Raymundo Rico, Jr. v. L-3 Communications Corporation and Megan Ridge

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 10, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01099-CV
RAYMUNDO RICO, JR., Appellant
V.
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION AND MEGAN RIDGE, Appellees
On Appeal from the 354th Judicial District Court
Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 73537
OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Fillmore
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
Raymundo Rico, Jr. appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of L-3
Communications Corporation (L-3) and Megan Ridge. In six issues, Rico asserts the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment on Rico’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and for malicious prosecution because (1) he provided sufficient evidence to support all
elements of each cause of action and to enable a rational jury to infer that L-3 could be held
liable for Ridge’s conduct based on the doctrines of respondeat superior and ratification, (2) the
two claims are alternative claims and are not mutually exclusive, and (3) appellees intentionally
destroyed evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
On September 18, 1998, Rico was hired as an aircraft maintenance operator at L-3’s
Greenville facility. In June 2006, L-3 hired Ridge as a production support trainee at the same
facility. L-3’s Greenville facility is composed of a number of different buildings, referred to as
“bays” or “hangars,” and L-3’s employees are generally assigned to work in a specific bay or
hangar. On November 8, 2006, Rico was assigned to work from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on an
aircraft located in Bay 1 of Hangar 102 while Ridge was assigned to work from 4:00 p.m. until
12:00 a.m. as the tool crib attendant in the tool crib located in Hangar 150.
A “tool crib” is a small, enclosed area within an open hangar where specialty tools are
kept. A tool crib attendant is assigned to remain in the tool crib and distribute requested tools to
other employees. Access to the tool crib is generally restricted to the tool crib attendant.
However, the tool crib attendant may allow another employee to enter the tool crib to choose
specific tools, including a bucking bar, needed for the employee’s work. 1 Within each hangar at
the L-3 facility are one or more tool cribs. If the tool crib in a hangar did not have the specific
tool needed by an employee, the employee would attempt to locate the tool in a tool crib located
in another hangar.
When Rico arrived at work on November 8, 2006, he entered the L-3 facility through the
security turnstile south of Hangar 150. Once inside the facility, Rico obtained an L-3 vehicle and
drove toward Hangar 2, where he would get his work assignment. In transit, he saw Ridge
walking toward Hangar 150. Due to the size of the L-3 facility, it was common for L-3
employees to offer rides to one another. Ridge accepted a ride from Rico but, because she was
talking on her cellphone, the two did not speak. Rico turned around, drove Ridge to Hangar 150,
and then drove to Hangar 2.
1
A bucking bar is a tool used to buck rivets and to straighten metal.
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At approximately 9:00 p.m., Rico left Hangar 102 to meet his wife at the security
turnstile by Hangar 150 to get his lunch. Rico also needed some supplies for his work that were
not available in his work area and decided to obtain the supplies from Hangar 150. When he
entered Hangar 150, Rico saw an aircraft on which he had previously worked. Rico went into
the aircraft to observe the status of the work and to talk to a friend who was working on the
plane. Rico’s friend, B.J. Lucky, was not working that night, and Rico did not recognize any of
the individuals working on the plane.
Rico left the aircraft and proceeded toward the “free stock” area located near the tool crib
to obtain the supplies he needed. As he passed the tool crib, Ridge opened the window and
asked if he needed anything. Rico introduced himself to Ridge, and they talked for ten or fifteen
minutes. Ridge and Rico both described their conversation as cordial or friendly. Rico then
retrieved the supplies he needed and returned to Hangar 102.
According to Ridge, later that night, Rico returned to Hangar 150 and requested a
bucking bar from the tool crib. Ridge opened the door to the tool crib to allow Rico to retrieve
the bucking bar. According to Ridge, Rico then put his arm across her throat, pushed her against
the wall of the tool crib, broke her belt, and put his hand down her pants and into her vagina.
According to Ridge, during the assault, Rico appeared startled by a sound. He then told her they
“could continue this at any time” and left the tool crib.
James Brown was working on the aircraft in Hangar 150 and saw Rico on the aircraft
when Rico asked for “B.J.” Brown later saw Rico at the tool crib. Approximately ten minutes
later, Brown saw Rico leave the hangar. Brown went to the tool crib and found Ridge crying.
