Shane Owens v. State

Opinion issued November 7, 2013.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00075-CR
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SHANE OWENS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 08-04651-CRM-CCL2
OPINION
A jury convicted Shane Owens of driving while intoxicated. The trial court
assessed punishment at thirty days’ confinement and imposed a $1,500 fine. On
appeal, Owens contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
his blood test results. He asserts that (1) under the Fourth Amendment, he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his blood test results; and (2) the hospital staff
obtained his blood illegally. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
In August 2008, a police officer observed Shane Owens drive over a raised
center median. The officer stopped Owens’ car and noticed an odor of alcohol
coming from inside the car. The officer arrested Owens for driving while
intoxicated. While in the officer’s patrol car, Owens complained of shortness of
breath. The officer called an ambulance, and paramedics transported Owens to a
local hospital. The officer remained with Owens throughout his visit to the
hospital. Upon Owens’ release, the officer took Owens to jail.
During the hospital visit, Owens was belligerent and uncooperative with
hospital staff. Owens complained that he was experiencing an asthma attack, and
the emergency room doctor found Owens’ blood pressure and heart rate to be
elevated. She ordered an x-ray and blood tests. Owens refused to consent to any
blood tests. In light of Owens’ complaint and symptoms, the emergency room
doctor ordered the hospital staff to draw Owens’ blood without his consent to rule
out any life-threatening conditions. Owens stopped resisting the blood draw after
the doctor told him that she would take his blood with or without his consent.
Although the police officer was present, he did not suggest the blood draw or exert
any influence over the hospital staff. The doctor testified at the hearing to suppress
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Owens’ medical records that she “felt that it was appropriate to establish that he
was in fact intoxicated and able to attribute his tachycardia to his alcohol as
opposed to some other life-threatening medical condition.” She further testified
that she took the blood because she was “obligated to do what’s in his best interest,
medically.” After hearing the physician’s testimony, the trial court found that the
emergency room doctor ordered the blood draw for medical reasons alone and not
for law enforcement purposes.
The State procured a records subpoena to obtain the results of Owens’ blood
tests. Owens moved to suppress the records. After a hearing, the trial court denied
the motion. The State proffered, and the trial court admitted, the results of Owens’
blood tests at trial. According to those results, Owens had a blood alcohol level of
.193 at the time of the blood draw, above the legal limit of .080. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(B) (West 2011).
Discussion
Owens contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
his blood test results. He asserts that (1) the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution protects his reasonable expectation of privacy in his blood test results;
and (2) the hospital staff obtained his blood illegally.
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Standard of Review
We evaluate a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the
evidence and testimony. Weide v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts if
the record supports them. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. We review de novo the trial
court’s application of the law to those facts. Id. “[T]he prevailing party is entitled
to ‘the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably
supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”
Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Willover v.
State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
Preservation of error
The State first responds that Owens waived this evidentiary issue by not
objecting to it at trial or in the jury charge conference. However, when a trial court
denies a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, a defendant need not subsequently
object to admission of that evidence at trial to preserve error. Garza v. State, 126
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S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We hold that Owens has not waived this
issue.
Fourth Amendment
In State v. Hardy, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State’s
subpoena of the results of blood tests conducted by private medical personnel
solely for medical purposes did not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Hardy,
963 S.W.2d 516, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The facts in this case are similar to
those in Hardy. Here, the trial court found that (1) the police officer did not
suggest the blood draw or exert any influence over the hospital staff; and (2) the
blood draw was taken solely for medical purposes. Because private actors
conducted the blood draw and blood tests, the hospital staff’s blood draw and test
of it does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 526.
Although the State’s later subpoena of the blood tests is a state action, the request
for records does not violate Owens’ reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 527.
We hold that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the admission of Owens’ blood
test results.
Article 38.23(a)
Owens next contends that the hospital staff obtained his blood illegally by
committing an assault, and thus, the results of his blood tests are inadmissible
under Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 38.23(a)
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states that: “[n]o evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of
[any state or federal law] shall be admitted in evidence against the accused.” TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 38.23(a) (West 2005). Article 38.23(a) applies to
both state actors and private actors. Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007); State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 587–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Owens asserts that the hospital staff’s blood draw without his consent
amounts to an assault under § 22.01(a) of the Texas Penal Code. He cites Hailey v.
State, in which the Waco Court of Appeals held that a hospital staff’s blood draw
from a DWI suspect without the suspect’s consent amounted to an assault. Hailey
v. State, 50 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 87
S.W.3d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In Hailey, the appellate court held that no
evidence indicated that the defendant ever requested or consented to evaluation or
treatment of any physical or mental condition. Hailey, 50 S.W.3d at 639. But the
appellate court noted that “[i]t is axiomatic that if there was consent to or a request
for treatment, any complaint by [the defendant] that blood was taken illegally
would be negated.” Id. at 639 n.6. The appellate court also held that there was no
evidence that the defendant was in a condition which might justify emergency
action by hospital staff. Id. at 639.
The facts here are distinguishable from the facts in Hailey. Shortly after his
arrest, Owens reported to the police officer he was having an asthma attack.
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Owens appeared to have trouble breathing, so the police officer called an
ambulance. While at the hospital, Owens continued to complain of an asthma
attack. The doctor ordered the blood draw to rule out life threatening conditions,
such as a heart attack. Unlike the defendant in Hailey, Owens presented to medical
personnel in a condition that justified emergency action and medical treatment by
hospital staff. Because Owens presented for medical treatment, and he complained
of shortness of breath and an asthma attack, the trial court reasonably could have
concluded that the hospital staff did not assault Owens by drawing his blood in
connection with emergent medical diagnosis and treatment. See Hailey, 50 S.W.3d
at 639 n.6; see also State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 820–21 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006) (holding that hospital staff did not assault defendant and thus defendant’s
blood test results were admissible); Spebar v. State, 121 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.); Ramos v. State, 124 S.W.3d 326, 336 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d). We hold that Article 38.23(a) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not bar the admissibility of Owens’ blood test results.
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Conclusion
We hold that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article 38.23(a) bars the
admissibility of Owens’ blood test results. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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