John B. Kennedy v. State

Opinion issued November 6, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-12-01142-CV
NO. 01-12-01143-CV
———————————
JOHN B. KENNEDY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 178th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case Nos. 1320351 & 1237940
O P I N I ON
After pleading guilty, John B. Kennedy was convicted of two felony
offenses: (1) falsely holding oneself out as a lawyer 1 and (2) money laundering.2
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.122(a) (Vernon 2011).
2
See id. § 34.02(a)(1), (e)(4) (Vernon 2011).
The trial court sentenced Kennedy to concurrent terms of 10 years in prison.
Thereafter, in each case, Kennedy filed a motion for the restoration of property
pursuant to Chapter 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3 Kennedy asserted
“rightful ownership” to money being held as evidence by the State. The State
claimed that the money was stolen property, unlawfully acquired by Kennedy in
committing his crimes. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled
against Kennedy, rejecting his request to obtain the currency.
Kennedy appeals the order in each case. Raising two identical issues in each
appeal, he asserts that no evidence supports the trial court’s order.
We affirm.
Background
On April 3 2009, John B. Kennedy was arrested in Harris County, Texas, at
his place of business, a law office, on an outstanding warrant for falsely holding
himself out as a lawyer. Outside, the signs were displayed advertising attorney
services. Parked in front of the office was a van. The van was covered in a banner
advertising legal services. The license plates on the van were registered to
Kennedy. Inside the office, signs were displayed on the walls indicating that legal
3
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 47.01–12 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2014).
2
services were provided there. Kennedy was identified on the commercial lease as
the person who rented the office space.
Kennedy was charged by indictment with the offense of falsely holding
himself out as a lawyer on October 21, 2009. Kennedy was released on bond. At
some point, Kennedy left Texas and went to Delaware. On August 11, 2011,
the Harris County District Attorney’s contacted the City of Wilmington’s police
department in Delaware to request assistance in apprehending Kennedy. Kennedy
was believed to be in the Wilmington area and was considered to be a fugitive.
Sergeant D. Rosenblum of the Wilmington police department received the call for
assistance. Officer Rosenblum dispatched a number of officers, who soon located
Kennedy’s vehicle at a local motel.
Rosenblum went to the motel, where he found Kennedy. After obtaining
Kennedy’s consent, Rosenblum searched the vehicle. Inside, Rosenblum found
several identification cards, license plates, and a black attaché case. The case
contained numerous papers, documents, notebooks, and approximately $12,000 in
cash. Officer Rosenblum also found a receipt with a “code card” to a local storage
facility. After contacting the storage facility, Officer Rosenblum learned that
Kennedy had rented a storage unit on August 10, 2011 and had paid rent on the
unit through September 9, 2011.
3
Officer Rosenblum obtained a search warrant, signed by a Delaware judge,
to search the storage unit rented by Kennedy. Inside the storage unit, Officer
Rosenblum found numerous trash bags stuffed with thousands of white envelopes
containing cash, comprised of small denomination bills. A ledger was also found,
containing dates and a handwritten list of names. To the right of each name was a
corresponding amount of money.
In another trash bag, Officer Rosenblum recovered a number of documents
entitled “Attorney at Law, Divorce Interview Sheet.” These were form documents,
which had been filled in by hand. For example, in the space for “client,” names
had been written in and contact information had been provided. Money order
receipts were also attached to the forms.
In addition, Officer Rosenblum recovered two guns and other personal items
from the storage unit. A hand-written “to-do” list was also recovered. On the list,
were items such as “steal 2 TX license tags” and “sell van.”
After the search, the Wilmington police counted the cash found in the trash
bags and determined it to total $851,651. The money was deposited in a bank and
then transferred to the Harris County District Attorney’s Office. There, it was held
in a bank account where it accumulated interest. The IRS demanded a portion of
the money for payment of delinquent taxes owed by Kennedy. Once the IRS was
paid, a balance of $702,792.99 remained.