There was conflicting evidence about whether Ridge told Brown that she had been sexually
assaulted by Rico or whether, after Ridge told her roommate about the assault, Ridge’s
roommate told Brown. However, the next day, Brown reported the assault to L-3 management.
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When Ridge arrived at work the next day, Roger Lasater, the Senior Human Resources
Manager at the facility, requested that she meet with him. During the meeting, Ridge wrote a
statement about the incident. Lasater then showed Ridge a photograph of Rico. Ridge could not
identify Rico because the photograph was grainy and unclear. At Ridge’s request, Lasater
provided her with a clearer photograph of Rico, and Ridge then identified him as the assailant.
When Rico arrived at work, he was requested to meet with Lasater and Jack Russell, another L-3
employee. At some point, Rico’s union representative joined the meeting. Rico gave a written
statement denying the alleged assault and was suspended pending L-3’s investigation of the
incident. Lasater investigated Ridge’s allegations by interviewing employees who were either in
or around the hangar when the assault took place or who might otherwise have information that
could assist the investigation, checking the “badge readers” and turnstile records, and reviewing
all video surveillance. Based on the information obtained by Lasater, L-3 terminated Rico’s
employment.
Ridge also reported the alleged assault to the Greenville Police Department. The police
interviewed Lasater and two other members of L-3’s management, Ridge, and Brown and, on a
later date, Ridge’s roommate. Ridge initially declined to pursue charges, but later decided to do
so. Ridge provided the police with a written statement and identified Rico from a photographic
lineup prepared by the police.
After a jury acquitted Rico of the charge he sexually assaulted Ridge, he sued L-3 and
Ridge for intentional infliction of emotional distress. L-3 and Ridge filed a hybrid motion
seeking summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds. Rico amended his
petition to assert an additional claim against L-3 and Ridge for malicious prosecution. L-3 and
Ridge filed a second hybrid motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of L-3 and Ridge on both claims without
specifying the basis for the ruling.
Spoliation
In his sixth issue, Rico argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of L-3 and Ridge because they failed to provide through discovery either the surveillance
tapes of the facility or the names of the persons who reviewed the tapes. Rico raised the issue of
spoliation of evidence in response to both of L-3 and Ridge’s motions for summary judgment.
An allegation of spoliation does not give rise to an independent cause of action. Trevino
v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 952–53 (Tex. 1998). Rather, spoliation is a remedy for improper
conduct in the discovery context that “should properly be rectified within the context of the
lawsuit.” Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 951). A party who establishes that spoliation
has occurred may be entitled to a presumption that the destroyed evidence would not have been
favorable to its destroyer. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 721–22 (Tex.
2003); Buckeye Ret. Co. LLC, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2007, no pet.). Such a presumption is appropriate when a party has deliberately destroyed
evidence or has failed to either produce or explain the evidence’s nonproduction. Johnson, 106
S.W.3d at 721–22; MRT, Inc. v. Vounckx, 299 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no
pet.). In determining whether a spoliation presumption is justified, a trial court considers
whether: (1) there was a duty to preserve the evidence; (2) the alleged spoliator breached this
duty; and (3) the spoliation prejudiced the non-spoilator’s ability to present its case or defense.
Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954–55 (Baker, J., concurring); Buckeye Ret. Co. LLC, Ltd., 239 S.W.3d
at 401.
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Because Rico raised the issue of his entitlement to a spoliation presumption in his
responses to L-3 and Ridge’s motions for summary judgment, and the trial court nevertheless
granted a summary judgment, we presume the trial court considered and rejected the request for
a presumption. Mangham v. YMCA of Austin, Tex.-Hays Communities, 408 S.W.3d 923, 930
(Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); Clark v. Randalls Food, 317 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 2 Therefore, our review of the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment is slightly modified. Adobe Land Corp. v. Griffin, L.L.C., 236 S.W.3d 351,
357 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet denied). First, we review the denial of a spoliation
presumption for an abuse of discretion. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953; Mangham, 408 S.W.3d at
931. Second, if we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the spoliation
finding, we proceed under the traditional standards of review for a summary judgment to
determine whether, without the presumption, the movant was entitled to summary judgment.
