Thrift with his hand on JB’s penis. The defense called Thrift to testify; he denied the charges. The defense also called four minors who were at Thrift’s residence that night. They could not say that JB’s accusations were untrue or could not have happened, but they did not testify that they had witnessed Thrift touch JB. They also contradicted some of JB’s and BM’s testimonies about who was where in the residence at various times, doing what. They were, however, testifying about events two years old. Finally, AA, a female who is Thrift’s cousin and who was thirteen at the time of the alleged offenses, testified that the photographs were hers, and that she had downloaded them off the internet and placed them in the Dallas Cowboys book.

The jury heard the evidence and impliedly believed JB and BM but not Thrift and his witnesses. As a general rule we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations. However, although AA claimed ownership of the photographs, we do not know whether the jury believed her, which would preclude any prejudicial effect of the photographs. And, we do not know that it was the credibility-weighing of the witnesses that led to the verdict, rather than that the photographs “tipped the scales” in a close case. Thus, the strength of the evidence of guilt does not weigh in favor of a finding that the error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King, 953 S.W.2d at 271.

In a case in which evidence about the offenses comes primarily from two witnesses who directly contradict each other, and there is little circumstantial evidence and no physical evidence, the possibility that photographs like these affected the verdict is high because of their blatant sexual content of the sort alleged against the defendant. In addition, the charge instruction increased the possibility of harm because it instructed the jury that it could consider the photographs to determine “intent.” And the possibility of harm is not significantly reduced by the passing mention by the State in closing argument that AA claimed ownership of the photographs. After examining the record as a whole, we cannot say we have a “fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at 417; Castillo, 910 S.W.2d at 127-28; Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 30. Therefore, finding harmful error, we sustain the issue.

Conclusion

We sustain the conviction and judgment for sexual assault of a child, and we reverse the conviction and judgment for indecency with a child and remand for further proceedings on that offense.

Justice GRAY dissenting and concurring.

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,