Zafar Ali Raza v. State

Affirmed; Opinion Filed February 27, 2018.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-00066-CR
ZAFAR ALI RAZA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F15-58310-R
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Evans, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Evans
Zafar Ali Raza was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant pled
not guilty and, at trial, asserted defense of third person. A jury convicted appellant of aggravated
assault and assessed his punishment at eighteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal appellant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to disprove that he acted in defense of others or that his
conduct was justified by necessity. Appellant also contends he received ineffective assistance of
counsel due to counsel’s failure to request that instructions on the necessity justification and
presumption of reasonableness in defense of others be included in the jury charge. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2015, Michael Rogers, the complainant, was shot in the face by appellant.
Appellant admitted he shot appellant but claimed the shooting was justified because Rogers was
endangering the lives of other persons.
Evidence of the circumstances leading to the shooting was presented through witness
testimony and video surveillance. That evidence shows that appellant worked as a clerk at the
Peach Tree Food Mart located on the south end of a small strip shopping center on Walnut Hill
Lane in Dallas. Lupita’s Café, a pool hall, was at the north end of the center. There were a couple
of other stores in between the food mart and the pool hall. The businesses in the center shared a
small parking lot which also contained gas pumps located in front of the food mart. There were
two entrances or exits to the center, one coming off Walnut Hill close to the food mart, and one
off of Estate Lane, the side street close to the pool hall.
Rogers and his wife, Tarsha,1 owned a moving company and carpet cleaning business.
They had three daughters, aged six, eight and fifteen. On October 2, 2015, they had just finished
a move and carpet cleaning in Mesquite when Rogers pulled in front of the gas pumps in front of
the food mart in order to replenish the gas in the U-Haul truck before returning it to the nearby
rental center. Tarsha was with the three girls driving the family’s SUV with a trailer attached
carrying the carpet cleaning equipment. She followed Rogers to the gas station. When Rogers got
out of the truck to pump the gas, he locked the doors with the keys inside, stranding the vehicle
and blocking the pump. Tarsha told Rogers that the SUV also needed gas, and after arguing with
each other, Rogers had Tarsha get out of the vehicle so he could pull it around to the other side of
pump.
1
At the time of the shooting, Rogers and Tarsha had been together since 2007 but were not married. They
officially got married in June, 2016.
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The U-Haul truck and SUV blocked both sides of the pump for about an hour while Tarsha
and Rogers tried to find someone to open up the U-Haul. During that time, appellant and another
store employee confronted Rogers and Tarsha about the vehicles blocking the gas pumps. After
they explained the situation to appellant, the two men went back into the store. Shortly afterwards,
another man came out and confronted Rogers and Tarsha using profanity and threatened to damage
the vehicle. As a result of that encounter, Tarsha called 911. At that point, several men started
walking quickly towards the SUV and Rogers jumped in the car. The men beat on the window,
kicked the driver’s side door, and attempted to open the driver’s door as Rogers tried to pull away.
Rogers had a difficult time maneuvering the vehicle with the trailer and jack-knifed the trailer
several times; he also hit a couple of other vehicles in the parking lot. Each time the SUV slowed,
the men attacked the vehicle again. One of the aggressors was pushed by Roger’s vehicle when it
lurched out of a jack-knife position. After being bumped, that individual advanced on the SUV
again. Physical evidence showed that the SUV sustained damage to the driver’s window and door
and that the driver’s side door handle had been torn off.
When Rogers was finally able to maneuver the vehicle and trailer in a position to exit at
Walnut Hill, he was met by another vehicle attempting to enter the parking lot. At that point, the
video shows the SUV going in reverse and the trailer jackknifing. Detective Kreun testified that
the final rolling back and jackknife occurred after Rogers had been shot. Physical evidence shows
that the bullet that hit Rogers came through the driver’s side window and struck him in the face.
Rogers suffered injuries which included broken bones in his mouth and face, complete loss of
hearing in one ear, partial loss of hearing in the other ear, and an aneurysm from the fragments in
his carotid artery.
Although appellant did not testify at trial, his statement to police was presented to the jury.
In his statement, appellant admitted that he fired the weapon. He stated two reasons for shooting
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Rogers: he believed he was protecting the people in the parking lot because Rogers was trying to
run people over, and he believed Rogers was going to drive his vehicle into appellant’s store and
hit him.