Clark, 317 S.W.3d at 356; Adobe Land Corp., 236 S.W.3d at 357. A trial court abuses its
discretion if its refusal to apply the presumption was arbitrary or unreasonable. Mangham, 408
S.W.3d at 931; Adobe Land Corp., 236 S.W.3d at 357.
The initial inquiry into whether a party is entitled to a presumption based on spoliation is
the issue of duty. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d at 722. “Before any failure to produce material evidence
may be viewed as discovery abuse, the opposing party must establish that the non-producing
party had a duty to preserve the evidence in question.” Id. The duty to preserve evidence does
not arise unless a party knows or reasonably should know there is a substantial chance a claim
will be filed and that evidence within its possession or control will be material and relevant to
that claim. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d at 722; Clark, 317 S.W.3d at 356–57.
2
See also Anderson v. TU Elec., No. 05-99-01255-CV, 2000 WL 567045, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2000, no pet.) (not designated
for publication).
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Rico had the burden to show that L-3 or Ridge had a duty to preserve any videotapes and
breached that duty by disposing of or destroying any videotapes after they knew, or should have
known, that there was a substantial chance there would be litigation and that the evidence would
be material and relevant to it. See Johnson, 106 S.W.3d at 722; Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954–55
(Baker, J., concurring). However, Rico offered no evidence that he requested L-3 to produce any
videotapes, L-3 refused to produce any videotapes, or that any videotapes had been disposed of
or destroyed. Rather, in raising the issue of spoliation in his responses to L-3 and Ridge’s
motions for summary judgment, Rico directed the trial court to an interrogatory served on Ridge
inquiring as to results of any investigation of Ridge’s allegations including “a copy of the report,
recordings, video, and audio and if they do not exist, when were they destroyed?” Ridge
objected to the interrogatory on a number of grounds, including that it sought information or
documents that were not in her possession and control and that interrogatories were not the
appropriate forum for a request for documents. Ridge did not provide a substantive response to
Rico’s request for “videos” or information about when any “video” was destroyed, and the
record does not reflect Rico sought to compel Ridge to do so. See Roberts v. Whitfill, 191
S.W.3d 348, 361 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) (noting concern with giving spoliation
instruction because plaintiff “did not pursue her motion to compel and obtain an order requiring
[defendant] to produce” data that was the subject of instruction); see also Remington Arms Co. v.
Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. 1993) (“the failure to obtain a pretrial ruling on discovery
disputes that exist before commencement of trial constitutes a waiver of any claim for sanctions
based on that conduct”).
We conclude Rico failed to establish in his responses to L-3 and Ridge’s motions for
summary judgment that either L-3 or Ridge breached a duty to produce any videotapes.
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Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by impliedly overruling Rico’s request
for a spoliation presumption. We resolve Rico’s sixth issue against him.
Summary Judgment
In his first five issues, Rico challenges the trial court’s grant of a no-evidence or
traditional summary judgment in favor of L-3 and Ridge. We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). The
standards of review for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment are well known. See
Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.,
690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). With respect to a traditional motion for summary judgment,
the movant has the burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548–49.
We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard used to
review a directed verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 310. To defeat a no-
evidence summary judgment, the nonmovant is required to produce evidence that raises a
genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element of its claim. Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 310;
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).
In reviewing both a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment, we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417,
424 (Tex. 2009); 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). We credit evidence
favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the
nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.
Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 310.
When a party files a hybrid summary judgment motion on both no-evidence and
traditional grounds, we first review the trial court’s judgment under the no-evidence standard of
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review. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004); Gillespie v. Kroger Tex.,
L.P., No. 05-12-00652-CV, 2013 WL 5773290, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 25, 2013, no pet.
h.). Should we determine summary judgment was appropriate under the no-evidence standard,
we need not address issues related to the traditional summary judgment motion. Ridgway, 135
S.W.3d at 600; Mangham, 408 S.W.3d at 926.
Malicious Prosecution
Rico argues generally in his first issue that the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment in favor of L-3 and Ridge. In his third issue, Rico contends the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment on his malicious prosecution claim because he provided sufficient
evidence to support each element of that cause of action.
