DocketNumber: No. 1257.
Citation Numbers: 166 S.W. 46, 1914 Tex. App. LEXIS 628
Judges: Levy
Filed Date: 3/17/1914
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
As a fundamental principle equity takes jurisdiction where it is made necessary to administer a preventive remedy, or when the courts of ordinary jurisdiction are made instruments of injustice, or when the right of action is given by law, but the remedy allowable by the court within its jurisdiction is inadequate to meet the demands of justice. Brown on Jurisdiction, § 196.
The constitution of the state (article 5, § 8) gives the district court express jurisdiction over all causes of action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law or the constitution. And a remedy is not provided at law unless, as laid down in 1 High on Injunctions, § 30, "it is as practical and efficient to secure the ends of justice and its proper and prompt administration as is the remedy in equity." The several decided cases of this state granting injunctive relief against cases instituted in justice court when judgments had been entered have no relation to the precise question here, beyond showing that the exercise of equitable jurisdiction is warranted in the proper case by the district court possessing full powers to grant *Page 49
the proper relief. And the case of Ry. Co. v. Kuteman,
The text-books recognize the general rule to the effect that equity will enjoin the prosecution of numerous suits at law where all arise from some common source, and are governed by the same legal rule and involve similar facts, and the whole matter might be settled in a single suit, and it is apparent that the maintenance of many separate suits will result in loss and be against the material interests of the parties. 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (3d Ed.) §§ 245-256; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., § 854, and others; 1 High on Injunctions, §§ 12, 62-65.
As said in 2 Story, Eq. Jur., supra, "One class of cases to which this remedial process is properly applied is where there is one general right to be established against a great number of persons; and it may be resorted to either where one person claims or defends a right against many, or where many claim or defend a right against one. In such cases courts of equity interpose in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits; for if each separate party may sue or be sued in a separate action at law and each suit would only decide the particular right in question between the plaintiff and the defendant in that action, litigation might become interminable. Courts of equity, therefore, having a power to bring all the parties before them, will at once proceed to the ascertainment of the general right, and, if it be necessary, they will ascertain it by an action or issue at law, and then make a decree binding upon all parties." And in Pomeroy, supra, sections 255, 269 and 274, it is stated that equitable jurisdiction is properly exercised where individual claims are legally separate, provided there is a community of interest among all the claimants in the question at issue and in the remedy.
In the case of Tribette v. Ry. Co.,
In the case of Guano Co. v. Saunders,
In Hamner v. Garrett, 133 S.W. 1058, the Court of Appeals for the Second District said: "It is not to be doubted that in this state in a proper case the district court may issue an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits. See Ry. v. Dowe,
It is believed that this particular suit under the particular grounds alleged affords reasons for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the district court, and we so hold. A part of the equity devolving upon the complainant is, we think, the payment of all the costs accrued in the justice court, but we observe that the defendants herein can avail themselves of this right by claim therefor in the answer.
The next question is the sufficiency of the complaint, as against a demurrer, upon the subject-matter of the alleged power of assessment. The allegation in point is the authority of the association to raise the rate under the following clause of the constitution: "Provided in the event that the same should be found insufficient or inadequate, then further assessment should be made as might be necessary to fully meet the benefits due and payable." Under the term "further assessment," as alleged, there is power in the association, we think, to enforce such increased Payment of money by its members, without restriction to any particular mode, as may be necessary to fully meet the benefits due and payable. And the authority is not wanting, in the term, to obtain the needed increase of payment through the means of increased rate payable per month, or, as *Page 50 provided by the laws, by each member. It is not believed that a further discussion is necessary.
We conclude the court erred in sustaining the general demurrer, and the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Pfohl v. . Simpson , 1878 N.Y. LEXIS 719 ( 1878 )
National Park Bank v. Goddard , 131 N.Y. 494 ( 1892 )
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Woldert Grocery ... , 1914 Tex. App. LEXIS 162 ( 1914 )
Cleveland v. Ward , 116 Tex. 1 ( 1926 )
Repka v. American National Insurance , 143 Tex. 542 ( 1945 )
Houston Heights Water & Light Ass'n v. Gerlach , 1919 Tex. App. LEXIS 1186 ( 1919 )
City of Corsicana v. King , 3 S.W.2d 857 ( 1928 )
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Pearlstone Mill & Elevator Co. , 37 S.W.2d 299 ( 1931 )
Luttring v. American Fruit Growers, Inc. , 1932 Tex. App. LEXIS 472 ( 1932 )
Southwest Gas Co. v. Hoff , 1932 Tex. App. LEXIS 511 ( 1932 )