Ubaldo Suarez, Jr. v. Yolanda Chacon

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-18-00100-CV
________________________
UBALDO SUAREZ, JR., APPELLANT
V.
YOLANDA CHACON, APPELLEE
On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 2
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 88,139-2; Honorable Pamela Sirmon, Presiding
October 23, 2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, Ubaldo Suarez, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s Final Decree of
Divorce from Appellee, Yolanda Chacon. By a single issue, he contends the trial court
erred by awarding the marital residence solely to Yolanda in lieu of dividing the property
“on a 50/50 basis.” We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The parties entered into a common law marriage in 1995 and had four children,
two of whom were minors at the time of the divorce. In 2015, they ceased living together
as husband and wife. Yolanda filed suit for divorce in February 2016, and alleged
insupportability as well as adultery.
At the hearing on the divorce petition, counsel for both parties announced that the
parties agreed to the divorce and custody issues, as well as the division of their personal
property and a timeshare but disagreed on division of the marital residence. In her
answers to interrogatories, Yolanda suggested the home be sold and that the proceeds
be divided. Ubaldo’s counsel asked for a fifty/fifty split of the proceeds.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court granted the divorce but reserved
division of the property to review the evidence, which included other property and two
businesses. As relevant to this appeal, the trial court awarded the marital residence solely
to Yolanda in the divorce decree. Ubaldo appealed and limited his argument solely to the
award of the marital residence to Yolanda.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review the trial court’s division of the marital estate for abuse of discretion.
Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981). Generally, there is no abuse of
discretion where there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to
support the trial court’s decision. In the Marriage of Vick, No. 07-15-00019-CV, 2016 Tex.
App. LEXIS 11975, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). In
dividing the marital estate, the trial court has broad discretion and we must presume that
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it exercised that discretion properly. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698-99. Thus, “the appellant
bears the burden to show from the record that the division was so disproportionate, and
thus unfair, that it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Sullivan v. Lepage-Sullivan, 07-15-
00081-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 667, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 25, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing O’Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013,
no pet.).
Regarding division of the marital estate, the trial court’s division must be just and
right, having due regard for the rights of each party and the children. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 7.001 (West 2006). While the division of the marital estate must be equitable, it
does not have to be mathematically equal. Hrncirik v. Hrncirik, No. 05-15-00001-CV,
2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9661, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
ANALYSIS
Ubaldo’s entire argument on appeal is as follows:
Consistent with about one-half of the marriages in this State, this one ended
in divorce. There is plenty of blame for both parties, but they have both
moved on. The only issue tried below was the split of the marital home.
The Trial Court erroneously awarded the entire marital home to [Yolanda].
There was no evidence at trial to support anything other than a [sic] equal
division of the marital home.
Without citation to any authority or any references to the record, Ubaldo relies solely on
the above-quoted argument. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require adequate
briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring a brief to contain a clear and concise
argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
record). There is no citation to any authority to support Ubaldo’s no-evidence contention.
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An issue that is not adequately briefed is waived for consideration on appeal. See ERI
Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010).
Furthermore, notwithstanding Ubaldo’s inadequate briefing, an abuse-of-discretion
standard is difficult to overcome without a showing that the trial court’s decision was
arbitrary or unreasonable. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).
Because neither the record nor the briefing contains sufficient information from which a
fact finder could value the community estate otherwise divided by agreement, it would be
impossible for this court to determine whether the award of the marital residence was
inequitable, unjust, unreasonable, disproportionate, or an abuse of discretion. Therefore,
considering the division of the marital residence alone, we cannot say the trial court erred
in the overall division of the community estate. Ubaldo’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
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