A person subjected unjustifiably to criminal proceedings may have a cause of action for
malicious prosecution. Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. 2006).
However, the “cause of action must sometimes yield to society’s greater interest in encouraging
citizens to report crimes, real or perceived.” Id. Reflecting this balance, in order to prevail on a
malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a criminal prosecution was commenced
against him; (2) the defendant initiated or procured that prosecution; (3) the prosecution
terminated in his favor; (4) he was innocent of the charges; (5) the defendant lacked probable
cause to initiate the prosecution; (6) the defendant acted with malice; and (7) he suffered
damages. Id. at 792 & n.3. L-3 and Ridge asserted Rico had no evidence of elements (2), (4),
(5), and (6).
Probable cause is “the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in
a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor [complainant], that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.” Richey v. Brookshire
Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 921
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(Tex. 1983)). “The probable cause element ‘asks whether a reasonable person would believe that
a crime had been committed given the facts as the complainant honestly and reasonably believed
them to be before the criminal proceedings were instituted.’” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 792–93
(quoting Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517).
Because malicious prosecution actions involve a delicate balance between society’s
interest in the efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the individual’s interest in freedom
from unjustifiable and oppressive criminal prosecution, there is an initial presumption that the
defendant acted reasonably and in good faith and had probable cause to initiate criminal
proceedings. Id. at 793; Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517. In order to rebut this presumption, the
plaintiff “must produce evidence that the motives, grounds, beliefs, or other information upon
which the defendant acted did not constitute probable cause.” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 793; see
also Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 518. The burden then shifts to the defendant to offer proof of
probable cause. Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 518.
Ridge stated she reported the assault to the police. Rico, relying on a police report that
states the officer, after arriving at the L-3 facility, spoke with Lasater and other members of L-3
management, contends L-3 reported the assault to the police. However, regardless of whether L-
3 or Ridge reported the assault, the law presumes they honestly and reasonably acted on the
information available to them in reporting Rico to the police. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 794. Rico
was required to rebut this presumption by producing evidence that L-3 or Ridge initiated the
prosecution “on the basis of information or motives that do not support a reasonable belief” that
Rico was guilty of sexually assaulting Ridge. Id. at 794–95.
Rico argues Ridge’s failure to report the assault immediately after it allegedly occurred
and failure to seek medical treatment raise an inference the assault did not occur. However, Rico
produced no summary judgment evidence that Ridge was not assaulted or that the victim of a
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sexual assault always reports it immediately. 3 Rather, the only summary judgment evidence
about the assault is Ridge’s statement given to Lasater and her affidavits filed in this case
describing the assault. Further, Ridge told her roommate about the assault on the same day it
occurred, and Brown’s statement that he saw Ridge crying shortly after Rico left the hangar
supports Ridge’s statement the assault occurred. After Brown reported the assault to Lasater,
Ridge told Lasater about the assault and reported the assault to the police. Ridge identified Rico
as her assailant to both Lasater and the police.
Texas public policy is to encourage “citizens to report crimes, real or perceived.”
Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 792. This “strong public policy in favor of exposing crime” means
individuals who report crimes cannot be held liable unless it is proven they reported the crime
with malicious intent. Smith v. Sneed, 938 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ).
Here, Rico produced no evidence that L-3 or Ridge had any prior bad relations, animus, or
private motivation to harm him. See Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 795. Rico had never met Ridge
prior to November 8, 2006 and described their interactions on that date as cordial. Rico stated
that he had never been disciplined by L-3, and there was no evidence that L-3 had any basis for
terminating Rico other than Ridge’s complaint. There is no evidence that anyone in L-3
management had any racial animus or other improper motive for reporting Rico to the police.
There is no evidence Lasater or any other member of L-3 management engaged in discussion
with Ridge about Rico prior to her allegation that Rico sexually assaulted her. Further, Brown,
not Ridge, reported the incident to L-3 management. Although the critical question was L-3’s
and Ridge’s state of mind, Rico produced no evidence that either L-3 or Ridge contacted the
3
Rico also asserts, without substantive argument, that L-3 and Ridge had no probable cause to believe Rico committed the assault.
