James Ray Bates v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-21-00063-CR
________________
JAMES RAY BATES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 19-11-15656-CR
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Ray Bates appeals his conviction for failure to comply with registration
requirements as a sex offender. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(3). A
jury found Bates guilty of failure to comply with Sexual Offender Registration
Requirements, specifically, “enter[ing] the premises of any school in this state
during the standard operating hours of the school” and not…“immediately
notify[ing] the administrative office of the school and the person’s registration status
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under Chapter 62, Sex Offender Registration Program, Texas Code Criminal
Procedure.”
In the first two of his four issues on appeal, Bates argues the jury charge
contained egregious errors because it allowed the jury to convict without finding that
he knowingly entered a school premises and failed to allege an essential element of
the offense charged, namely the two prior convictions for which Bates was required
to register as a sexual offender. Finally in his last two issues, he argues that there
was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he knowingly entered the premises of
a school without notifying the school’s administrative office and that he has been
previously convicted of two sexually violent offenses. We affirm.
Background
Eric Erickson testified that on the morning of April 26, 2019, he was at Sacred
Heart Catholic School dropping off his children for school. On Fridays, he takes his
children to Chick-Fil-A to have breakfast before school and then waits in his truck
in the parking lot to attend chapel with his children at 8:30 a.m. On that morning, he
was checking emails while parked in the parking lot waiting for chapel to start when
he was approached by Bates. According to Erickson, the parking lot he was in
functions as both the church parking lot and parent parking lot for the school, and is
not gated. Bates approached him and told him he “was hungry[.]” Erickson offered
Bates some hash browns from his earlier breakfast and Bates rejected the food. He
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then described Bates as becoming agitated, and Erickson asked Bates to leave the
premises. Bates became more agitated and Erickson reached to get his cell phone to
call the police. During this confrontation, Erickson said that the school children were
“[t]o our left and to our right walking in single file with their teachers from the school
to the church, both sides of where this was happening.” He stated he wanted to call
the police because he was concerned with the way Bates was acting near the children.
At that moment, a police officer approached Bates and Erickson and took Bates
aside. Erickson was told to stay by his truck and he waited approximately thirty
minutes to speak to the officer. Erickson could not confirm the direction from which
Bates approached his truck, but stated that Bates approached his vehicle within 25
to 30 feet from the school.
Kristophorr Christenson testified that he is a Conroe police officer. On the
morning of April 26, 2019, he was being paid to be uniformed security for the school
and the church. He described his duties as watching children safely crossing the
crosswalks, and watching for vagrancy or homeless that could interfere with the day-
to-day activities of the school. Christenson stated that he first observed Bates when
Bates broke through a line of children coming from the school to approach
Erickson’s truck. He then observed Bates get into an argument near Erickson’s truck.
Christenson went to investigate “to make sure nothing was going on.” As he
approached the vehicle, he spoke to Erickson first, who confirmed that Bates asked
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for food and then turned down the food Erickson offered him, leading to Bates and
Erickson exchanging words. The officer then walked toward Bates, stopped him and
asked him what he was doing. He asked Bates for identification and Bates
immediately gave him his “sex registry card.” He questioned Bates as to whether he
should be on a property with children during school hours. Christenson then
contacted the on-call district attorney who confirmed there was probable cause to
arrest Bates, and Bates was subsequently arrested and transported to the
Montgomery County Jail.
During cross-examination, Christenson stated that on that day in April, the
“entire premises” was being used for both school and church purposes. Christenson
explained that during school hours, the church parking lot is used for school
functions. But he confirmed that there is no line separating the church from the
school that would indicate to a person when he is crossing from the church to the
school. Christenson stated he never saw Bates in the “western parking lots closest to
the school[.]”
Tosha Hyde testified that she works for the Conroe Police Department as a
sex offender registration specialist. She explained that her duties include “keep[ing]
up with the sex offenders that are currently residing in the city limits of Conroe. I
make sure that they come in for their annual verification appointments, their 90-day
verification or their 30-day verification. I update the DPS system for the State of
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Texas for any and all new information for each sex offender.” She testified that she
met with Bates on April 3, 2019, confirmed that he could read and write, and went
over all the rules with him, and had him initial by each rule, sign, date and provide
a right thumbprint. A copy of the rules signed by Bates was entered into evidence.
The form contained the following paragraph signed by Bates.
Entry Onto School Premises: I understand that if I enter the premises
of any private or public school or daycare center in Texas during
standard operating hours of the school, I shall immediately notify the
administrative office of the school of my presence and registration
status. The office may provide a chaperon to accompany me while I am
on the premises of the school. These requirements will NOT apply if I
am a student enrolled at the school, a student from another school
participating at an event at the school; OR a person who has entered
into a written agreement with the school that exempts me from these
requirements.
