Colt Dillon Gaulding v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-21-00096-CR
___________________________
COLT DILLON GAULDING, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1581939R
Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Colt Dillon Gaulding appeals his convictions on two counts of
aggravated assault with the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon and two counts of
assault causing bodily injury to a family member while having a prior conviction.1 On
appeal, Gaulding argues in three related points that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting certain extraneous offense evidence pursuant to Article 38.371 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Gaulding and the Complainant Meet and Begin a Romantic Relationship
In 2013, the complainant, who had recently separated from her husband, met
Gaulding while out with a friend. After a short acquaintance, Gaulding and the
complainant began a romantic relationship, and Gaulding quickly moved in with the
complainant and her three children.
During their relationship, Gaulding and the complainant frequently consumed
excessive amounts of alcohol and used marijuana together. Gaulding also introduced
the complainant to methamphetamine and Xanax. Due in part to the couple’s drug
use, their relationship was fraught with violence and abuse.
1
Gaulding was also charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assault but
was found not guilty of these charges.
2
B. The Needles, California Incident
Gaulding first physically abused the complainant while they were on a trip to
Needles, California, to visit Gaulding’s friend Ian. During the visit, the complainant
was hospitalized after being injured in an off-roading car accident. While lying in bed
recuperating at Ian’s home, the complainant received a text message from an ex-
boyfriend. After reading the text, Gaulding flew into a jealous rage. He climbed on
top of the complainant and struck her in the face. Ian heard the commotion and told
Gaulding to stop. Though the complainant was shocked and upset by this incident,
she returned home with Gaulding and continued their relationship.
C. The Luau Bar Incident
In May 2016, Gaulding physically abused the complainant again. After
drinking at some clubs in Corpus Christi, Gaulding and the complainant began to
argue. During the drive back to their home in Kingsville, Gaulding began striking the
complainant in the face. Gaulding then grabbed the complainant’s hair, pulled her
head to his lap, and repeatedly punched her in the head.2 When the assault stopped
and the complainant was able to lift her head, she saw that they were in the parking
lot of the Luau Bar in Kingsville. The complainant did not want to enter the bar
because her face was bruised and her lip was bleeding, so Gaulding ordered her to tidy
herself up before going inside. Once inside, the complainant sneaked away to the
2
While Gaulding admitted that he had “backhanded” the complainant, he
denied that he had pulled her head into his lap and punched her.
3
bathroom and escaped. The police were called, and Gaulding was arrested.3 Despite
this incident, Gaulding and the complainant stayed together.
D. The Barbell Incident
In September 2017, another incident of physical abuse occurred. While
Gaulding and the complainant were at Gaulding’s father’s house in Nueces County,
Texas, Gaulding’s brother arrived and began threatening to commit suicide. While
Gaulding was talking to his brother and attempting to console him, the complainant
injected herself into the conversation.4 This angered Gaulding, and he slapped the
complainant in the face with such force that she was knocked to the ground.
Gaulding’s brother witnessed the slap and immediately exited the room saying, “I
don’t want to have anything to do with this.” Gaulding then began to kick and stomp
on the complainant as she lay helplessly on the floor. The complainant called out to
Gaulding’s brother, who eventually returned and restrained Gaulding, allowing the
complainant to grab her keys and flee.
As the complainant attempted to drive away, Gaulding grabbed a 45-pound
barbell—a long bar to which weights can be added at each end—and threw it through
3
Gaulding was ultimately charged with the misdemeanor offense of assault
causing bodily injury to a family member and sentenced to community supervision,
which was later revoked.
4
The complainant claimed that she had been trying to dissuade Gaulding’s
brother from harming himself, but Gaulding testified that she had been encouraging
him to do so.
4
the complainant’s windshield.5 The barbell narrowly missed the complainant’s head
and came to rest in the back seat. The complainant drove away to a safe place and
then called police. Gaulding was ultimately charged with aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, assault causing bodily injury to a family member with a previous
conviction for the same, and continuous violence against the family.6
After this incident, Gaulding and the complainant remained apart for some
time. The complainant entered Oxford House, a drug treatment facility in Dallas, and
remained sober for eight months.
