the City of Houston v. Atser, L.P.

Concurring and dissenting opinion issued April 5, 2012

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-10-00240-CV

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The City of Houston, Appellant

V.

Atser, L.P., Appellee

On Appeal from the 334th Judicial District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2008-48039

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION

I respectfully concur in the judgment with respect to the first issue (the $5M claim), and I respectfully dissent from the judgment with respect to the second (the $250K claim).  Although a majority of the panel has agreed on the judgment in this appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 41.1(a), the fact that a justice concurring in the judgment has declined to provide or join any legal opinion means that there is no majority reasoning to explain the outcome, except to the extent that the two opinions partially agree about why we lack appellate jurisdiction with respect to the City’s $5M claim.  The panel opinions in this appeal thus lack any precedential value except to the extent of our agreement as described in this opinion.  Cf. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994) (noting that plurality opinions are “not authority for determination of other cases” because “the principles of law involved have not been agreed upon by a majority of the sitting court”); Rothenberg v. State, 176 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (observing that plurality opinions may be persuasive authorities, but they lack precedential value).

I conclude that this appeal should be dismissed in its entirety for want of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.  “Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides such jurisdiction.”  Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007) (citing Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998)).  The City appealed only from the trial court’s March 9, 2010 interlocutory order denying its motion for partial summary judgment, and we have interlocutory jurisdiction only if that order denied a plea to the jurisdiction.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2008).  A summary judgment motion that “clearly challenged the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction” is treated as a plea to the jurisdiction for the purpose of determining interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.  Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006).  The availability of an interlocutory appeal is not “constrained by the form or caption of a pleading,” but will instead be determined by “the substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, not merely its title.”  Id. (quoting Surgitek, Bristol–Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999)).

The general thrust of the City’s arguments on appeal is that its motion for partial summary judgment challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts necessary to plead and prove the waiver of governmental immunity for contract claims pursuant to Local Government Code section 271.152.  We cannot address the merits of the City’s arguments on appeal because, as I explain below, they were not presented to the trial court as jurisdictional arguments. The statute authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001 [of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code],” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8), is strictly construed as a “narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.”  Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 841 (quoting Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. 2001)).  Although the question of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal by the court or by the parties, see Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993), that principle presupposes that we are properly exercising our appellate jurisdiction, and on this record we cannot do so.

$5M claim. With respect to the first issue, a careful examination of the substance of the motion for partial summary judgment reveals that the City did not “clearly challenge” the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction as to ATSER’s $5M claim. Although the argument, excerpted in the majority’s opinion, made reference to the governmental immunity statute, it did so only with specific reference to the kinds of claims that ATSER could not pursue against a governmental unit, i.e., a purported “tort or quasi-contract claim” and “these types of claims.”  ATSER did not allege such claims in the third amended petition, the live pleading.  Thus, in context, the City’s reference to the statutory waiver of governmental immunity under section 271.152 was a straw man argument because ATSER had already voluntarily dropped its unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims from the suit.  The real issue is whether the City is immune from suit for the contract claim.

The City relies upon ICI Construction, Inc. v. Orangefield Independent School District, 339 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.), as an example in which an appellate court upheld a trial court’s order granting a plea to the jurisdiction based upon the plaintiff’s failure to establish the existence of an actionable contract within the scope of the waiver of governmental immunity, thus demonstrating the absence of jurisdictional facts necessary for the case to proceed.  See ICI Construction, 339 S.W.3d at 239.  That authority is inapplicable because in this case the City did not present an argument in its motion for partial summary judgment that the alleged infirmities in ATSER’s contract claim deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.  Quite to the contrary of suggesting immunity from suit, the City’s motion acknowledged that “Atser’s only possibility of recovery lies in an action for breach of contract, which is Atser’s only remaining claim.”

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment that the appeal must be dismissed as to the $5M claim for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  However I would not parse the motion to distinguish between the City’s no-evidence and traditional summary judgment grounds, as Justice Keyes has done in her opinion.  The City’s motion either challenged subject matter jurisdiction over the $5M claim or it did not. I agree with Justice Keyes that it did not.  We therefore lack appellate jurisdiction for interlocutory review of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the $5M claim.

$250K claim. With respect to the City’s second issue, a close review of the City’s motion demonstrates that it also did not challenge subject matter jurisdiction over the $250K claim.  “Sovereign immunity encompasses two principles: immunity from suit and immunity from liability.”  Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. 2001).  The City did not argue that it was immune from suit for the $250K claim.  As noted in the lead opinion, with respect to the $250K claim the City’s motion only disclaims liability for lost profits because ATSER is prohibited by statute from obtaining that type of damages. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.153(b)(1) (West 2005) (excluding recovery of consequential damages for contract claim against local governmental entity, except to extent allowed under section 271.153(a)(1)).  Such an argument does not implicate the City’s immunity from suit; rather, it only implicates immunity from liability for damages.  See Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 840 (Tex. 2010); City of Houston v. S. Elec. Servs., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 739, 743–44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

Because the motion for partial summary judgment only claimed immunity from liability for the $250K claim, the City did not challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.  “Immunity from liability does not affect a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case.”  Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); see also City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. 2011) (“Immunity from suit deprives a trial court of jurisdiction.” (citing Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638–39)); S. Elec. Servs., 273 S.W.3d at 744–45 (affirming denial of plea to the jurisdiction based upon section 271.153).  The City’s argument was premised upon immunity from liability for a category of damages.  It was not premised upon immunity from suit, and therefore it did not “clearly challenge” the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  See Thomas, 207 S.W.3d at 339.  Accordingly, the City’s motion for partial summary judgment cannot be treated as a plea to the jurisdiction for the purpose of establishing interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, and the appeal should likewise be dismissed as to the $250K claim.  See Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Tate, 77 S.W.3d 467, 472–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

Although no analysis with respect to the City’s second issue has garnered the support of a majority of the panel, and therefore the legal discussion has no precedential value, I respectfully disagree with the portion of the lead opinion which reviews the City’s second issue and suggests, incorrectly, that the City cannot use a plea to the jurisdiction to challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts necessary to substantiate a claim within the scope of a legislative waiver of governmental immunity.  See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227–28 (Tex. 2004) (observing that a plea to the jurisdiction may challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts and “if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law”); ICI Construction, 339 S.W.3d at 239.

                                                                   Michael Massengale

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Massengale.

Justice Sharp, concurring in the judgment only.

Justice Massengale, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting from the judgment in part.