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Defense of Third Person
In appellant’s first issue, he contends that the evidence is legally insufficient for a rational
jury to have found that he did not act in defense of a third person.
We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s rejection of defense of
third person claim under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In defense
of third person cases, this requires a court to review all of the evidence presented at trial in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if any rational trier of fact would have found
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against
appellant on the defense of third person issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton v. State, 522
S.W.3d 714, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2017, pet. granted) (citing Saxton v. State, 804
S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In this case, appellant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by
intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing bodily injury to Rogers by shooting him with a
firearm. A person commits aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if he intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon
during the commission of the assault. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 2017),
22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). A deadly weapon includes a firearm. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(17)
(West Supp. 2017). The jury was also instructed on the definition of defense of a third person in
accordance with the applicable law. A person is justified in using deadly force against another to
protect a third person, “[s]o long as the accused reasonably believes that the third person would be
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justified in using [deadly force] to protect himself. . . ” Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (quoting Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.33 (West 2011). A person is justified in using
deadly force against another . . . when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly
force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of
unlawful deadly force. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a) (West 2011). A “reasonable belief”
is defined as one that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances
as the actor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2017).
A defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support a claim of defense of
others. Braughton, 522 S.W.3d at 730 (citing Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003)). Once the defendant does so, the State then bears the burden of persuasion to disprove
the raised defense. Id. The burden of persuasion does not require the State to produce evidence; it
requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. A determination of guilt
by the fact finder implies a finding against the defensive theory. Id.
The issue of defense of a third person is a fact issue to be determined by the fact finder,
who is free to accept or reject the defensive issue. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14. As the sole
judge of the weight and credibility accorded any witness's testimony, the fact finder is free to
believe or disbelieve the testimony of all witnesses, and to accept or reject any or all of the evidence
produced by the respective parties. Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st. Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).
In his statement to the police, appellant admitted that he shot Rogers. He maintains,
however, that he shot Rogers to protect the people in the parking lot, and the other people on the
sidewalk in front of the food mart, and the people on the sidewalk between the food mart and the
pool hall. Appellant contends that he acted reasonably because the evidence, including his
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statement, the 911 call he made, and the testimony of other witnesses, show that Rogers’s conduct
threatened people in the parking lot and threatened people on the sidewalk because they thought
he was going to drive into the food mart. The statements of appellant and his witnesses do not
conclusively prove a claim of defense of a third person. See London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 203
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. ref’d).
Based upon the evidence in this case, the jury rationally could have rejected appellant’s
defense of third person theory. The jury viewed three different video recordings of the events
surrounding the shooting. The video from the pool hall shows an hour of events leading up to the
altercation. Two videos from the food mart show the actions of appellant and others prior to the
shooting and immediately after. In the videos, it is apparent that no one was in danger of being hit
by Rogers’s vehicle, that the only people that are near Rogers’s vehicle are the men attacking the
vehicle and that Rogers is trying to get away from the men but that the men keep coming after his
vehicle as it is moving forward. It is apparent from the videos that if Rogers was intent on hitting
somebody in the parking lot, he could have done so but instead drove his vehicle in a manner
indicating he was trying to get away. It is also apparent from the videos that just before Rogers
was shot, he was positioning his vehicle to head out of the Walnut Hill exit, as opposed to aiming
his vehicle to run forward or backward into the front of the store, as claimed by appellant. The
videos also showed that the bystanders, including appellant, were standing on the sidewalk in front
of the food mart as they watched the events unfold. The videos did not show anyone on the
sidewalk in front of the food mart trying to scramble out of the way of Rogers’s vehicle.
Detective Kreun testified the physical evidence also indicated that Rogers was trying to
exit the parking lot and that no one was in danger of being hit. The evidence showed that the bullet
that hit Rogers came through the driver’s side window and struck him in the face, which placed
appellant, who was standing on the sidewalk in front of the food mart, beside the car and not in
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front of the car. Detective Kreun testified that after his investigation at the scene and viewing the
videos, he could find no evidence that anyone was in danger.