E. Events Giving Rise to the Current Case
Shortly after leaving Oxford House, the complainant rekindled her relationship
with Gaulding and began living with him in an Arlington hotel. The complainant
soon relapsed when Gaulding offered her methamphetamine, and the two began
regularly using drugs while staying at the hotel.
On June 5, 2018, Gaulding and the complainant had dinner and drinks with
another couple in the hotel restaurant. Afterward, all four of them returned to
Gaulding and the complainant’s room where they continued to consume large
quantities of alcohol and use methamphetamine. At one point, the other couple
5
Gaulding claimed that the complainant was not inside the vehicle when he
hurled the barbell through the windshield.
6
Gaulding initially received deferred adjudication for these charges but was
ultimately adjudicated guilty of all three charges and sentenced to ten years in prison.
5
started arguing, and the complainant became angry and upset when Gaulding told the
complainant that he thought the man was being abusive to the woman and wanted the
complainant to help her.7
Once the other couple left, Gaulding began hitting the complainant in the face
and ribs with his fists. The complainant escaped to the parking lot where she
screamed for help to several people, including her friend Bobbie,8 who also resided at
the hotel. Gaulding chased the complainant, who threw herself to the ground.
Gaulding then carried her—kicking and screaming—back to their hotel room.9
Minutes later, Bobbie knocked on the door. Gaulding told the complainant to tell
Bobbie that everything was fine and not to call the police. The complainant complied
but winked as she did so, signaling to Bobbie and prompting her to immediately
contact the police.
7
The complainant explained that this upset her because Gaulding was trying to
protect this woman whom he barely knew from physical abuse even though he had
physically abused the complainant in the same manner.
8
At times, Bobbie is referred to as “Bobby” in the reporter’s record. Despite
the spelling differences, the record references appear to refer to the same person.
9
Gaulding’s and the complainant’s accounts differ regarding the manner in
which Gaulding transported the complainant back to the room. The complainant
testified that Gaulding grabbed her by her shorts, yanked her by her hair, and dragged
her back inside. However, Gaulding denied pulling the complainant’s hair or dragging
her; rather, he claimed that he had carried her over his shoulder “[k]ind of like a
caveman” back to the room.
6
After the door was closed, Gaulding grabbed a long knife and began pacing
back and forth in anger. He threatened to kill the complainant, who curled up on the
bed covering her face with her hand. Gaulding struck the complainant in the face and
head while holding the knife and cut her hand. Gaulding then used the knife to cut
off the complainant’s clothing, and they had sex. They were still on the bed when
police arrived and kicked in the door. The complainant grabbed a T-shirt to clothe
herself and ran past the officers out the door.
Gaulding was placed under arrest and charged with two counts of aggravated
sexual assault, two counts of aggravated assault with the use or exhibition of a deadly
weapon, and two counts of assault causing bodily injury to a family member while
having a prior conviction. In July 2021, a jury found Gaulding not guilty of
aggravated sexual assault but guilty of the four remaining charges. Gaulding was
sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration ranging from twelve to forty years in
length on the four counts of which he was convicted.10 This appeal followed.
10
Gaulding was sentenced to terms of thirty years and forty years on the two
aggravated-assault counts and to terms of twenty years and twelve years on the two
counts of assault causing bodily injury to a family member while having a prior
conviction.
7
III. DISCUSSION
In three points,11 Gaulding argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting extraneous offense evidence of the Needles, California Incident; the Luau
Bar Incident; and the Barbell Incident pursuant to Article 38.371 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, Gaulding asserts that the trial court erred by
admitting this extraneous offense evidence because (1) it was offered only to show
character conformity in violation of the Texas Rules of Evidence, see Tex. R. Evid.
404(b), and (2) its probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair
prejudice, see Tex. R. Evid. 403.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). We
will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the record
shows a clear abuse of discretion. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. An abuse of discretion
occurs only when the trial court’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that
11
Because Gaulding’s three points are interrelated, we will address them
together. See Phillips v. State, No. 02-16-00049-CR, 2016 WL 6519118, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
see also Garcia v. State, No. 05-19-00310-CR, 2020 WL 4013151, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Threadgill v.
