Ralph Eugene Bridwell v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-17-00167-CR
____________________
RALPH EUGENE BRIDWELL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 128th District Court
Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. A160313-R
________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After pleading guilty to an indictment charging him with intoxication
manslaughter,1 Ralph Eugene Bridwell filed an appeal in which he argues that his
plea was not voluntary. In one issue, Bridwell argues that he received ineffective
1
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.08(a) (West 2011) (a person commits the
offense of intoxication manslaughter if he operates a motor vehicle in a public place
while intoxicated and, by reason of that intoxication, causes the death of another by
accident or mistake).
1
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to reasonably investigate
certain matters, to develop a potential defense, and to properly advise him regarding
the punishment the he could receive based on the circumstances in his case. Because
the record on appeal fails to overcome the strong presumption that Bridwell received
reasonable professional assistance, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Late one night in October 2015, a car Bridwell was driving struck a man on a
bicycle while both the car and the bicycle were travelling in a northeasterly direction
on the shoulder of State Highway 12. When the investigating officer spoke with
Bridwell at the scene, Bridwell agreed to provide the officer with a sample of his
blood. Two other police officers accompanied Bridwell to a hospital, where a
registered nurse obtained the sample. Three days later, the officer in charge of the
investigation sent the sample to the Department of Public Safety’s Crime Lab, which
found that it contained 0.094 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. 2
In August 2016, a grand jury indicted Bridwell for intoxication manslaughter.
Seven months later, without the benefit of a plea bargain, Bridwell appeared in court
2
See id. § 49.01(2)(B) (West 2011) (providing that a person is intoxicated if
his blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 or more).
2
and pleaded guilty to that charge.3 One month later, during Bridwell’s punishment
hearing, Bridwell pleaded true to the two felony enhancement allegations in his
indictment.4 After pleading true to the allegations that he had committed two prior
felonies, the trial court advised Bridwell his punishment range was “a minimum of
25 years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional
Division and a maximum of life[.]” Bridwell then called four witnesses to testify
during the punishment phase of his trial. After hearing the punishment evidence, the
trial court sentenced Bridwell to a thirty-five-year sentence.5
In the brief that Bridwell filed to support his appeal, he argues that his trial
attorney (1) failed to properly investigate his case, (2) performed deficiently because
he failed to develop potential defenses to the State’s theory claiming that Bridwell
was guilty of intoxication manslaughter, and (3) failed to advise Bridwell that
3
See id. § 49.08(a), (b) (West 2011) (providing intoxication manslaughter is
a second-degree felony).
4
The enhancement allegations assert that in 2006, Bridwell was convicted on
a charge of felony driving while intoxicated, and that in 1994, he was convicted of
a second felony for aggravated assault.
5
See id. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2018) (authorizing a maximum punishment
of life in prison under the circumstances established by the record in Bridwell’s
case).
3
pleading true to the enhancement allegations in the indictment would subject him to
the range of punishment that the trial court considered when assessing his sentence.
Analysis
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must first
establish that his attorney made errors so serious that the attorney failed to function
as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 6 Establishing that such serious
error occurred is difficult without a record that is sufficient to overcome the “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” 7 Second, the defendant must show that “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”8 In the context of a guilty plea, “the
defendant’s burden is to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the deficient
performance caused the defendant to waive a judicial proceeding that he was
otherwise entitled to have.”9
6
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
7
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
8
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
9
Miller v. State, 548 S.W.3d 497, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
4
To overcome the presumption that the trial attorney provided the defendant
with reasonable professional assistance, the evidence showing the trial attorney was
ineffective must be “‘firmly founded in the record and the record must affirmatively
demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.’” 10 Ordinarily, when the defendant failed to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance in the proceedings that took place in the trial
court, the record before the appellate court will seldom have been sufficiently
developed to allow the appellate court to conclude that trial counsel made errors so
serious that they violated the Strickland standards.11 If the trial attorney who
represented the defendant was never given the opportunity to explain the conduct
that the defendant is challenging in his appeal, appellate courts generally presume
that had such an opportunity been made available, the attorney’s explanation would
have shown that the choices made in defending the case were decisions that
represented reasonable choices between different trial strategies.12
Here, the record does not show that Bridwell filed a motion for new trial. The
record also contains no evidence showing what Bridwell’s trial attorney did to
10
Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting
McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
11
Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
12
Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
5
investigate the facts and law that were relevant to Bridwell’s case. Without an
explanation from Bridwell’s trial attorney about what he did to investigate
Bridwell’s case, the record fails to show that Bridwell’s trial attorney conducted an
unreasonable investigation or made recommendations to Bridwell that fell below the
standard of objectively reasonable assistance. 13 Moreover, were we to assume that
Bridwell’s trial attorney performed deficiently, the record that is before us in the
appeal fails to show that Bridwell would have likely pleaded not guilty and chosen
to go to trial given all the circumstances, as they are shown by the record before us
in the appeal.
We conclude that Bridwell has failed to overcome the strong presumption that
he received reasonable professional assistance.14 We overrule Bridwell’s ineffective
13
See Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We also observe
that the record shows the trial court told Bridwell about the punishment range that
the court would consider in assessing his sentence during the hearing on his plea.
14
See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 (“In the majority of instances, the record
on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of
trial counsel.”); see also Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 813 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (stating that only in rare cases will the record on direct appeal be sufficient to
establish a claim that counsel’s performance was deficient).
6
assistance claim, without prejudice to his right to raise his claim in a post-conviction
writ.15 For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on August 13, 2018
Opinion Delivered November 7, 2018
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
15
See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Robinson, 16 S.W.3d at 813 n.7.
7