e/yS^
J"L^jLj^AtJ""S^}iiJMi^lj Ml/* //V3'dtou155 S.W.3d 176, 179
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005). If the Rule is violated by a witness, the witness's testimony may be
admitted or excluded at the trial court's discretion. Bell v. State,
938 S.W.2d 35, 50
(Tex.Crim.App. 1996).
We review the trial court's decision whether to exclude a witness who has violated the
Rule for an abuse of discretion. Webb v. State,
766 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989);
State v. Saylor,
319 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.App. - Dallas 2009, pet. ref d). A violation of the
Rule is not in itself reversible error, but only constitutes error when the objected-to testimony is
admitted and the complaining party is harmed. See
Webb, 766 S.W.2d at 239-40; Archer v.
State,
703 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Harm to the complaining party is proven
by showing that: (1) the witness actually conferred with or heard testimony of other witnesses;
and (2) the witness's testimony contradicted the testimony of a witness from the opposing side or
corroborated the testimony of a witness he had conferred with or heard.
Archer, 703 S.W.2d at
666.
The record reflects that Wright mistakenly overheard twenty minutes of testimony from
other witnesses after the rule was invoked. Outside of the presence of the jury, Wright told the
court that she did not remember who was testifying when she was in the courtroom and that she
could not say what was talked about. Wright's testimony was admitted over Appellant's
objection that her testimony was tainted as a result of her presence in the courtroom during the
officers' testimony.
Although the record clearly reflects Wright violated the rule because she heard the
testimony of Officers Hicks and Grizzard, Wright's testimony did not contradict or corroborate
18-
the testimony of either officer. The extent of Wright's testimony was that she lived on Frank
Lane and owned a 1992 GMC pickup that was stolen on December 2,' 2010. According to
Wright, there had been no damage to the steering column of her vehicle before it was stolen.
The record reflects that the testimony of Officers Hicks and Grizzard had nothing to do with
Wright's residence, vehicle, or the damage to the vehicle's steering column. While Appellant
seems to argue that Wright overheard a discussion of the State's theory of the case that occurred
with the trial court just before the lunch recess, we agree with the State that a careful review of
the record shows that any discussion about the State's theory of the case was taken up after the
trial court broke for lunch and outside of the presence of Wright. Accordingly, we conclude
Appellant was not harmed or prejudiced by Wright overhearing the testimony of Officers Hicks
and Grizzard. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Wright's testimony.
Webb, 766 S.W.2d at 240. Issue Three is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all three of Appellant's issues, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice
January 14,2015
Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
Rivera, J., not participating
(Do Not Publish)