4
R. Montoya, a fraud examiner with Harris County District Attorney’s Office,
analyzed the ledger that had been seized from the storage unit. He created two
spreadsheets, sorting the handwritten entries chronologically and alphabetically.
He determined that the time period covered in the ledger was from July 1, 2009
through July 15, 2011. Montoya also determined that the total for the monetary
entries reflected in the ledger was $778,663.58.
In addition to the 2009 indictment, charging Kennedy with the offense of
falsely holding oneself out as an attorney, Kennedy was charged with the offense
of money laundering on October 27, 2011. With respect to the first offense, the
2009 indictment read as follows: “John B. Kennedy . . . did . . . on or about
September 25, 2007 . . . unlawfully, with intent to obtain an economic benefit for
himself, falsely hold himself out as a lawyer to Sarah E. Lee.”
The October 27, 2011 indictment for money laundering charged as follows:
John B. Kennedy . . . did . . . on or about April 5, 2011, . . .
unlawfully, pursuant to a single scheme and continuing course of
conduct, knowingly acquire and maintain an interest in funds of the
value of at least two hundred thousand dollars, which constituted the
proceeds of criminal activity, namely, by falsely holding out as an
attorney.
On March 29, 2012, Kennedy pleaded guilty to the offenses of falsely
holding oneself out as an attorney and money laundering, as charged in the 2009
and 2011 indictments. Pursuant to the State’s punishment recommendation, the
trial court sentenced Kennedy to concurrent 10-year sentences in prison. The trial
5
court signed the judgments of conviction. That same day, Kennedy filed his
“Motion to Restore Property and Claim of Ownership by Interested Party and
Request for Hearing Pursuant to Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,”
under both cause numbers.
In the motion, Kennedy claimed as follows:
1. The state of Texas is holding items of property including money
pursuant to Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was
evidence in and in part alleged to be contraband.
2. The defendant has pled guilty to the above described causes and
claims to the property are to be decided by the Court sitting as a
Magistrate pursuant to Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. The code provides that any interested person may make claim that
the property at issue was not acquired by theft or other unlawful
means and make claims. Defendant hereby makes claim that money
and property or a portion of money and property which is being held
as evidence and for disposition by the State of Texas was not acquired
by unlawful means and makes a claim of rightful ownership of the
property.
On May 8, 2012, a hearing was held on Kennedy’s motion for the restoration
of stolen property. The trial court admitted into evidence Kennedy’s judgments of
conviction for the offenses of falsely holding oneself out as an attorney and money
laundering.
The State presented the testimony of the assistant district attorney who is the
custodian of the funds obtained from the Delaware storage unit. She testified that,
6
after payment was made to the IRS, a balance of $702,792.99 remained in the bank
account.
In testifying for the State, Officer Rosenblum described the items recovered
from Kennedy’s vehicle and from the storage unit, including the $851,651.00 in
cash found stuffed in the garbage bags, the ledger, and the client interview sheets.
Through him, the ledger and other documents recovered from the storage locker
were introduced into evidence.
In addition, fraud examiner R. Montoya testified for the State. The State
introduced into evidence the spreadsheets Montoya had prepared from his analysis
of the ledger. Montoya testified that the ledger contained monetary entries totaling
$778,663.58, covering the period of July 1, 2009 through July 15, 2011.
Also, the State offered the testimony of C. Johnson, an investigator for the
district attorney’s office. Johnson stated that, in 2009, he had gone to Kennedy’s
place of business located at 1585 South Highway 6 in Harris County, Texas. He
acknowledged that Kennedy had not held himself out to be an attorney that day
when an undercover officer had approached Kennedy. Johnson stated that
Kennedy was, however, arrested that day on an outstanding warrant for holding
himself out to be a lawyer.
Johnson testified that the office had signs advertising legal services. He
stated that a van parked in front of the office also had a large banner advertising
7
legal services. A photograph of the van introduced into evidence showed the
banner, which said, “We beat everybody’s price! Divorce Cheap Quick!” Johnson
testified that the license plates on the van were registered to Kennedy. Inside the
office, Johnson observed signs displayed on the walls indicating that legal services
were provided there. A photograph of Kennedy standing in the office in front of
the signs was admitted into evidence.