However, “[u]nless there is evidence rebutting the presumption of probable cause, a prosecution resulting from eyewitness identifications that
turn out to be incorrect or, at least, insufficient to warrant a conviction, does not satisfy the exacting requirements for a plaintiff to prevail in a
malicious prosecution case.” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 795.
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police on the basis of something other than a reasonable belief that Rico was guilty of sexually
assaulting Ridge. Id. at 795.
We conclude Rico produced no evidence that either L-3 or Ridge lacked probable cause
to initiate the prosecution. Accordingly, we need not consider whether Rico produced more than
a scintilla of evidence on any other element of his malicious prosecution claim. See French v.
French, 385 S.W.3d 61, 69 n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied). We resolve Rico’s first
issue, to the extent it relates to his claim for malicious prosecution, and his third issue against
him.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In his first issue, Rico generally challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of L-3 and Ridge and, in his fourth issue, asserts the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because he provided sufficient
evidence to support all elements of the claim.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a “gap-filler tort,” judicially created to allow
recovery in rare instances where severe emotional distress is inflicted in such an unusual manner
there are no other recognized theories of redress. See Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144
S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004); Hairston v. S. Methodist Univ., No. 05-11-00860-CV, 2013 WL
1803549, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2013, pet. denied). To prevail on this claim, Rico
must establish that: (1) L-3 or Ridge acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused his emotional distress; and (4) the emotional
distress was severe. See Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 796; Hairston, 2013 WL 1803549, at *3. L-3
and Ridge sought a no-evidence summary judgment on grounds Rico had no evidence of
elements (1), (2) and (4).
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Conduct is extreme and outrageous only if it is “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 796 (quoting
Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)). An action that is intentional, malicious,
or even criminal does not, standing alone, mean that it is extreme or outrageous for purposes of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 215–16
(Tex. 1999); see also Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. 2005).
Meritorious claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are rare because “most human
conduct, even that which causes injury to others, cannot be fairly characterized as extreme and
outrageous.” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 796.
Rico argues that L-3’s and Ridge’s conduct was extreme and outrageous because they
intentionally provided false information to the police. However, although Rico denied
committing the assault, there is no summary judgment evidence that Ridge did not honestly
believe that she had been assaulted and that Rico was her assailant. Rico’s claimed innocence,
by itself, is insufficient to establish that L-3 or Ridge did not honestly and reasonably believe
that Rico was guilty. See id. Further, as noted above, Rico produced no evidence of any prior
bad relations he had with either L-3 or Ridge, no evidence of racial animus by either L-3 or
Ridge, and no evidence of other ulterior motives that L-3 or Ridge might have had in reporting
Rico to the police. See id. There is no evidence that either L-3 or Ridge subjected Rico to
distress knowing he was innocent. See id. at 796–97. We conclude Rico produced no evidence
that either L-3’s or Ridge’s conduct was extreme or outrageous.
Because Rico produced no evidence that L-3’s or Ridge’s conduct was extreme or
outrageous, we need not consider whether Rico produced more than a scintilla of evidence on
any other element of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Colson v.
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Grohman, 24 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting one
basis for affirming summary judgment on claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
was that evidence did not establish conduct was extreme and outrageous). We resolve Rico’s
first issue, to the extent it relates to his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
his fourth issue against him.
Having concluded the trial court properly rendered judgment based on L-3 and Ridge’s
no-evidence motions for summary judgment, we need not address Rico’s challenges to L-3 and
Ridge’s traditional motions for summary judgment. See Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d at 600. Further,
based on our resolution of Rico’s first, third, and fourth issues, we need not address Rico’s
second issue, relating to whether his claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction
of emotional distress are mutually exclusive, or his fifth issue, relating to whether L-3 is liable
for Ridge’s actions under the doctrines of respondeat superior and ratification. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 47.1.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
121099F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
RAYMUNDO RICO, JR., Appellant On Appeal from the 354th Judicial District
Court, Hunt County, Texas,
No. 05-12-01099-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 73537.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore,
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS Justices Bridges and Lang participating.
CORPORATION AND MEGAN RIDGE,
Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees L-3 Communications Corporation and Megan Ridge
recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Raymundo Rico, Jr.
Judgment entered this 10th day of January, 2014.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
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