Further, testimony from two defense witnesses, the manager of the pool hall and the
security guard for the pool hall, indicated that no one on the sidewalk in front of the pool hall or
in the parking lot near the pool hall was in danger of being hit by Rogers’s vehicle. The pool hall
manager stated that he was standing on the sidewalk and if he had been in danger, he would have
called 911 himself. The security guard testified that when he came out to the parking lot, Rogers
was coming in his direction and he shined his flashlight at Rogers but did not pull his gun because
he did not believe his life or any other person’s life was in danger; he thought Rogers was trying
to leave the parking lot.
Finally, Rogers testified that he was still learning to maneuver the trailer. He testified that
he was frightened and trying to get away from the men who were attacking his vehicle in order to
protect his children. He testified that he did not think he could get out of any other exit and that
the only exit he knew was the Walnut Hill exit – the exit he had used to come into the parking lot.
He testified that when the security guard was shining the flashlight in front of him, he thought it
was a gun pointing towards him and that he was being told not to come that way. He testified that
all of his maneuvering of the SUV and trailer was him just trying to get to the exit he knew in order
to get out of the parking lot.
Based upon the video and physical evidence, as well as the testimony of not only the State’s
witnesses, but also the defense witnesses, the jury could have reasonably concluded that contrary
to appellant’s statements, no people were in danger of being hit by Rogers’s vehicle when he was
heading towards the exit of the parking lot. Considering all of the evidence in the light most
favorable the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could have found the essential elements of
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aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt and rejected appellant’s defense of third person
claim. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Defense of Necessity
In appellant’s second issue he contends that the evidence is insufficient to disprove that
appellant’s conduct was justified by necessity. Appellant argues that although the defense of
necessity was not included in the jury charge, the hypothetically correct jury charge in this case
would include consideration of the necessity defense and that under the holding in Malik v. State,
the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured according to a hypothetically correct charge.
See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We need not address appellant’s
claim because the “hypothetically correct jury charge” analysis is inapplicable under the facts of
this case.
Malik provides that a hypothetically correct jury charge is one that accurately sets out the
law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof
or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular
offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. A hypothetically correct jury charge includes only
the defensive issues applicable to the case that the defendant timely requests or objects to the
omission from the jury charge. Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);
Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 61–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Appellant did not ask to include
the defense of necessity in the jury charge, nor did he object to its omission. Therefore, the
necessity defense is not be considered in an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault. See Cervantes v. State, No. 07-14-00391-CR, 2015
WL 3610543, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 9, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for publication);
Osborne v. State, No. 07-13-00156, 2015 WL 3463047, at *3, (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 29 2015,
pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Pruiett v. State, No. 05-12-00131-CR, 2013 WL
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1277861, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 25, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In appellant’s third and fourth issues, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial because of counsel’s failure to request that instructions on the defense of necessity
and the presumption of reasonableness be included in the jury charge. We disagree.
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that (1) his trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); Lopez v. State,
343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Appellant has the burden to establish both prongs
by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998). “An appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to
consider the other prong.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see
also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
A. Defense of Necessity Instruction
Assuming, without deciding, that appellant was entitled to an instruction on the defense of
necessity, on this record, appellant cannot show how the result of the proceeding would have been
different had the jury charge included a necessity instruction.
The necessity defense provides that conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid
imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according
to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law
proscribing the conduct; and
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(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does
not otherwise plainly appear.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (West 2011). A proper charge on the defense of necessity includes
the first two subsections. See Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 642–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
The jury was instructed on defense of third person, as follows:
You are instructed that under our law a person is justified in using force or
deadly force against another to protect a third person if, under the circumstances as
he reasonably believes them to be, such person would be justified in using force or
deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or deadly force of another
which he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect,
and he reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect
the third person.
A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree
he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against
the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force.
By the term “reasonable belief” as used herein is meant a belief that would
be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the
defendant.
A person is justified in using deadly force against another:
(1) if the person would be justified in using force against the other; and
(2) when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force
is immediately necessary:
(A) to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of
unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other’s imminent commission of aggravated
kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery,
or aggravated robbery.
“Deadly force” means force that is intended or known by the person using
it to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death
or serious bodily injury.
....
