Jose Luis Cardenas D/B/A J&S Body Shop v. Betty Wilson & Jeffery Wilson

Opinion issued January 14, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
jfitat Huftrttf of ®exa*
NO. 01-13-00509-CV
JOSE LUIS CARDENAS D/B/A J & S BODY SHOP, Appellant
V.
BETTY WILSON AND JEFFERY WILSON, Appellees
On Appeal from the 215th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2013-25987
OPINION
In this dispute over a pick-up truck repair bill, Betty Wilson and Jeffery
Wilson moved in the trial court that it review auto-mechanic Jose Cardenas' notice
of intent to file a mechanic's lien and set the lien aside. See Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. § 51.903 (West 2013). The trial court found that Cardenas' lien was
"presumed fraudulent" as defined by statute, and it ordered the lien to be removed
and Cardenas to release the truck to the Wilsons. Cardenas appeals the trial court's
interlocutory orders, contending that it erred in removing his mechanic's lien and
in ordering the truck's release to the Wilsons. We reverse.
Background
According to the pleadings, in February 2013, Jeffery Wilson drove his truck
to a car repair shop after it was damaged in a car accident. The shop clerk
informed Wilson that a different shop should repair the truck's head lamp before
the shop could undertake the remainder of the repairs. Wilson then drove his truck
to Jose Cardenas' J&S Body Shop. Wilson alleges that he and Cardenas orally
agreed that Cardenas would repair the truck's head lamp, and nothing else, for
$300. Wilson alleges that Cardenas, in contravention of their agreement, found
some insurance claim documents in Wilson's truck and called Wilson's insurance
company to obtain an estimate to repair the truck. Cardenas performed $4,645.17
worth of repairs on Wilson's truck, the same amount as the insurance estimate.
Wilson refused to pay Cardenas. Cardenas notified Wilson of his intent to file a
mechanic's lien. Cardenas attached an authorization form to the notice that
purports to authorize Cardenas to repair the truck in accordance with Wilson's
insurance estimate. Wilson alleges that Cardenas forged his signature on the
authorization form. Cardenas, however, contends that Wilson signed the
authorization form and authorized him to repair his truck in accordance with the
insurance estimate.
Jeffery Wilson and his mother Betty Wilson, the truck's co-owner, sued
Cardenas for breach of contract, among other claims, and moved that the trial court
review Cardenas' notice of intent to file a mechanic's lien and the attached
authorization form under section 51.903 of the Texas Government Code. See id.
After a hearing, the trial court found that Cardenas' mechanic's lien was presumed
fraudulent under the statute's definition because it was not created by Wilson's
implied or express consent. The trial court ordered the lien to be removed and
Cardenas to release the truck to the Wilsons.
Discussion
As a preliminary matter, we determine whether we have appellate
jurisdiction to review a trial court's interlocutory orders under section 51.903 Of
the Texas Government Code. We hold that the statute confers appellate
jurisdiction. Id, § 51.903(c) ("An appellate court shall expedite review of a court's
finding under this section."); see also David Powers Homes, Inc. v. M.L.
Rendleman Co., Inc., 355 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2011,
no pet.) (reviewing trial court's finding under section 51.903).
Standard ofReview
Whether a document purporting to create a lien is presumed to be fraudulent
under section 51.901 of the Texas Government Code is a question of law and thus
is subject to de novo review. DavidPowersHomes, Inc., 355 S.W.3d at 335.
Analysis
Pursuant to Section 51.901 of the Government Code, a document is
"presumed" to be fraudulent if:
[T]he document or instrument purports to create a lien or assert a claim
against real or personal property or an interest in real or personal property
and:
(A) is not a document or instrument provided for by the constitution
or law of this state or of the United States;
(B) is not created by implied or express consent or agreement of the
obligor, debtor, or the owner of the real or personal property or an
interest in the real or personal property, if required under the laws of
this state, or by implied or express consent or agreement of an agent,
fiduciary, or other representative of that person; or
(C) is not an equitable, constructive, or other lien imposed by a court
with jurisdiction created or established under the constitution or laws
of this state or of the United States.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 51.901(c)(2) (West 2013). A trial court may presume a
document is fraudulent only if it makes one positive finding and three negative
findings about the document; if the document is provided for by constitution or
statute, created by agreement, or imposed by a court, then it is not "presumed
fraudulent" under section 51.901(c)(2). See id.; In re Hai Qudng La, No. 02-13-
00110-CV, 2013 WL 5651746, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 17, 2013, no
pet. h.). A trial court may base its finding solely on its review of the document
itself and without hearing any testimonial evidence. Tex. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 51.903(e) (West 2013). A trial court may review the document ex parte and
without delay or notice of any kind, but the trial court may make no finding as to
any underlying claim. Id. § 51.903(c), (g); In re Purported Liens or Claims
Against Samshi Homes, LLC, 321 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist] 2010, no pet.) (holding that trial court may not rule on validity of underlying
lien). The trial court also may not rule on any substantive evidentiary claim.
Samshi Homes, 321 S.W.3d at 668.
A document filed in the form of a mechanic's lien is "provided for by the ...
laws of this state" and thus cannot be presumed to be fraudulent under
section 51.901(c)(2)(A) of the Government Code. Id. at 667-68; see also David
Powers Homes, 355 S.W.3d at 339 (discussing and applying holding of Samshi
Homes).
Cardenas notified the Wilsons of his intent to file a mechanic's lien on
Wilson's truck. Article 16, section 37 of the Texas Constitution and Chapter 53 of
the Texas Property Code both provide a legal basis for a mechanic's lien. TEX.
Const, art. XVI, § 37 (West 1993); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. Ch. 53 (West 2007).
Cardenas' document is provided for by the laws of Texas and is thus not presumed
to be fraudulent. See Samshi Homes, 321 S.W.3d at 667-68. The Wilsons respond
that they adduced proof that Cardenas forged the repair authorization. The
Wilsons' proof, however, does not refute the validity of a lien for a mechanical
repair under Texas law, but rather attacks the merit of the underlying claim for
payment for the repair. Under the fraudulent lien statute, the trial court does not
rule on the validity of the underlying claim creating the lien of rule on any
substantive evidentiary claim. See id. at 667-68.
Conclusion
We hold that Cardenas' lien is not presumed fraudulent as defined by
section 51.901 of the Texas Government Code. We therefore reverse and vacate
the trial court's orders removing the lien and releasing the truck to the Wilsons.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.