DocketNumber: No. 885.
Citation Numbers: 42 S.W.2d 278
Judges: Leslie
Filed Date: 9/18/1931
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The plaintiff, Mrs. Ida Compere, instituted this suit against W. D. Girand to recover upon a promissory note of date May 3, 1928, payable to the order of C. C. Compere, now deceased. The note is in the sum of $300, ■bears interest, and provides for' attorney’s fees. The defendant Girand, among other things, answered that he performed various legal services for the said C. C. Compere during his lifetime, each being of the certain value alleged, and in addition rendered him oth-_ er services by way of advice, consultations, etc., during a,period of some two and a half years prior to hfe death. These services were alleged to be of a reasonable value of $250 per-
The first proposition by which the appellant seeks to reverse the judgment is to the effect that, since it affirmatively appears from the undisputed evidence that the appel-lee (defendant), as attorney for C. C. Compere, deceased, had no contract with reference to the payment for his services rendered on an annual basis, it was error to admit proof of the reasonable value of services rendered by the appellee as a practicing attorney to the said C. O. Compere, which reasonable value is ■based upon the annual basis of services as such attorney.
The form of the question is technically objectionable for the reasons assigned, but we are unable to see that the defendant’s rights have been prejudiced thereby. True, the ap-pellee was asked to state the reasonable value of his services per year, but, under the pleadings and the testimony, had he inquired the reasonable value of the two years’ services rendered the deceased, no objections could properly have been made to the same. The question actually propounded called for an answer on the basis of annual services, but it covered the same ground, no more nor less, than had the question .been put as above suggested. The answer elicited by either form of the question is, and necessarily would amount to, the same. The trial court evidently considered all the testimony, and while the judgment rendered on the cross-action is considerably less than the amount ■claimed by the appellee, it is nevertheless supported by the pleadings and the testimony, and should be affirmed.
The second proposition is the same in substance as .the first. The same question is raised at different stages of the trial. Both are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.