Lawrence Young, Jr. v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
_________________________
No. 06-12-00045-CR
______________________________
LAWRENCE YOUNG, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 188th Judicial District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 40550-A
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Moseley
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Carter
OPINION
In the early morning hours of January 25, 2011, while Texas State Trooper Jacob
Muehlstein was on patrol on Interstate 20 in Gregg County, Texas, he spotted a Nissan Altima
(which he discovered was driven by Lawrence Young, Jr.) following a white Ford Mustang.
Muehlstein stopped Young because he believed that the Altima he was driving was following the
Mustang too closely. During this stop, Muehlstein observed that Young’s eyes were red and
glassy, his hands were shaking, his breath smelled of alcohol, and he was acting very nervous.
The vehicle exhibited an unusually strong odor of air freshener. Young granted Muehlstein
permission to search the vehicle, and he found three pounds of marihuana in the trunk.
Young was charged with possession of more than four ounces but less than five pounds
of marihuana, a state jail felony. Young filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the
stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. After a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Young subsequently entered a plea
agreement.
On appeal, Young’s sole point of error centers upon his contention that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress, maintaining that the officer lacked the reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle. We affirm.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s decision to deny Young’s motion to suppress evidence by
applying a bifurcated standard of review. Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—
2
Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d); Rogers v. State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009,
pet. ref’d).
Because the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility at a
suppression hearing, we afford almost total deference to its determination of facts supported by
the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche v. State,
10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). We also afford such deference to a trial court’s ruling on application of law to fact
questions, also known as mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions
turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
While we defer to the trial court on its determination of historical facts and credibility, we
review de novo its application of the law and determination on questions not turning on
credibility. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 332; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Graves, 307 S.W.3d at
489. Since all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we are
obligated to uphold the denial of Young’s motion to suppress if it was supported by the record
and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328;
State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In determining whether a trial
court’s decision is supported by the record, we generally consider only evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing, because the ruling was based on that evidence, rather than evidence
introduced later at trial. Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
3
Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop Young’s vehicle?
In his sole point of error, Young contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to suppress because “the record reflects that the officer instigated his
detention of Mr. Young based upon a perceived violation of the Transportation Code by
following another vehicle too closely.”
Police officers may stop and detain a person if they have a reasonable suspicion that a
traffic violation is in progress or has been committed. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992). A traffic stop is a detention and must be reasonable under the United
States and Texas Constitutions. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997); Caraway v. State, 255 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.).
Reasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Spight v. State, 76 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Reasonable suspicion must be founded on specific,
articulable facts which, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the
officer to conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
criminal activity. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An investigative
stop that is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment because of excessive
intensity or scope. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968)).
Following too closely is a violation of Section 545.062(a) of the Texas Transportation
Code. Section 545.062(a) provides:
4
An operator shall, if following another vehicle, maintain an assured clear distance
between the two vehicles so that, considering the speed of the vehicles, traffic,
and the conditions of the highway, the operator can safely stop without colliding
with the preceding vehicle or veering into another vehicle, object, or person on or
near the highway.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.062(a) (West 2011).
Here, Muehlstein testified that the road was dry and the weather was cold. He testified
that Young was following so closely that in the event the Mustang stopped, Young would have
been unable to stop his car without colliding into the Mustang.1 He also testified that he
(Muehlstein) had been trained in judging time, speed, and distance of automobile traffic.
Muehlstein stated that “[t]he vehicle following the Mustang was following at a distance that was
unsafe.” In addition to that during direct examination, the following exchange took place
between the State and Muehlstein:
Q. How close would you estimate that they were apart? Do you have
any kind of estimation?
A. Being it was that long ago I couldn’t tell you an exact foot. I’m
not qualified to tell you distance. But it would have been, from my experience
when I looked at it, I would have recognized that the distance he was following
was too closely.
Q. In the academy or in the DPS training that you received, do you go
over following distance and those type of things?
A. Yes, ma’am. We receive training in regards to time and distances
and speeds. So we’re aware of, you know, when you -- because a lot of people
just really don’t realize how fast they’re moving and how long it takes to actually
stop or recognize a threat or something like that in the roadway. We do receive
training in that.
1
The record contains a video recording from the officer’s dash camera; however, it does not contain evidence of a
traffic violation.
5
Young primarily relies on Ford v. State, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed a somewhat similar situation. 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In Ford,
Texas State Trooper Andrew Peavy stopped Ford’s car for following too closely and during a
search of the vehicle, the officer discovered fifty-five grams of marihuana hidden in the car’s
console. Id. at 490–91. Ford filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to have initiated the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion and the
court of appeals affirmed that decision.
At trial, Peavy testified that he saw Ford’s car “following a white car, following too
close.” Id. at 491. Peavy was directly behind Ford’s automobile when he made that judgment.
