Judges: Hodges
Filed Date: 10/19/1911
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024
Appellant's first assignment of error attacks the following portion of the court's charge: "If you believe from the evidence that it was agreed and understood by and between the plaintiffs and the defendant, San Antonio Aransas Pass Railway Company, that on the 15th of May, 1909, the cattle in question should be placed in said defendant's stock pens at Falfurrias, Tex., and that on the morning of the 16th of said month the said cattle should be shipped out of Falfurrias by the said defendant, and you further find that, in pursuance of such understanding, the plaintiffs drove or caused to be driven said cattle to Falfurrias, Tex., and placed the same in defendant's stock pens, then from the time they were so placed in said pens it became, and was, the duty of said defendant to use such care as an ordinarily prudent person would have used under the same or similar circumstances to provide facilities for watering said cattle in said stock pens, and to use the same care to prevent said cattle from suffering injuries while detained in said stock pens; and, upon the placing of said cattle in said stock pens, it became and was the duty of said defendant to use ordinary care to transport the said cattle to the end of said defendant's line of railway at Waco, Tex., with reasonable dispatch and without unnecessary delay. And if you find that after they were so placed in said stock pens the said defendant failed to furnish facilities for watering said cattle, or that said defendant unreasonably delayed the shipment of said cattle, and that such failure was negligence, and that by reason of such failure in either respect, if any, said cattle became weak and emaciated and were injured and damaged thereby, and if you further find and believe from the evidence that the said cattle were unreasonably delayed at Yoakum, on said defendant's line of railway, and that such delay, if any, was negligence on the part of said defendant, then you will find for the plaintiffs such a sum of money as in your judgment will compensate plaintiffs for the injuries, if any, sustained thereby."
Article
If there was an agreement by the agents of the appellant to furnish appellees with cars for the shipment of their cattle on the morning of May 16th, and appellant failed to do this, it was liable for such damages as proximately resulted from its failure to comply with the terms of its contract. It was its duty to do that which it had contracted to do, and to exercise the proper degree of care for the preservation of the stock while in its keeping. The charge of the court assumed as a matter of law that it was the duty of the railway company to use ordinary care to furnish water for the stock while in the pens before they were loaded in the cars. The court had no more authority to do this than he had to tell the jury that the railway company should exercise the same care to supply them with water in the cars, or at some particular point on their route. In the absence of some statutory provision requiring stock to be watered at stated intervals, or designated places, whether or not the failure to do so or to make provision therefor is negligence becomes an issue for the jury. We think the charge was erroneous and misleading.
The remaining assignments of error are without merit. The only one which we think it proper to specially refer to is that which complains of the refusal of the court to give the following special charge: "If you believe and find from the evidence a man of ordinary care situated as plaintiffs were on May 16, 1909, and while the cattle were in the pens, could and would have taken the cattle to water, then you are instructed that plaintiffs were guilty of negligence in not watering said cattle, and, if you believe that such negligence caused or contributed to cause any damage suffered by the cattle, you will find for the defendant as to such damage." Contributory negligence, when predicated upon the omission to do some act to avoid an injury, is the failure to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances, and such failure causes or contributed to cause the injury complained of. An ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances here referred to might have taken the cattle out of to *Page 516 pens for the purpose of giving them water; but it does not necessarily follow that a person of ordinary prudence would not have omitted to do this under the same conditions. The charge, we think, submits an improper test, and was properly refused by the court.
For the error pointed out, the judgment of the court is reversed, and the cause remanded.