Lance Julian Laura v. State

Opinion issued January 7, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00489-CR
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LANCE JULIAN LAURA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1314922
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After appellant, Lance Julian Laura, with an agreed punishment
recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of compelling
prostitution by a minor,1 the trial court deferred adjudication of his guilt and placed
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.05(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2015).
him on community supervision for four years. The State, alleging several
violations of the conditions of his community supervision, subsequently moved to
adjudicate appellant’s guilt. After a hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty
and assessed his punishment at confinement for twelve years. In his sole issue,
appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the court costs
assessed against him.
We affirm.
Background
In its motion to adjudicate his guilt, the State alleged that appellant had
“violate[d] [the] terms and conditions” of his community supervision by: (1)
committing the offense of “knowingly caus[ing] . . . a person younger than
eighteen years of age[] to commit prostitution”; (2) “intentionally and knowingly
fail[ing] to report to the . . . City of Houston Police Department . . . in order to
verify the information in the sex offender registration form maintained by that law
enforcement agency”; (3) “[f]ailing to report to the Community Supervision Office
for the 232nd District Court”; (4) “[f]ailing to work faithfully at suitable
employment” and “provide proof of employment”; (5) failing to “comply with the
sex offender registration procedures”; and (6) “[h]aving [unauthorized] contact
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with a minor under the age of 17.”2 Appellant pleaded “[n]ot true” to these
allegations.
After a hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court found true the State’s
allegations. It further found appellant guilty, assessed his punishment at
confinement for twelve years, and ordered him to pay $584 in court costs.
Court Costs
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
the trial court’s imposition of court costs in the amount of $584 because the bill of
costs contained in the record reflects that the “total amount” of courts costs to be
assessed against appellant is $499.
A convicted criminal defendant must pay certain court costs. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42.15 (Vernon Supp. 2015) (applying when punishment is
fine only), 42.16 (Vernon 2006) (applying when punishment imposed “is any other
than a fine”); see also Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014). The imposition of court costs upon a criminal defendant is a “nonpunitive
recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial
of the case.” Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 390 (internal quotations omitted). When the
imposition of court costs is challenged on appeal, we review the assessment of
court costs to determine whether there is a basis for the cost, not to determine if
2
The State abandoned the other allegations contained in its motion to adjudicate.
3
there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each cost. Id. In other
words, we do not apply the traditional standard of review for sufficiency of the
evidence. Id.; Petty v. State, 438 S.W.3d 784, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, pet. ref’d).
The trial court, in its judgment adjudicating appellant’s guilt, assessed courts
costs against him in the amount of $584. Although a bill of costs3 is not required
to sustain statutorily authorized and assessed court costs, it is the most expedient,
and therefore, preferable method to do so. See Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 395–96
(bill of cost sufficient basis); Petty, 438 S.W.3d at 803 (“[T]he bill of costs
supports the assessment of the court costs in the judgments.”).
Here, the bill of costs, which identifies each itemized court cost that accrued
in appellant’s case, is signed by the Harris County District Clerk, is certified, and
lists $499 as the “Total Amount [of Court Costs] Assessed” and the “Total Amount
[of Court Costs] Due.” See Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 392–93. Notably though,
mathematically the “Total Amount” of court costs listed on the bill of costs is
incorrect; there is a typographical error. In fact, simply adding together the dollar
amounts of each individual cost included on the bill of costs reveals that the actual
3
A bill of costs must: (1) contain the items of costs; (2) be signed by the officer
who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost;
and (3) be certified. See Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 392–93 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 103.001 (Vernon Supp.
2015), 103.006 (Vernon 2006).
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“Total Amount” of court costs to be assessed against appellant is $584—the same
amount of court costs that is assessed against him in the trial court’s judgment.4
See Hearne v. State, 415 S.W.3d 365, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
4
The bill of costs lists the following costs to be assessed against appellant, which
total $584:
 Sheriff’s Fee (see TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011
(Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $110;
 District Clerk’s Fee (see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.005(a) (Vernon 2006)) – $40;
 Security Fee (see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.017(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $5;
 Consolidated Court Cost (see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 133.102(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $133;
 DNA Testing Fee (see TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.020(a) (Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $250;
 Jury Reimbursement Fee (see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.0045(a) (Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $4;
 DC Records Preservation (see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.005(f) (Vernon 2006)) – $25;
 Support of Indigent Defense (see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 133.107(a) (Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $2;
 Support of Judiciary Fee (see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 133.105(a) (Vernon 2008)) – $6;
 Court Technology Fee (see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.0169(a) (Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $4;
 Electronic Filing State (see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.851(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2015)) – $5.
We note that appellant does not challenge the validity of any of these costs. Cf.
Petty v. State, 438 S.W.3d 784, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
ref’d) (“no challenge to any specific cost assessed”); see also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 103.002 (Vernon 2006) (“An officer may not impose a cost for a
service not performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided
by law.”); Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 389 (only statutorily authorized court costs may
be assessed against defendant).
5
pet. ref’d) (affirming trial court’s assessment of court costs, where “sum of the[]
costs” contained in bill of costs same as “amount the trial court assessed as costs”
against defendant); see also Ewells v. State, No. 01-11-01014-CR, 2013 WL
6198318, at *4–7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 26, 2013, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling defendant’s complaint of
“insufficient evidence to support the imposition of $244 in court costs,” where “the
sum of the[] costs” was “amount the trial court’s judgment ordered [defendant] to
pay”).
Because the bill of costs supports the assessment of the court costs in the
trial court’s judgment, we hold that there is no error in the assessment of $584 in
court costs against appellant.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Bland.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
6