Justin Baker Haile v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-14-00482-CR
Justin Baker Haile, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY, 424TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 9552, THE HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING
OPINION
On April 25, 2003, pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant Justin Baker Haile pleaded
guilty to the misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,500.
See Tex. Penal Code § 31.03. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced
appellant to serve 80 days in the county jail, with credit for time served, and to pay a fine of $2,000,
court costs of $253, and restitution in the amount of $1,463.50. See id. § 12.21. No appeal was
taken. On June 27, 2014, appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss Court Costs and Fines Due to
Indigency, which the trial court subsequently denied after conducting a hearing. The notice of appeal
appellant filed in this Court indicates that he is attempting to appeal the trial court’s ruling denying
this motion. We do not have jurisdiction over such an appeal.
In Texas, appeals in a criminal case are permitted only when they are specifically
authorized by statute. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see
Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[A] defendant’s right of appeal is
a statutorily created right.”). The standard for determining whether an appellate court has
jurisdiction to hear and determine a case “is not whether the appeal is precluded by law, but whether
the appeal is authorized by law.” Blanton v. State, 369 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
(quoting Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); State ex rel. Lykos,
330 S.W.3d at 915.
In his Motion to Dismiss Court Costs and Fines Due to Indigency, appellant relied
on article 43.091 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits a trial court to “waive
payment of a fine or court costs imposed on a defendant who defaults in payment” if the court
determines that the statutory alternative methods of discharging the fine or costs would impose
undue hardship on the defendant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 43.091. We note, however, that
appellant did not seek a waiver of payment, but rather a dismissal of the fines and court costs
altogether, which is akin to requesting a modification of the previously imposed judgment.
Nevertheless, even assuming the trial court’s ruling was pursuant to article 43.091, that statute does
not authorize an appeal of the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding the waiver of payment.
We have found no constitutional or statutory provision granting Texas courts of
appeals jurisdiction over a trial court’s post-judgment ruling denying a motion to dismiss court costs
and fines, as appellant filed here, or a ruling declining to waive the payment of previously imposed
court costs and fines under article 43.091. Therefore, we hold that we lack jurisdiction over
appellant’s appeal of the trial court’s ruling in this case. See Staley v. State, 233 S.W.3d 337, 338
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (defendant’s appeal dismissed because it was not authorized by law); see
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also Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“It is axiomatic that a party
may appeal only that which the Legislature has authorized.”).
Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.
P. 43.2(f).
__________________________________________
J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Rose and Goodwin
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: November 14, 2014
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