To support his motion to restore property, Kennedy offered his own
testimony. He claimed that he had not held himself out as an attorney while
working at the Harris County law office. In his testimony, Kennedy indicated that
he had worked at that location from 2005 to 2011 as a secretary assisting an
attorney. He stated that he would answer the telephone, set up appointments, and
fill out client interview sheets. Kennedy testified that he was paid a salary of less
than $25 per week at the law office.
Kennedy claimed that the $851,651.00 in cash found stuffed into garbage
bags in the storage locker was not related to the monetary amounts, totaling
$778,663.58, recorded in the ledger. Kennedy asserted that the cash found inside
the garbage bags was his life savings and represented money that he had earned
working since he was 12 years old. He stated that he had earned all of the money
before moving to Texas in 2004.
8
Kennedy asserted that he had been storing the cash with a person named
“Frank Madison” in Washington, D.C. Kennedy testified that he had retrieved the
money from Madison before going to Delaware for medical treatment. Kennedy
stated that Madison lived somewhere around the “7800 block of Washington,
D.C.”
Kennedy claimed that the $778,663.58 reflected in the ledger found in the
storage unit was money earned by the law firm for which he had worked as a
secretary. He stated that he had not received the money; rather, it had gone to the
attorney for whom he worked to pay for office rent and other business expenses.
On cross-examination, Kennedy admitted that his name was on the commercial
lease for the law office. The lease for the law office was admitted into evidence.
In its closing arguments, the State asserted that Kennedy was not entitled to
the funds held by the district attorney’s office because the evidence was sufficient
to show that Kennedy had obtained the funds illegally by falsely holding himself
out as a lawyer. In contrast, Kennedy asserted that the evidence had not
sufficiently connected the funds recovered in the storage unit to the offenses for
which he was convicted. He maintained that he was entitled to have the funds
restored to him because he had acquired them through legitimate means.
On August 10, 2012, the trial court signed its “Order on Motion for
Disposition of Stolen Property” in both trial court cause numbers. The court
9
rejected Kennedy’s request to restore the funds to him and made a number of
factual findings in the order. In the decretal portion of its order, the court ruled as
follows:
ORDERED that the rest and remainder of the APPROXIMATELY
$702,792.99 in United States currency, including all accrued interest
thereon, if any, be awarded to the Harris County District Attorney’s
Office, the party with superior right to possession of the property, as
set forth in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, for their official
purposes, all to be administered and disposed of in compliance with
Article 47.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Kennedy now appeals the order in each case. He presents two issues in
which he asserts that no evidence supports the trial court’s order.
Chapter 47
Kennedy initiated the underlying proceeding pursuant to Chapter 47 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 4 Chapter 47 provides a procedure by which a person
4
Although he was adamant in the trial court that Chapter 47—not the forfeiture
statutes—applied to the underlying proceedings, Kennedy now cites civil forfeiture law
to support his challenge to the trial court’s order. We note that similarities exist between
Chapter 47 and the civil forfeiture statutes; however, there are also significant
differences. The forfeiture statutes apply to contraband—property used in the
commission of crime or proceeds gained by the commission of a crime—that has been
seized by law enforcement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 59.01–.14 (Vernon
2006 & Supp. 2014). The civil forfeiture statutes are remedial in nature. See Fant v.
10
claiming an interest in stolen property, which is in the custody of a governmental
authority, may seek to obtain possession of the property. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. arts. 47.01–.12 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2014); see also York v. State,
373 S.W.3d 32, 43 (Tex. 2012) (stating that Chapter 47 authorizes a court to make
determination of possession of property); City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d
231, 234 (Tex. 2011) (explaining that party claiming lien interest in stolen property
seized by government authority can assert its interest by filling a Chapter 47
proceeding).
