in Re Melissa Marie Lara Perez

NUMBER 13-22-00254-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE MELISSA MARIE LARA PEREZ
On appeal from the 267th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
Appellant Melissa Marie Lara Perez appeals the trial court’s ordering denying her
petition for an adult name change. By what we construe as two issues, Perez argues the
trial court erred by: (1) not providing her an opportunity to explain the reason for her name
change request; and (2) denying her request “based on [the trial court’s] personal belief”
even though she complied with the applicable statutes. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 45.101–45.107. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Perez, an adult, filed a verified original petition to change her name. Perez’s
petition included her current name, current place of residence, the name that she was
seeking the change to, the reason for her request, confirmation that she has not been
charged with a class A or B misdemeanor or felony, and a complete set of fingerprints
along with a Texas Department of Public Safety report showing that she has no criminal
history in Texas. See id. § 45.102(a). Perez also included most of the demographic
information required but left her race blank. See id. § 45.102(b).
Perez sought to change her name to this symbol 1:
Perez stated that requested the change because “[t]he new name has a very spiritual
meaning to [her].” See id. § 45.102(a)(3). Perez further noted that “[she] now identif[ies]
as this person.”
At the hearing on her petition, the trial court called the case and immediately
notified Perez that it was denying her request, stating: “Ma’am, I’ve reviewed your petition
and I don’t believe that is a name and I’m going to deny your petition.” This appeal
followed.
1 In Perez’s brief, she notes that the symbol may be represented through text by typing “O(+>”.
Perez acknowledges that the symbol depicted was first adopted by recording artist Prince Rogers Nelson
(Prince). In 1993, Prince issued a press release regarding the adoption of the name wherein he described
it as “a symbol with no pronunciation.” RUPERT TILL, POP CULT: RELIGION AND POPULAR MUSIC 63 (2010).
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether a petition for a change of name is granted is a matter of judicial
discretion.” In re Jones, 507 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
pet.). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we look to whether “the
trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles—i.e., whether the
trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Id. An appellate court cannot find that a trial
court abused its discretion merely because it would have exercised its discretionary
authority differently than the trial court. Id. When findings of fact and conclusions of law
are not requested or filed, we presume the trial court made all findings necessary to
support its judgment, and we will affirm the ruling on any basis supported by the record.
See Point Lookout W. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam); see
also In re Gallagher, No. 05-20-00128-CV, 2021 WL 526336, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Muse, No. 09-17-00388-CV, 2018 WL 1097668,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Chapter 45 of the Texas Family Code governs the request for a name change of
an adult. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 45.101–45.107. Section 45.102 requires that the
petition be verified and include certain personal and demographic information. Id.
§ 45.102. Among the information required is “whether the petitioner has been the subject
of a final felony conviction” and “whether the petitioner is subject to the registration
requirements of Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure [(sex offender registration)].” Id.
§ 45.102(a)(4), (5); see generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 62.
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The court shall order a change of name under this subchapter for a person
other than a person with a final felony conviction or a person subject to the
registration requirements of Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, if the
change is in the interest or to the benefit of the petitioner and in the interest
of the public.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103(a). What constitutes “the interest or . . . benefit of the
petitioner [or] . . . the interest of the public” is not described by the applicable statutes.
While a petitioner’s “own proper reasons” and conscientious feelings about the
necessity of being known as and referred to by a specific name may be sufficient reasons
to support a name change, a petitioner does not have the absolute right to a name change
by court order. In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, no writ); In re Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1965, writ
ref’d). For example, “[i]mposition by assuming the name of a celebrity or other well-known
entity . . . may negate the right to a legal change of name.” See In re Erickson, 547
S.W.2d at 359.
Further, where the requirements of § 45.103 are not satisfied, a petitioner’s
religious motivation does not require a trial court to grant a name change. See Matthews
v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118, 119–20 (5th Cir. 1994); see also In re Gallagher, 2021 WL
526336, at *3; In re Barnes, No. 13-13-00685-CV, 2015 WL 2452614, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 21, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
IV. ANALYSIS
By her first issue, Perez complains that the trial court “immediately denied the
[n]ame [c]hange upon [her] approach to the bench and did not allow [her] to explain the
reason for the name request.” In other words, Perez complains that the trial court denied
her the benefit of a hearing. However, Perez cites to no authority that requires the trial
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court to provide a hearing on a request for name change and we have found none.
Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103, with id. § 159.611 (allowing a court to modify an
out-of-state child support order “after notice and hearing” if certain conditions are met),
and TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 101.456(b) (allowing a trial court to rule on discovery
matters for derivative actions “after notice and hearing”). A petitioner is required to state
“the reason the change in name is requested” in her petition and Perez did so. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.102(a)(3). The trial court was able to consider Perez’s petition
without reiterating her reason through testimony. Thus, Perez’s first issue is overruled.
By her second issue, Perez complains that the trial court determined “that [she]
was not requesting a valid name based on [the trial court’s] personal belief,” rather than
“based on the statute.” By her third issue, Perez contends that she satisfied all the
requirements to obtain the adult name change. We construe these issues together as
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Perez her requested name
change despite meeting the statutory requirements.
As Perez acknowledges, the symbol to which she seeks to change her name was
originally adopted by pop star Prince. In her petition, Perez identified the reason for her
requested change as “[t]he new name has a very spiritual meaning to [her].” While we do
not doubt the sincerity of Perez’s intention, “[i]mposition by assuming the name of a
celebrity or other well-known entity . . . may negate the right to a legal change of name.”
See In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d at 359.
Although Perez does not directly cite to the First Amendment, strongly held
religious beliefs do not require a trial court to grant a name change when the requirements
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of § 45.103 have not been satisfied. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103(a); Matthews, 23
F.3d at 119–20; see also In re Barnes, 2015 WL 2452614, at *3; In re Gallagher, 2021
WL 526336, at *3; see generally U.S. CONST. amend. I. Among the requirements in
§ 45.103 is that the name change be “in the interest or to the benefit of the petitioner and
in the interest of the public.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103(a) (emphasis added).
The trial court could have concluded that the name change was not in the interest of the
public because the symbol to which Perez seeks the name change has no pronunciation
and is not easily replicated through text, which may confuse or frustrate the public,
including government entities, such as law enforcement or the Social Security
Administration. 2 See id.; see also RUPERT TILL, POP CULT: RELIGION AND POPULAR MUSIC
63 (2010); In re Muse, 2018 WL 1097668, at *1 (concluding the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the petitioner’s name change to “Lord Shawn-Lee House of
Muse” as only a first name with no surname). Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Perez’s request to change her name. See In re Jones,
507 S.W.3d at 407. Perez’s second issue is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
25th day of August, 2022.
2 Although Perez may choose to go by any name she wishes, such does not necessarily entitle her
to a legal name change.
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