Now, therefore, bearing in mind the foregoing definitions and instructions,
if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Zafar
Ali Raza, did unlawfully then and there intentionally or knowingly or recklessly
cause bodily injury to Michael Rogers, hereinafter called complainant, by shooting
complainant with a firearm, and said defendant did use or exhibit a deadly weapon
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to wit; a firearm, during the commission of the assault, as alleged in the indictment,
but you further find from the evidence, or you have a reasonable doubt thereof, that,
that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force when and to the degree
used, if it was, was immediately necessary to protect an unknown individual against
the use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force by Michael Rogers you will
acquit the defendant and say by your verdict “not guilty.”
The instructions and evidence in this case make the prejudice prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis analogous to the harm analysis in Rodriguez v. State, 524 S.W.3d
389, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). In Rodriguez, the Houston Court of
Appeals held that the appellant was not harmed by the omission of a necessity instruction when
the jury charge included a self-defense instruction. The court noted that the jury rejected
appellant’s claim of self-defense and found that none of the evidence and instructions concerning
self-defense set up any barriers that could have led to a finding of necessity without a finding of
self-defense. Id.
Here, the jury rejected appellant’s claim of defense of third person. Thus, the jury found
that the State negated at least one essential element of defense of third person and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt either (1) appellant did not reasonably believe that a third person was in danger
of death or serious bodily injury, or (2) appellant did not reasonably believe that deadly force was
immediately necessary to protect a third person against Rogers’s use or attempted use of unlawful
deadly force. Id. (citing Barrios v. State, 389 S.W.3d 382, 398 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet.
ref’d). If the jury rejected the defense of third person theory based on the first prong – no
reasonable belief that a third person was in danger – then the jury would have also rejected the
necessity defense because appellant did not reasonably believe that a specific harm was imminent.
If the jury rejected the defense of third person theory based on the second prong – no reasonable
belief that force was immediately necessary to protect a third person from Rogers – then the jury
would have also rejected the necessity defense because appellant did not reasonably believe that
shooting Rogers was immediately necessary.
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As in Rodriguez, we cannot find any evidence in the record specific to appellant’s necessity
defense such that the jury might have rejected appellant’s defense of third person theory while
accepting his necessity theory. Appellant’s conduct was the same: shooting Rogers. The harm
sought to be avoided was the same: protecting others from being seriously injured by Rogers
conduct in driving his vehicle in the parking lot. None of the evidence and instructions concerning
defense of third person set up any barriers that could have led to a finding of necessity without a
finding of defense of third person. The instructions and evidence overlapped to such a degree that
we are assured appellant suffered no harm and the result of the proceeding would not be different.
Id.; see also Barrios, 389 S.W.3d at 398.
B. Presumption of Reasonableness Instruction
Appellant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel
should have requested that the presumption of reasonableness instruction be included in the charge.
Appellant claims that he was entitled to the presumption because the jury could have found
appellant reasonably believed Rogers was attempting to commit murder. We conclude that
appellant can show neither deficient performance by counsel in failing to request the instruction,
nor a likelihood that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the jury charge
included a presumption of reasonableness instruction.
The presumption of reasonableness under Penal Code § 9.32 provides that the actor’s belief
that deadly force was immediately necessary was reasonable if the actor knew or had reason to
believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used was committing or attempting to
commit the offense of murder. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)(C) (West 2011).
The Penal Code “requires that a presumption that favors the defendant be submitted to the jury if
there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption . . . unless the court is
satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the
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presumed fact. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.05(b)(1) (West 2011); Morales v. State, 357 S.W.3d
1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). As pointed out by the State in its brief, the record in this case is
devoid of any facts that support the elements of murder or attempted murder. Thus, appellant was
not entitled to the instruction.
Further, under the evidence in this case, a complete instruction would have permitted the
jury to disregard the presumption of reasonableness based on its determination that appellant had
no reason to believe that Rogers was attempting to commit murder. See Villarreal v. State, 453
S.W.3d 429, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In addition, a presumption of reasonableness instruction
would not likely have resulted in a different verdict because of the weakness of appellant’s
defensive evidence in comparison to the evidence in the record refuting that evidence. Id. at 439.
We overrule appellant’s third and fourth issues.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
170066F.U05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ZAFAR ALI RAZA, Appellant On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-17-00066-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F15-58310-R.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 27th day of February, 2018.
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