A question has arisen in the instant appeals regarding which provision of
Chapter 47 applies to the proceeding initiated by Kennedy in his motion to recover
property. Kennedy asserts that the proceeding was governed by Article 47.01a.
The State asserts that Article 47.02 applies. We agree with the State that Article
47.02 governs here.
Article 47.01a, the provision relied on by Kennedy, applies only to Chapter
47 proceedings occurring when a criminal action relating to the allegedly stolen
property is not pending. CRIM. PROC. art. 47.01a (Vernon 2006). In other words,
State, 931 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The statutes encourage property
owners to safeguard their property so it is not used for illegal purposes; this ensures that
persons do not profit from their illegal acts. See id. at 308. In contrast, Chapter 47 serves
to provide a procedure by which someone claiming a right of possession in stolen
property may seek to recover it from law enforcement officials by showing a legitimate
interest in the property. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 47.01–.12.
11
Article 47.01a applies when no indictment or information has been filed initiating a
criminal action. See Perry v. Breland, 16 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2000, pet. denied) (holding that Article 47.01a applies only to Chapter 47
proceedings occurring before filing of indictment or information); see also VSC,
347 S.W.3d at 235 (discussing utilization of Article 47.01a procedure to remedy
party’s claim to interest in motor vehicles seized by government; facts there show
no criminal action pending).
In contrast, if a criminal action is pending, jurisdiction to dispose of the
property lies with the trial court under article 47.02. See CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02;
Perry, 16 S.W.3d at 189. Article 47.02(a)’s express language allows the trial court
to restore stolen property to its owner during or after a criminal trial. CRIM. PROC.
art. 47.02(a); see, e.g., Nelms v. State, 761 S.W.2d 578, 579–80 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1988, no writ) (involving appeal by criminal defendant from trial court’s
order restoring stolen funds to their owners, pursuant to Article 47.02, after
defendant’s criminal trial). Specifically, Article 47.02(a) provides, “On the trial of
any criminal action for theft or any other offense involving the illegal acquisition
of property, the court trying the case shall order the property to be restored to the
person appearing by the proof to be the owner of the property.” CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 47.02(a). Here, the circumstances fit under the rubric of Article 47.02(a).
12
Kennedy filed his motion to restore property the same day that he pleaded
guilty to offenses of falsely holding himself out as an attorney and money
laundering. The trial court signed the judgments of conviction that day. The Court
of Criminal Appeals has made clear that a plea proceeding is considered a trial
under Texas law. Murray v. State, 302 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
In addition, the trial involved “the illegal acquisition of property.” See
CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(a). The record reflects that Kennedy pleaded guilty to
charges of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer and money laundering in an
amount of at least $200,000, which constituted the proceeds of falsely holding
himself out as a lawyer. Article 47.11 provides that Chapter 47 extends to property
acquired in any manner which makes the acquisition a penal offense. CRIM. PROC.
art. 47.11. Thus, we conclude that Article 47.02 governed the Chapter 47
13
proceeding to restore property initiated by Kennedy in these cases. 5 We now turn
to the merits of the appeals.6
Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, Kennedy raises two issues, asserting that there was “no
evidence,” that is, legally insufficient evidence, to support the trial court’s order
disposing of the currency.
A. Standard of Review
When the appellate record includes the reporter’s record, the trial court’s
factual findings, whether express or implied, may be challenged for legal and
factual sufficiency. See McMahon v. Zimmerman, 433 S.W.3d 680, 691 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We review the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a trial court’s challenged findings of fact by applying the same
5
Kennedy advocates for the application of criminal substantive law to the
underlying proceeding. However, a proceeding to restore property under Article 47.02 is
considered a civil case because it concerns the disposition of property. See A. Benjamini,
Inc. v. Dickson, 2 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.);
Four B’s Inc. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied); cf.
Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (dismissing appeal because Court
of Criminal Appeals lacks jurisdiction over appeals from order disposing of property
under 47.02, indicating that such proceeding was a civil matter over which it had no
jurisdiction).
6
The State asserts that the appeals should be dismissed because Kennedy did not
properly perfect his appeals from an Article 47.01a proceeding. See CRIM. PROC. art.