State, No. B14-92-00710-CR, 1993 WL 187988, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] June 3, 1993, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
8
zone within which reasonable persons might disagree. Id. If the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling is correct on any applicable theory of law, we will not disturb it even
if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its correct ruling. De la Paz v. State, 279
S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 675 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d).
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
Prior to trial, the State gave notice of its intent to introduce extraneous offense
evidence pursuant to Article 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Gaulding filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to prohibit the State from
mentioning or alluding to any of his extraneous offenses. During a pretrial
evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that pursuant to Article 38.371 the State could
present evidence concerning the Needles, California Incident; the Luau Bar Incident;
and the Barbell Incident.12 In making its ruling, the trial court conducted a balancing
test and determined that the potential prejudicial impact of the extraneous offense
evidence did not outweigh its probative value. The trial court later admitted the
evidence during trial over Gaulding’s objections but gave an oral limiting instruction
and repeated this limiting instruction in the written guilt–innocence jury charge.13
12
The trial court ruled that the State could not present evidence of an additional
2015 incident in Kleberg County, Texas, because the State had failed to provide
defense counsel with sufficient notice.
13
The trial court instructed the jury, among other things, that it could consider
the extraneous offense evidence “only . . . in determining the nature of the previous
9
C. Admissibility under Article 38.371 and Rule 404(b)
Gaulding argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
extraneous offense evidence because it was introduced merely to show that he acted
in conformity with his character in violation of Rule 404(b). Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); see
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b). Rule 404(b) precludes the admission of
evidence of a crime, wrong, or act solely to prove a person’s character to show that he
acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion, but the rule allows
for such evidence to be admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Those listed purposes “are neither mutually
exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. Thus, while
Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence limits character evidence, it is
nevertheless a rule of inclusion. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343;
Nash v. State, Nos. 02-17-00236-CR, 02-17-00237-CR, 2018 WL 4495440, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
As we have previously recognized, “Article 38.371, which applies to family-
violence prosecutions, provides an additional non-character-conformity purpose for
admitting extraneous-offense evidence.” James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 545 (Tex.
and subsequent relationship of . . . [the complainant] and . . . Gaulding . . . and for no
other purpose.”
10
App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371).
Though Article 38.371 explicitly proscribes the presentation of character evidence that
is otherwise inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence or other laws, it expressly
allows “evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances that would assist the trier of
fact in determining whether the actor committed the offense . . . , including testimony
or evidence regarding the nature of the relationship” between the accused and the
complainant. Id. at 545-56 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b), (c)).
Thus, Article 38.371(b) expressly provides for the admission of extraneous offense
evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between an accused and a
complainant. James, 623 S.W.3d at 546; Mourning v. State, No. 02-19-00168-CR, 2020
WL 6165309, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); see also Franco v. State, No. 08-18-00040-CR, 2020 WL
3168560, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 15, 2020, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (“[T]he Legislature has determined under article 38.371 that the nature of
the relationship itself is a permissible, non-character-conformity purpose for which
evidence is admissible.”).
Contrary to Gaulding’s assertion, the complained-of extraneous offense
evidence was not introduced to show character conformity. Rather, the State made
very clear at the pretrial evidentiary hearing that it was offering the extraneous offense
evidence to show the nature of the relationship between Gaulding and the
complainant, and it was on this basis that the trial court allowed the evidence to be
11
admitted. Indeed, as noted above, the trial court issued limiting instructions to the
jury explicitly directing them to consider the extraneous offense evidence “only . . . in
determining the nature of the previous and subsequent relationship of . . . [the
complainant] and . . . Gaulding . . . and for no other purpose.” The nature of
Gaulding and the complainant’s relationship was an important factor in the case, and
in addition to the extraneous offense evidence, the State also presented expert
testimony to explain the dynamics of a relationship marked by violence. Because all
of the complained-of extraneous offense evidence showed the nature of Gaulding and
the complainant’s relationship, it was admissible for that purpose under Article 38.371
and Rule 404(b). See James, 623 S.W.3d at 546. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence over Gaulding’s Rule 404(b) objection.
