Jordan Eaglin v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00504-CR
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JORDAN EAGLIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12-15298
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jordan Eaglin pleaded guilty to the offense of
aggravated robbery. The trial court found the evidence sufficient to find Eaglin
guilty, but deferred further proceedings, placed Eaglin on community supervision
for ten years, and assessed a $1000.00 fine.
The State filed a motion to revoke. Eaglin pleaded “true” to one of the
alleged violations of his community supervision. The trial court revoked Eaglin’s
community supervision and sentenced him to thirty-five years in prison.
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In issues one and two, Eaglin argues that the trial court’s sentence was
disproportionate and unreasonable, thereby violating his rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under article I, section 13 of the Texas
Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. His
constitutional challenges to the sentence were preserved below. See Kim v. State,
283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing Rhoades v.
State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
We address Eaglin’s issues together.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Cont. amend. VIII. Even when a sentence is
within the range permitted by law, a sentence may in rare instances be
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,
323-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Subject only to a very limited, ‘exceedingly
rare,’ and somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-disproportionality
review, a punishment that falls within the legislatively prescribed range, and that is
based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment, is unassailable on
appeal.” Id. (footnote omitted); see Jarvis v. State, 315 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.).
2
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court referenced
Harmelin v. Michigan and the test Harmelin cited for determining whether a
sentence is grossly disproportionate to a defendant’s crime. Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005
(1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment));
see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-30 (2003) (employing Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin as guide for application of proportionality
principles). The proportionality principle does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence, but forbids extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-60; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
997, 1000-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The first step is to compare the gravity of
the offense with the severity of the sentence. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60. If there is
gross disproportionality, then the court should “compare the defendant’s sentence
with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id.
Eaglin committed aggravated robbery with a firearm. The thirty-five year
sentence was within the statutory range of punishment for the offense of first-
degree aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 29.03 (West
2011). Generally, we will not disturb a sentence that is within the statutory range
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of punishment. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
In addition, a punishment that is within the statutory range for the offense is
generally not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual under the Texas
Constitution or the United States Constitution. See Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769,
772 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d); see also Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d
842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.). The trial court could have
sentenced Eaglin to a sentence of up to life in prison, but instead it sentenced him
to thirty-five years. Furthermore, there is a lack of any evidence “reflecting
sentences imposed for similar offenses on criminals in Texas or other jurisdictions
by which to make a comparison” in evaluating Eaglin’s disproportionate sentence
claim. 1 See Jackson, 989 S.W.2d at 846; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-60. The
sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
or article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. Issues one and two are overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
1
Eaglin suggests that if more information is needed, this Court should abate
the appeal for a hearing to allow him to gather information regarding sentences
imposed for similar offenses on criminals in Texas or other jurisdictions. Eaglin
cites no applicable authority to support the basis for this request and we decline the
request. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
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_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on July 7, 2014
Opinion Delivered September 3, 2014
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
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