Id. There was no other testimony relevant to Ford’s driving. The trial court and the court of
appeals held that Peavy’s testimony presented sufficient articulable facts to form reasonable
suspicion.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and ordered the
motion to suppress be granted because the officer’s statement was a mere conclusory opinion and
because the record lacked specific articulable facts upon which to base reasonable suspicion. Id.
at 493. While his training and experience could be useful, the court found that Peavy’s training
and experience were “insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion absent objective factual
support.” Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 494. The court noted that if it allowed an officer’s opinion to
suffice in place of specific facts, it would eviscerate Terry’s reasonable suspicion protection by
removing the “reasonable” from the reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. at 493 (citing Terry, 392
U.S. 1). In a dissent, Judge Keller (joined by Judges Womack and Cochran) acknowledged that
6
there were scant background facts provided by the testifying officer which could have provided
the basis of his conclusion that Ford was traveling too close and, thus, had violated the statute.
Judge Keller opined, however, that neither the defendant nor the trial judge “requested greater
specificity, and if greater specificity were not forthcoming, then the evidence would have been
subject to suppression. Because greater specificity was not requested in this case, I would affirm
the trial court’s judgment.” Id.2
In order to appreciate the finite differences that slight variations in fact situations can
precipitate, one should compare Ford to Stoker v. State, 170 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2005, no pet.), upon which the State relies. In Stoker, Trooper Fabbiani, a trooper with the Texas
Department of Public Safety, stopped Stoker for following too closely (as is the case here and as
in Ford). Id. at 809. Fabbiani testified that Stoker would not have been able to safely stop his
vehicle without colliding with the vehicle he was traveling behind if that vehicle had stopped or
slowed down. Id. at 813. He said that Stoker was “traveling at a high rate of speed” and was
“right up on another car.” Id. The Tyler Court of Appeals found that Fabbiani’s testimony
exceeded the mere “following too closely” testimony in Ford, and was therefore sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion. Id. One can infer that the Tyler court determined that the
additional information provided from the witness stand in Stoker was sufficient to remove the
2
This position would seem to have the effect of removing from the State some of its responsibility to present a
background of testimony which would lay the premise for the admissibility of its evidence and place some of that
burden on the defendant or the trial judge. In most circumstances, one would expect the trial judge to be neutral, not
attempting to elicit information from a witness which would bear on the admissibility of the testimony the witness is
presented to proffer. Further, one would also expect a defendant in an adversarial proceeding would hope that the
State would fail to elicit the proper predicates to assure admissibility of adverse testimony.
7
reason provided for the traffic stop being a simple conclusory statement that the law was
violated.
Our circumstance here lies neatly equidistant between the seemingly close factual
circumstances of Ford and Stoker; although this case is not identical to either, it is difficult to
place a figurative butter knife between the facts of this case and those of either Ford or Stoker.
As shown above, in this case, Muehlstein’s testimony articulated a bit more background
facts upon which he based his opinion that Young was violating the law than we find in the
testimony in Ford. The recitation of these background facts upon which Muehlstein rested his
opinion that Young was following too closely removed his testimony from the realm of a pure
conclusory statement. Therefore, we find that the record contains sufficient facts to support
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. We overrule Young’s point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
In Ford v. State, the police officer testified that Ford’s vehicle was “following too close
behind another vehicle.” 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This presented no factual
detail to allow a neutral magistrate to evaluate Ford’s conduct. Here, the testimony is very
similar. The officer testified Young was following too close and would have been unable to stop
8
without colliding with the vehicle he was behind. He specifically denied having any knowledge
of the distance and stated he was not qualified to estimate it. But he recited that “he was
following too closely.”
Except for the binding precedent from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, I could
accept the premise that the officer’s testimony was a shorthand rendition of the facts when he
stated the vehicle was following too closely and would not be able to stop in time to avoid a
collision. But the majority in the Ford case rejected that idea even though it was proposed in the
dissent. Id. at 496 (Keller, P.J., dissenting). I cannot see any substantive difference in the
testimony that the defendant was “following too close” behind another vehicle and that the
defendant was following too close and could not stop to avoid a collision. Each of those
statements is an opinion that the driver was violating the law without providing any factual
details. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that allowing a police officer’s opinion to
replace specific facts removed the “reasonable” element from the “reasonable suspicion”
requirement. Id. at 493. “Mere opinions are ineffective substitutes for specific, articulable facts
in a reasonable-suspicion analysis.” Id. This case, like Ford, relies on mere opinions.
Finally, it appears the majority opinion gives equal weight to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals opinion in Ford and the Tyler Court of Appeals opinion in Stoker. While I am often
persuaded by opinions from my colleagues in Tyler, their opinion is not binding precedent for
the State of Texas, whereas the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion is.
9
I respectfully dissent.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: October 4, 2012
Date Decided: October 19, 2012
Publish
10