See id.; Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 312–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, no pet.).
D. Admissibility under Rule 403
Gaulding also argues that the trial court should have excluded the extraneous
offense evidence under Rule 403. Otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded
under Rule 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403; see
Emich v. State, No. 02-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 311153, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Jan. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “Rule 403 favors
12
the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence is
more probative than prejudicial.” James, 623 S.W.3d at 546–47 (first citing Montgomery,
810 S.W.2d at 389; and then citing Emich, 2019 WL 311153, at *7). Because of this
presumption, it is the burden of the party opposing the admission of the evidence to
show that the evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more
of the dangers listed in Rule 403—including unfair prejudice. James, 623 S.W.3d at
547; Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d);
Sanders v. State, 255 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d).
To determine whether evidence is admissible in the face of a Rule 403
objection, the trial court must conduct a balancing test. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at
389; see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed that when undertaking a Rule 403
analysis, courts must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of
evidence and (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of
the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the
evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency that a
jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence would
give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42.
13
1. Probative Value
The first two Gigliobianco factors assess “probative value,” Rule 403’s “first key
phrase.” Id. at 641. Probative value pairs “the inherent probative force of an item of
evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence
of a fact of consequence to the litigation . . . with the proponent’s need for that item
of evidence.” Id. When the State has “other compelling or undisputed evidence to
establish” what the extraneous offense evidence “goes to prove,” the value of the
extraneous offense evidence is much less. Id. (quoting Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390).
Here, the inherent probative force of the extraneous offense evidence is
undisputed. As the State points out, the evidence’s inherent probative force was
strong because it provided context and insight into Gaulding’s motivation for striking
the complainant and showed how the abuse had escalated over time until the
complainant had had enough. The extraneous offense evidence also rebutted
Gaulding’s theory that the abuse was mutual and just part of the couple’s sexual
foreplay or their usual, “toxic” dynamic.
With respect to the second factor, Gaulding asserts—in conclusory fashion—
that the State did not need the extraneous offense evidence to prove its case against
him. However, while the State had robust evidence of the charged assault, it still had
a strong need for the extraneous offense evidence. As noted above, Gaulding’s
defense attempted to show that the abuse was mutual and just part of the couple’s
sexual foreplay. Thus, the extraneous offense evidence was necessary to show that
14
Gaulding’s relationship with the complainant had been marked by violence and abuse,
thereby rebutting the defense’s theory and strengthening the inference that Gaulding
had assaulted the complainant on this particular occasion.
Therefore, the first two factors weigh in favor of admission.
2. Danger of Unfair Prejudice, Confusion of the Issues, or Misleading
the Jury
Having determined that the extraneous offense evidence had probative value,
we must now weigh that probative value against the danger that this evidence would
unfairly prejudice, confuse, or mislead the jury.14 See id. Unfair prejudice “refers to a
tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.” Id. Evidence is not excludable under Rule 403 if it is
merely prejudicial; “all evidence against a defendant is . . . designed to be prejudicial.”
Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Tex. R. Evid. 403.
Thus, Rule 403 is not concerned with merely prejudicial evidence but instead with
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Tex. R. Evid. 403; Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 811.
“‘[C]onfusion of the issues,’ refers to a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from
the main issues in the case. Evidence that consumes an inordinate amount of time to
present or answer, for example, might tend to confuse or distract the jury from the
14
As the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized, the Gigliobianco factors may
“blend together” in certain cases. Id. at 642. In his brief, Gaulding appears to lump
his arguments for factors three, four, and five together under the broad heading of
“und[ue] prejudice.” Therefore, we consider these factors together.
15
main issues.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. “Misleading the jury” involves the
likelihood that a jury will place too much weight on the evidence for some reason not
involving emotion. Id. “For example, ‘scientific’ evidence might mislead a jury that is
not properly equipped to judge the probative force of the evidence.” Id.Gaulding asserts that the prejudicial effect of the extraneous offense evidence is
“obvious,” that the jury would necessarily have given the evidence undue weight, and
that, as a result, the jury “had no other option but to find [Gaulding] guilty.”