47.12 (defining procedure for appeal following an Article 47.01a hearing). We need not
reach this issue because we have determined that Article 47.02 applies here.
14
standards that we use in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jury
findings. See Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).
When deciding a legal-sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable
inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822
(Tex. 2005). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and
disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827.
The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable a reasonable and fair-minded
person to reach the verdict under review. Id.
B. Analysis 7
Pursuant to Article 47.02, “the court trying the case shall order the property
to be restored to the person appearing by proof to be the owner of the property.”
CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(a) (emphasis added). On appeal, Kennedy points to his
own testimony, explaining the origin of the cash found in the storage unit. He
indicates that his testimony establishes that he is the owner of the recovered
7
Much of Kennedy’s argument in his brief incorrectly presumes that Article 47.01a
governed the disposition of the funds. In addition, he cites law pertaining to civil
forfeiture to support his position. As mentioned, there are distinctions between civil
forfeiture proceedings and Chapter 47 proceedings. Nonetheless, to the extent possible
and applicable, we construe Kennedy’s legal-sufficiency challenges “reasonably, yet
liberally” to review the merits of his appeals. Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex.
2008). (“[A]ppellate courts should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably
possible.”).
15
currency and that he acquired it by legal means. In his brief, Kennedy summarizes
his testimony on this point as follows:
[Kennedy] explained that the money was his personal savings
collected over fifty-seven years in the workforce, including twenty-
four years of practicing law. Put simply, [Kennedy] explained that
money in the storage unit was collected “before this alleged criminal
event occurred.”
The cash seized by Delaware police never entered Texas,
according to [Kennedy]. Instead, [Kennedy] had stored the money in
Washington, D.C. with an acquaintance named Frank Madison while
he worked there, then picked it up once he left Texas and then took
the cash to Delaware with him. The reason that [Kennedy] stored the
money in cash rather than in a checking account was due to problems
he was experiencing with the IRS, which claimed [Kennedy] owed
approximately $3 million in back taxes.
Kennedy also points to his testimony in which he explained that the
monetary entries in the ledger, totaling $778,663.58, are unrelated to the cash
found in the storage unit. According to Kennedy, the ledger entries represent
money collected by the licensed attorney for whom he worked as a secretary. He
claimed that the names listed in the ledger were the clients of the licensed attorney.
Kennedy testified that he did not personally receive the monies reflected in the
ledger; rather, those funds went directly to pay the law office’s expenses, such as
rent.
As the factfinder in the Chapter 47 proceeding, the trial court was the sole
judge of Kennedy’s credibility and was permitted to resolve any inconsistencies in
the testimony. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).
16
Thus, it was the trial court’s prerogative to disbelieve Kennedy’s testimony
regarding the origin of the cash recovered from the storage unit. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 819; McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697.
In its order, the trial court found “that the approximately $702,792.99 in
United States currency was acquired by theft or other criminal acts as that term is
used Chapter 31 of the Texas Penal Code.” 8 From this express finding, it may be
implied that Kennedy was the person who had acquired the currency “by theft or
other criminal acts.” See Smith v. McDaniel, No. 12–12–00165–CV, 2013 WL
5302492, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing
that, “if the findings are not as definite and specific as they should be, a reviewing
court will consider not only the facts expressly found, but those that are implied
from those expressly found”). As the thief of the recovered currency, Kennedy
would not be a “person appearing by proof to be the owner of the property” under
Article 47.02. See CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(a). Accordingly, the trial court’s express
and implied findings support its rejection of Kennedy’s request to recover the
currency. See Nelms, 761 S.W.2d at 580 (holding that, despite the appellant’s
8
A person commits the offense of theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with
intent to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2014). Consent is not effective if induced by deception. Id. § 31.01(3) (Vernon
Supp. 2014). “Deception” includes “creating or confirming by words or conduct a false
impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction
. . . .” Id. § 31.01(1)(A). As mentioned, Kennedy pleaded guilty to the offense of falsely
holding oneself out as an attorney.