Hyde explained that there is no rule on how far Bates has to stay away from a
child if Bates is attending a church service. Hyde stated that Bates is not allowed to
go to the church during school hours if the church is considered a school.
Deb Brown testified that she is the principal at Sacred Heart Catholic School.
A normal school day at Sacred Heart is Monday through Friday, from eight o’clock
in the morning to three-fifteen in the afternoon. She stated there are also an after-
school care program and after school extracurricular activities from three-fifteen
o’clock to six o’clock in the afternoon. Brown described the school as across the
street from the church but stated that the school uses the church regularly for
“educational purposes[.]” According to Brown, the school is a parochial school and
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uses the church property to “attend mass every Friday and every holy day of
obligation. Religion is part of Sacred Heart’s curriculum. We also go for
reconciliation. We have graduation in the church. We have first communion in the
church. We also use it if we have retreats and things of that nature where we have
guest speakers.” Brown testified that in April 2019, there were signs posted in the
church parking lot explaining the layout of the Sacred Heart church and school.
According to Brown, the church, the lot next to the church, and the school parking
lot are all considered “one entity, Sacred Heart parish.” An exhibit was entered
showing two signs in the church parking lot. The signs stated the following: “Thou
Shalt Not Park This reserved space was purchased for one year at the Annual
Oktoberfest by THE [School member] FAMILY.” Brown stated the signs were
purchased by two school families during the Sacred Heart’s Oktoberfest. Brown
described that
the entire premises where the school is located is all fenced in. So all
the gates are locked. So in order to be able to get into the school, you
have to go in through the gates that you just showed.
When questioned during cross-examination, Brown stated the church is used
by the school…“to attend mass and when we go to stations of the cross and
graduation.” Brown acknowledged that the school cannot control who is in the
church parking lot. She testified that the church has charitable programs for
homeless individuals and that anyone can use those programs. She was not aware of
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Bates ever attempting to breach the fence surrounding the school. According to
Brown, the church and the school do not share the same address, but there are several
signs in front of the church and school zone signs identifying the school. Pictures of
the signs were admitted at trial.
Mitzy Barrera, the school secretary, testified that to her knowledge, Bates had
never entered into the school buildings or notified the school office that he was on
the school premises or wished to enter the school buildings.
Issues One and Two
In his first two issues, Bates challenges the trial court’s jury charge. First,
Bates argues that the trial court’s jury charge contained egregious error because it
allowed the jury to convict without finding that Bates knowingly entered the
premises of a school. Specifically, he argues that “[e]ntering the premises of a school
isn’t the same as failing to report a new address when you have been previously told
that you must do so. Accordingly, the State must prove that the defendant
‘knowingly’ entered the premises of a school to obtain a conviction.” Second, Bates
argues that the jury charge contained egregious error because it failed to allege an
essential element of the offense charged, that is, the two prior convictions for which
Bates was required to register as a sex offender.
Bates admits that he did not object at trial to the issues in the charge. As such,
we review the charge for egregious error. When reviewing alleged charge error, we
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determine whether error existed in the charge and, if so, whether sufficient harm
resulted from the error to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); see also Phillips v. State, 463 S.W.3d 59, 64-65 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015).
When, as here, the defendant does not object to the alleged charge error at
trial, we may reverse the judgment only if the error was so egregious that the
defendant did not receive a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d
157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g); see also Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d
621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Errors that result in egregious harm are those that
affect the “‘very basis of the case,’ deprive the defendant of a ‘valuable right,’ or
‘vitally affect a defensive theory.’” Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). “Egregious harm is a difficult standard to prove[,] and such a
determination must be done on a case-by-case basis.” Id. The egregious harm inquiry
under Almanza is fact specific and “should be done on a case-by-case basis.”
Gelinas, 398 S.W.3d at 710. “[T]he record must show that a defendant has suffered
actual, rather than merely theoretical, harm from jury instruction error.” Ngo, 175
S.W.3d at 750.
In assessing the degree of harm, we must consider the entire jury charge, the
state of the evidence, including contested issues and the weight of probative
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evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by
the record. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see also Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d
429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008). We must examine the charge in its entirety rather than as a series of
isolated statements. Holley v. State, 766 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989);
Iniguez v. State, 835 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet.
ref’d).