However, we are unpersuaded by Gaulding’s oversimplified analysis. First, while the
extraneous offense evidence is undeniably prejudicial, Gaulding has not shown that
the evidence of the three incidents in question, which are similar in nature and
seriousness to his charged offenses, is unfairly prejudicial. See Norwood v. State, No. 03-
13-00230-CR, 2014 WL 4058820, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 15, 2014, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“When the extraneous offense is no more
heinous than the charged offense, evidence concerning the extraneous offense is
unlikely to cause unfair prejudice.”); see also Payne v. State, No. 02-17-00268-CR, 2019
WL 2223575, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“Although the [extraneous offense] evidence was
necessarily prejudicial, it was not unfairly so compared to its probative value.”).
Moreover, as noted above, the trial court gave the jury clear limiting instructions
restricting its consideration of the extraneous offense evidence to admissible
purposes. These instructions—which we presume the jury followed, see, e.g., Thrift v.
16
State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)—equipped the jury to weigh the
extraneous offense evidence properly and minimized the risk of the jury’s improperly
relying on such evidence in reaching its verdict. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 549. Further,
because the evidence was not scientific or complex, there was little risk of jury
confusion. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 (providing scientific evidence as an
example of the type of evidence that “might mislead a jury that is not properly
equipped to judge” its “probative force”). Finally, Gaulding’s contention that the jury
“had no other option but to find [him] guilty” is belied by the fact that the jury found
Gaulding not guilty of two of the six offenses with which he was charged. The jury’s
split verdict suggests that it did not place undue weight on the extraneous offense
evidence but rather was able to carefully and properly consider all of the evidence
presented. See Brito v. State, No. 08-15-00196-CR, 2018 WL 3569616, at *9 (Tex.
App.—El Paso July 25, 2018, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Therefore, we conclude that the third, fourth, and fifth Gigliobianco factors
weigh in favor of admission. 210 S.W.3d at 641.
3. Likelihood of Undue Delay and Needless Repetition
Giglioblanco’s sixth factor addresses Rule 403’s concerns regarding “undue
delay” and the “needless[] present[ation of] cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403;
James, 623 S.W.3d at 550. “This factor focuses on how efficient the trial is, not on the
risk of an erroneous verdict.” James, 623 S.W.3d at 550. Here, while the presentation
of extraneous offense testimony comprised a substantial portion of the trial, the
17
length of the evidentiary presentation was not inordinate, particularly given the
lengthy history of Gaulding and the complainant’s relationship and the bearing that
the nature of their relationship had on the proceedings. Indeed, Gaulding has not
asserted on appeal that the presentation of the extraneous offense evidence caused
undue delay or was needlessly cumulative. Accordingly, we hold that this factor
weighs only slightly, if at all, against admission.
4. Resolution
Weighing all six factors, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by concluding that the probative value of the extraneous offense evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the risk of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex.
R. Evid. 403; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42; see James, 623 S.W.3d at 551. As
shown above, the probative value of the evidence was strong, and because the
extraneous offenses were no more heinous than the charged offenses, the risk of
unfair prejudice was relatively low. See Norwood, 2014 WL 4058820, at *5. This risk
was further minimized by the trial court’s limiting instructions. See James, 623 S.W.3d
at 549. In addition, Gaulding’s argument that the jury would “necessarily” have given
“undue weight” to the extraneous offense evidence is undermined by the jury’s split
verdict. See Brito, 2018 WL 3569616, at *9.
18
Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit
the extraneous offense evidence, we overrule all three of Gaulding’s points.15
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all three of Gaulding’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.16
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 29, 2022
15
In his brief, Gaulding asserts that he was harmed by the trial court’s alleged
error. However, because we have concluded that the trial court did not commit error
in this case, we do not need to conduct a harm analysis. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1;
Montoya v. State, No. 13-12-00736-CR, 2014 WL 223228, at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 16, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
16
The trial court entered separate judgments for each of the charged offenses.
19