Bloom v. Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists

SHANNON, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

One who has a master’s degree from an “accredited institution based upon a program which is primarily psychological” and in addition, has eight years of professional psychological experience is permitted by Sec. 15(b) of Article 4512c, Texas Revised Civil Statutes to be licensed without examination provided that he is twenty one years of age, a resident of Texas, of good moral character and is a citizen of the United States.

Appellant has a master’s degree in a program “primarily psychological” from an accredited university and has in addition more than eight years of professional psychological experience. In addition, appellant is over twenty one years of age, a resident of Texas, and is a citizen of the United States. The only basis upon which the Board could have denied appellant’s application was that he was not of “good moral character.”

Admittedly, the Board’s judgment upon “good moral character” must of necessity involve the exercise of a measure of discretion. The Board’s discretion is, however, limited to that determination. The fact that Section 8 of the Act confers upon the Board the power to prescribe rules and regulations, does not enlarge the power of the Board. Additionally, there is nothing in the record that the Board has even adopted any rules and regulations, much less was acting pursuant thereto in denying appellant its certification.

An examination of the record in this case reveals no evidence upon which the Board could have concluded that appellant was of bad moral character. The fact that appellant failed the licensing examination in California and in Texas does not bear upon moral character. Nor does the fact that appellant’s “orals” committee of the University of Texas refused to confer upon him the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Educational Psychology reflect upon his moral character. In that connection, the majority seems to stress an accusatory letter from Dr. Robert Peck who was on appellant’s “orals” committee at The University of Texas. The doubts, if any, about appellant’s moral character cast by the vague innuendoes contained in that letter are dispelled by the oral testimony of Peck explaining the meaning of that letter.

Peck testified that when appellant failed to pass his “orals” examination, he became “acutely wrought up, angry.” Peck continued, “It was not possible to carry on a coherent discussion with him, and the examining committee which, in our field, we tend to be extremely gentle and non-high pressured, and we just called it off.”

Peck said further that appellant got in touch with the members of the “orals” committee and that he, Peck, advised appellant to consult “professional therapeutic treatment, psychiatric or psychological in nature.” Appellant did not follow Peck’s advice in this respect, and when the second orals examination was a repetition of the first, the committee decided to fail him. Instead, appellant was granted the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Education from The University of Texas.

The “orals” examinations emphasized by the majority occurred in the spring nearly ten years ago, and Peck has not seen appellant since. It is upon this obscure and amphibolous testimony that appellant is denied his certification.

I would suggest that appellant’s angry conduct over his failure to pass the “orals” committee’s examination, while perhaps not in good taste for “extremely gentle and non-high pressured” academics, was not entirely unnatural. Past that point, Peck’s testimony, of course, had nothing whatever to do with appellant’s moral character, either good or bad.

Appellant having met the requirements of Sec. 15(b) of Article 4512c, a legal duty arose on the part of the Board to certify him as a psychologist, and I would reverse the judgment and direct that the writ of mandamus be issued.