Glen Rust v. the Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District and Harris County Appraisal District

Opinion issued January 6, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00148-CV
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GLEN RUST, Appellant
V.
THE APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD OF HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL
DISTRICT AND HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellees
On Appeal from the 334th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-27949
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On May 4, 2010, appellant, Glen Rust, filed a lawsuit in the trial court
against the Appraisal Review Board of the Harris County Appraisal District and
against the Harris County Appraisal District. On November 12, 2012, the trial
court granted a plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Appraisal Review Board and
dismissed Rust’s claims against the Appraisal Review Board, leaving the claims
against the Harris County Appraisal District pending. On February 17, 2014, Rust
filed a notice of appeal in the trial court, attempting to appeal from the trial court’s
November 12, 2012 order. We dismiss the appeal.
An appeal from an interlocutory order granting a plea to the jurisdiction filed
by a governmental unit is an accelerated appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a) (defining
accelerated appeal to include appeals from interlocutory orders). In an accelerated
appeal, absent a motion to extend time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
26.3, “the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is strictly set at twenty days after
the judgment is signed, with no exceptions . . . .” In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923,
927 (Tex. 2005); see TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). If a motion for extension of time to
file the notice of appeal is timely filed, the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is
extended by fifteen days, to thirty-five days after the judgment is signed. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Filing a
motion for new trial does not extend the appellate deadlines in an accelerated
appeal. See K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927, 928; In re R.B.M., 338 S.W.3d 755, 756
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
Because the trial court signed the order dismissing Rust’s claims against the
Appraisal Review Board on November 12, 2012, Rust’s notice of appeal was due
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by December 3, 2012. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a), 26.1(b). Rust filed his notice of
appeal on February 17, 2014, which was more than fourteen months after the
deadline. Hence, Rust’s notice of appeal was untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P.
26.1(b), 26.3; K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927.
On November 25, 2014, we notified Rust that his appeal was subject to
dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless he filed a written response showing how
this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a) (allowing
involuntary dismissal of case after notice). Rust failed to file an adequate
response.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927 (holding that untimely notice of
appeal failed to invoke jurisdiction of appellate court); R.B.M., 338 S.W.3d at 756,
758 (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction when notice of appeal was
untimely). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
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