In his first issue, Bates argues that the jury charge contained egregious error
because the State was required to demonstrate a culpable mental state, that he
knowingly entered a school premises in violation of sex offender registration. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this issue and stated that “intent does
not apply. We hold that…the culpable mental states of knowledge and recklessness
apply only to the duty-to-register element of Article 62.012’s failure-to-comply
offense.” Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also
Ruiz v. State, Nos. 12-19-00023-CR, 12-19-00024-CR, 12-19-0025-CR; 2020 WL
562974, *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The culpable
mental state for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements applies
to the duty to register, not the failure to comply. Accordingly, the evidence must
establish a defendant’s awareness of the registration requirements but need not
establish an additional culpable mental state regarding his failure to register.”).
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In this case, Officer Hyde testified and provided evidence that she explained
and went over each of the rules with Bates and had him sign next to each rule and
provide a thumb print less than thirty (30) days before this incident. A culpable
mental state for failure to comply with the requirements of his registered status is
not required to be included within the jury instructions. Thus, Bates has failed to
show any error in the jury charge for omitting any requirement to find that Bates
knowingly entered a school premises in violation of his sex offender registration
requirements.
The charge contained the following language,
Now, bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you find from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about April 26, 2019 in
Montgomery County, Texas, that the defendant, James Ray Bates, did
then and there knowing the defendant was required to register pursuant
to Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Sex Offender
Registration Program, fail to comply with a requirement of Chapter 62
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, to wit: the defendant entered
the premises of Sacred Heart Catholic School during the school’s
standard operating hours and did not immediately notify the school’s
administrative office of the defendant’s presence at the school, and the
defendant’s duty to register expires when the defendant dies, and the
defendant is required to verify his registration once each 90-day period
under Article 62.058, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, then you will
find the defendant guilty of Failure to Comply with Sexual Offender
Registration Requirements as charged in the indictment.
The application paragraph of the charge correctly instructed the jury that they
must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Bates “did then and there knowing the
defendant was required to register pursuant to Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of
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Criminal Procedure, Sex Offender Registration Program, fail to comply with a
requirement of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . . . then you
will find the defendant guilty of Failure to Comply with Sexual Offender
Registration Requirements as charged in the indictment.” “Where the application
paragraph correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not
egregious.” Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also
Robinson, 466 S.W.3d at 172. Accordingly, we determine no error resulting in
egregious harm has been shown and Bates’s first issue is overruled.
Next, Bates argues that the charge failed to include an essential element of the
offense, that is, the two prior convictions which resulted in requiring him to register
as a sex offender. The indictment read as follows:
James Ray Bates, on or about April 26, 2019, and before the
presentment of this indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, did
then and there, knowing the defendant was required to register pursuant
to Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Sex Offender
Registration Program, fail to comply with a requirement of Chapter 62
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, to wit: the defendant entered
the premises of Sacred Heart Catholic School during the school’s
standard operating hours and did not immediately notify the school’s
administrative office of the defendant’s presence at the school,
And it is further presented that the defendant is a person whose duty to
register expires when the person dies and that the defendant is required
to verify his registration once each 90-day period under Article 62.058,
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
The indictment also alleged two prior felony enhancements.
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Bates was charged under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
requiring him to comply with Chapter 62 per his registration as a sex offender. The
State argues that it introduced evidence of Bates’s convictions in its first exhibit,
though not through certified judgments. The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed
this issue in 2007 and stated that a certified document is not necessary to prove a
defendant has previously been convicted.
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction
exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. No specific
document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements.
There is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires that the fact of a
prior conviction be proven with any document, much less any specific
document. While evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and
sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove
both of these elements in a number of different ways, including (1) the
defendant’s [a]dmission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a person who
was present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and
can identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof
(such as a judgment) that contains sufficient information to establish
both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as
the person convicted. Just as there is more than one way to skin a cat,
there is more than one way to prove a prior conviction.
Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citations
omitted).
Additionally, even assuming without deciding it was jury charge error not to
include the two prior convictions as an essential element of the offense charged,
Bates stipulated at trial that he was a registered sex offender. Therefore, any such
error would not have been harmful. See Hollen v. State, 117 S.W.3d 798, 802 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 2003) (“Since the two prior offenses were validly mentioned in the
indictment and validly introduced into evidence via the stipulation, there was
likewise no error in the jury instructions, and the prior convictions were the
legitimate subject of voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments.”); see
also Tapps v. State, 257 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, aff’d 294
S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)) (citation omitted) (Describing egregious error
in an unobjected jury charge case. “Egregious error goes to the very basis of the case,
deprives the accused of a valuable right, or vitally affects his defensive theory. The
error must deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. A party waives error in
the admission of evidence by failing to object at the time evidence is offered. Even
properly preserved error can be waived by failing to object when other similar
evidence is offered.”). As such, we overrule his second issue.
