in the Interest of I.J.G.

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-18-00299-CV
____________________
IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.G.
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. C-230,177
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.G. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, I.J.G. 1,2
The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds exist for
termination of R.G.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in
I.J.G.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2)
(West Supp. 2018).
1
To protect the identity of the minor, we use the initials for the child and his
parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The Order of Termination also terminated the parental rights of I.J.G.’s
father, V.O., however, V.O. is not a party to this appeal.
1
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which
counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional
evaluation of the record. Counsel certified Appellant was served with a copy of the
Anders brief filed on her behalf. This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a
pro se response, as well as the deadline for filing the response. This Court did not
receive a pro se response from Appellant. We have independently reviewed the
appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous.
We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal.
Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating R.G.’s parental
rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by R.G.’s court-appointed appellate
counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all
appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event R.G. decides to pursue an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to R.G. can be met “by filing a
petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
2
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on October 29, 2018
Opinion Delivered November 8, 2018
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
3