17
acquittal of the related criminal offense, the evidence nonetheless showed that the
appellant had “staged a robbery” related to the funds he sought to recover under
Article 47.02; thus, the trial court’s award of the funds to the original issuers of the
funds was supported by the evidence).
On appeal, Kennedy asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to
establish a link between the offenses of which he was convicted—falsely holding
oneself out as an attorney and money laundering—and the currency recovered
from the storage unit. We disagree.
The State offered adequate evidence from which a factfinder could
reasonably infer that the recovered cash was laundered funds unlawfully acquired
by Kennedy by falsely holding himself out as a lawyer. The record reflects that,
in 2009, Kennedy was arrested at his Harris County law office, where he admitted
working, on a warrant for the offense of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer.
Kennedy was the only person listed on the lease as renting the law office space. A
van parked in front of the office displayed a large banner, which read, “We beat
everybody’s price! Divorce Cheap Quick!” The license plates on the van were
registered to Kennedy.
The record further shows that Kennedy fled Texas, while out on bond,
ending up in Delaware. The Delaware police arrested Kennedy in August 2011 as
a fugitive. There, the police obtained a search warrant for his Delaware storage
18
unit. In the unit, the police recovered trash bags stuffed with over $800,000 in
cash. Along with the cash, the police found numerous other documents and
paperwork, a number of which appeared to correspond to the operation of a law
practice. These included “Attorney at Law Divorce Interview Sheets,” three of
which were admitted into evidence. These indicated that client information and
payment had been received from those persons.
Along with the cash in the storage locker, the police also recovered a ledger,
listing hundreds of names and corresponding monetary entries. The monetary
entries totaled $778,663.58. The entries covered the period of July 2009 through
June 2011. Kennedy admitted that he worked at the Harris County law office from
2005 until 2011. Lastly, the records shows Kennedy pleaded guilty to falsely
holding himself out as a lawyer and to laundering funds in an amount of at least
$200,000. In so doing, he stipulated to, and confessed as true, the facts alleged in
the corresponding indictments.
From the evidence, the trial court, as the factfinder, could have reasonably
inferred that Kennedy unlawfully earned a minimum of $778,663.58 by falsely
holding himself out as an attorney at his Harris County law office and then fled to
Delaware with the currency. 9 We conclude that the evidence could have enabled a
9
Kennedy also asserts that the evidence is insufficient because there is a difference
in the total amount of money seized from the storage unit ($851,651.00) and the total
19
reasonable and fair-minded person to find that Kennedy acquired “approximately
$702,792.99 in United States currency . . . by theft or other criminal acts,” as found
by the trial court.10 See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. We hold that the
evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s order disposing of the
property and implicitly refusing to award the currency to Kennedy. See CRIM.
PROC. art. 47.02(a); Nelms, 761 S.W.2d 578, 579–80.
We overrule Kennedy’s first and second issues in each appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s August 10, 2012 order in each appellate cause.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
amount of money reflected in the ledger ($778,663.58). This difference is $72,987.42.
As mentioned, the ledger entries cover the period of June 2009 to July 2011. By his own
testimony, Kennedy worked at the Harris County law office from 2005 to 2011. Thus,
the evidence supports an inference that Kennedy unlawfully acquired the additional
$72,987.42 by falsely holding himself out as a lawyer in the period preceding the entries
in the ledger. Moreover, in its order, the trial court found that $702,792.99 had been
acquired by theft or other criminal acts. This amount is less than the total amount
contained in the ledger. And, as mentioned, the balance of the $851,651.00 recovered
from the storage unit was seized by the IRS for taxes owed by Kennedy.
10
Because this finding supports the trial court’s judgment, we need not address
Kennedy’s challenges to the other findings made by the trial court in its order. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.1. We note that Kennedy has asserted that the State’s evidence failed to
meet some of the requirements of Article 47.01a; however, as discussed, that is not the
governing provision in these cases.
20
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Sharp.
21