Issues Three and Four
Finally, in his third and fourth issues, Bates challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude that he was previously convicted of
two sexually violent offenses, and that he knowingly entered the premises of a school
and did not immediately notify the school of his presence as required by the sex
offender registration requirements.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under the
standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See Brooks v.
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State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, we view
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine, based on
that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, whether any rational
factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and
weight to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses. Id. In this role, the jury may
choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties.
Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Further, the jury
is permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts as long as each is
supported by the evidence presented at trial. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360. When the
record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved those
conflicts in favor of the verdict and therefore defer to that determination. Id.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence
in the record, regardless of whether it was properly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are
equally probative of an actor’s guilt, and “‘circumstantial evidence alone can be
sufficient to establish guilt.’” Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 359 (quoting Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In a circumstantial evidence case, each
fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the defendant so long
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as the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances
warrants the conclusion that the defendant is guilty. Id. at 359-60 (quoting Johnson
v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
“After giving proper deference to the factfinder’s role, we will uphold the verdict
unless a rational factfinder must have had reasonable doubt as to any essential
element.” Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
In his third issue, Bates challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
demonstrating his two prior convictions requiring him to register as a sex offender.
The elements of the offense of failure to register as a sex offender are: (a) the person
is required to register as a sex offender, and (b) he or she fails to comply with any
requirement of Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a); Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). A person is required to register as a sex offender if he has a “reportable
conviction or adjudication[.]” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.051(a). Article
62.001(5) defines “[r]eportable conviction or adjudication” as a conviction or
adjudication for certain specifically identified sex offenses or offenses containing a
sexual component. Id. art. 62.001(5).
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. The
hypothetically correct jury charge sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof
or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Here,
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the hypothetically correct jury charge required proof that [the
defendant] (1) had a reportable conviction or adjudication, (2) was
required to register, (3) failed to comply with that requirement, and that
(4) his duty to register had not expired.
Hall v. State, 440 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d)
(citations and quotations omitted).
Bates disputes whether the State provided evidence of a reportable conviction
or adjudication for which he must register. Id; see also Crabtree, 389 S.W.3d at 824-
25. As we stated previously, the State admitted evidence of two prior convictions of
Bates through the testimony of Officer Hyde and sex offender registration forms
signed by Bates before this incident. Additionally, the State offered evidence of his
prior convictions by way of Bates’s prerelease notification form for the Texas Sex
Offender Registration Program, and Bates stipulated that he had a duty to register as
a sex offender.
[THE STATE]: The State and the Defense have agreed that the Defendant is
a person who has a duty to register as a sex offender, that his duty to register
expires when he dies, and that the Defendant is required to verify his
registration once each 90-day period under Article 62.058 of Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No objections, Judge.
[THE TRIAL COURT]: Thank you. That is accepted.
On this record, we hold a jury could reasonably conclude that Bates was a sex
offender required to register under the statute. We overrule his third issue.
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Finally, in his last issue, Bates challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
demonstrating that he knowingly entered a school premises in violation of his sex
offender registration regulations. As we previously discussed, the burden on the
State is to demonstrate that he had a duty as a registered sex offender to comply with
the terms of his sex offender status, among them not entering a school premises
unless the offender immediately notifies school personnel of his status. The culpable
mental state for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements applies
only to the duty to register, not the failure to comply with the requirements of sex
offender registration afterwards. Robinson, 466 S.W.3d at 172. A person commits
an offense if he is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement of
Chapter 62. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a).
First, as we noted before, Bates stipulated that he was a sex offender and had
a duty to register. Additionally, there was testimony from Officer Hyde that on April
3, 2019, Bates signed a Texas Sex Offender Registration Program form wherein he
acknowledged a requirement that Bates not enter school premises without
immediately notifying school administration of his presence and registration status.
Multiple witnesses testified that the school shared the parking lot with the church
during regular school hours, the school and church were considered one entity, and
at the time of the confrontation between Erickson and Bates, students were present
and walking toward the chapel through or adjacent to the parking lot. Evidence also
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demonstrated that Bates had to cross through a line of students to get to Erickson’s
truck. Photographs were admitted showing parking spots reserved for parents of
students of the school in the parking lot, the visibility of the school signs and school
zone lights, and testimony from Erickson that parents regularly use the parking lot
to enter the school.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring
to the jury’s authority to decide the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give
their testimony, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have found, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Bates entered a school premises in violation of his sex
offender registration. We overrule Bates’s final issue.
Conclusion
After overruling all of Bates’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on July 5, 2022
Opinion Delivered November 30, 2022
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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